



Western Cape
Government

Community Safety



POLICING NEEDS AND PRIORITIES 2019
Secretariat for Safety and Security

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF ACRONYMS	4
FOREWORD BY THE WESTERN CAPE MINISTER OF COMMUNITY SAFETY	6
1. INTRODUCTION	8
1.1. Mandate and programmes of the Department of Community Safety	9
1.2. Public consultations to determine the PNPs	11
2. PROFESSIONAL POLICING IN THE WESTERN CAPE	13
2.1. Measuring professional policing	14
2.2. Evidence-based professional policing	16
3. CRIME, HARM AND SAFETY IN THE WESTERN CAPE	17
3.1. Priority crime	18
3.2. Reducing violence by reducing murder	22
3.2.1. Murder: contributing factors	24
3.2.2. Murder: day, time and tool	25
3.3. Attempted murder	25
3.4. Gang-related murder and attempted murder	26
3.5. Robbery	28
4. RESPONDING TO PRIORITY CRIME IN THE WESTERN CAPE	32
4.1. Policing informal areas (and where crime occurs)	32
4.1.1. Where crime occurs	33
4.1.2. Sector policing and the focused policing of informal neighbourhoods	34
4.2. Gender-based and domestic violence	36
4.2.1. DVA station audits	40
4.3. Violence, alcohol and the Alcohol Harms Reduction Game Changer	45
4.3.1. AHR developments during 2016/2017	47
4.3.2. Reported crime and PNP feedback in AHR pilot areas	48
4.4. Gang-related crime and the provincial response to the National Anti-Gangsterism Strategy	52

5. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS OF THE POLICING NEEDS AND PRIORITIES PUBLIC CONSULTATIONS, 2017/2018	57
5.1. Target group	57
5.2. Structure of the workshops	58
5.3. Safety confidence scorecard	59
5.4. Non-plenary group discussions	59
5.5. Limitations	59
6. RESULTS OF THE PNP SAFETY CONFIDENCE SCORECARD	60
6.1. Participants	60
6.2. Contact with the Criminal Justice System	61
6.3. Professional policing	63
6.4. Perceptions of safety in public spaces and at home	65
6.5. Partnerships	68
7. SUMMARY OF KEY PNP CONCERNS AND SAFETY PLANS	70
8. THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE AND THE WESTERN CAPE COMMUNITY	91
8.1. Overview	91
8.2. Strategy and performance	92
8.2.1. Performance environment	92
8.2.2. Organisational environment	92
8.2.3. Areas of strategic focus	93
8.3. Human resource utilisation	95
8.4. Management interventions	96
8.5. Provincial instructions and tools	97
8.6. The Visible Policing environment	98
8.7. Specialised units	99
8.7.1. Anti-Corruption Section and Unit	100
8.7.2. Stock theft and endangered species	100
8.8. Detection rate	100
8.9. Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences	104

9. SELECT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS RELEVANT TO DEMOCRATIC AND PROFESSIONAL POLICING: DATA AND COMMENTARY	105
10. POLICE CONDUCT	112
10.1. The office of the Western Cape Police Ombudsman	112
10.2. Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID)	115
10.3. SAPS-recorded complaints	116
10.4. Disproportionate complaints in the Western Cape	118
10.5. Civil litigation, accidents and absenteeism	118
10.6. Watching Briefs	120
11. POLICE RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION	121
11.1. SAPS human resource management in the Western Cape	122
11.1.1. The THRR, FE and actual resource allocation per station	124
11.1.2. Problematic areas pertaining to THRR input audit sheets	124
11.1.3. Constraints that impact the utilisation of human resources	125
11.2. Vehicle allocation	125
11.3. Reservists	125
11.4. Conclusion	126
11.5. Recommendations	126
11.5.1. What if systems were made more efficient?	128
12. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS	129
12.1. Comments	129
12.2. Recommendations	130
13. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	134

TABLE OF ACRONYMS

AFU	Asset Forfeiture Unit
AHR	Alcohol Harms Reduction
AVL	Automated Vehicle Locator
CBO	Community-based Organisation
CID	City/Central Improvement District
CoCT	City of Cape Town
CAP	Community Action Plan
CJS	Criminal Justice System
CSF	Community Safety Forum
CPF	Community Police Forum
CSC	Community Service Centre
CSF	Community Safety Forum
CSIP	Community Safety Improvement Partnership
DoCS	Department of Community Safety
DPCI	Directorate of Priority Crimes and Investigation (Hawks)
DVA	Domestic Violence Act
EHW	Employee Health and Wellness
EMS	Emergency Medical Services
EPP	Expanded Partnership Programme
FBO	Faith-based Organisation
FCS	Family, Child and Sexual Offences Unit (SAPS)
FIC	Financial Intelligence Centre
GBH	Grievous Bodily Harm
IDZ	Industrial Development Zone
IPV	Intimate Partner Violence
LG	Local Government
MURP	Mayoral Urban Renewal Programme
NAGS	National Anti-Gangsterism Strategy

NDMP	National Drug Master Plan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NICOC	National Intelligence Coordinating Committee
NHW	Neighbourhood Watch
NI	SAPS National Instruction
NPA	National Prosecuting Authority
NPO	Non-profit Organisation
PEP	Performance Enhancement Process
POCA	Prevention of Organised Crime Act
POP	Public Order Police
PNP	Policing Needs and Priorities
SAPS	South African Police Service
SBM	Saldanha Bay Municipality
SBM LDAC	Saldanha Bay Municipal Local Drug Action Committee
SCC	Serious Commercial Crime
SOC	Serious Organised Crime
SOCIU	Serious Organised Crime Investigating Units
SOP	Standard Operation Procedure
VCP	Vehicle Check Points
VEP	Victim Empowerment Programme
VPUU	Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading
WHO	World Health Organisation
WC	Western Cape
YEP	Youth Empowerment Programme

FOREWORD BY THE WESTERN CAPE MINISTER OF COMMUNITY SAFETY

It is an honour to present the Policing Needs and Priorities (PNP) report for the Western Cape for 2019. This comprehensive document represents the Department of Community Safety's efforts to determine the policing needs and priorities of the Western Cape within the broader context of policing and crime within South Africa.

Section 206(1) of the Constitution stipulates that the cabinet minister (national) responsible for policing must determine the national policing policy after consulting the provincial governments, taking into account the policing needs and priorities of the provinces as determined by the provincial executives.

This year's report, compiled under the leadership of my predecessor, MEC Dan Plato, sets it apart from previous years' findings as we continue to analyse beyond mere observations and perceptions in communities, but also aim to look at the impact of our combined responses on the crime situation in our communities.

To this extent, this document for the first time takes a closer look at professional policing in the Western Cape; the focus, performance and organisational environment of the SAPS in the province; policing complaints, as well as policing resource distribution.

The PNP Report 2019 identifies the provincial safety needs, concerns and priorities in accordance with the Department's Community Safety Improvement Partnership (CSIP), which focuses on the promotion of professional policing, making all public buildings and spaces safe, establishing viable safety partnerships within communities and reducing alcohol-related injuries. Within this context, the community safety plans have already been updated and distributed back to their implementing custodians.

For this reporting period, we focused our attention for the PNP determination on five areas – through community-based consultative workshops in 2017 in Manenberg, Gunya, Saldanha, Khayelitsha and Paarl East – to better align to the Provincial Joint Planning Initiative with participating municipalities entering into Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) with the Department to formalise cooperation and implementation of the safety plans.

Safety is everyone's responsibility and together with all safety role players – specifically the police, municipalities, community police forums, neighbourhood watches and communities – the Department will continue to monitor and promote

the implementation of all safety plans across the province through the Expanded Partnership Programme (EPP) matching grants applications.

I would like to express my sincere thanks to everyone who participated in the determination workshops and to the dedicated staff of the Department of Community Safety for their continued commitment in service of the people of the province. I thank the South African Police Service, the Community Policing Forums, Neighbourhood Watches, various representatives from different spheres of government, non-governmental organisations, faith-based organisations, the private sector, private security safety partners and every community member for their support.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Adv Fritz', with a light blue circular stamp behind it.

Adv Albert Fritz

**Minister for Community Safety
Western Cape Province**

1. INTRODUCTION

The Policing Needs and Priorities Report stems from constitutional and legislative obligations placed on the Minister of the Executive Council (MEC) for Community Safety. The national Minister of Police is obliged in terms of Section 206(1) of the Constitution to determine national policing policy after consulting provincial governments. The identified policing needs and priorities are of utmost importance, as they must be taken into account when resource allocation to provinces is considered. The Constitution also provides that national policing policy may make provision for different policies based on the policing needs and priorities of each province. The Western Cape Community Safety Act, No 3 of 2013, obliges the Provincial Minister responsible for policing, the MEC for Community Safety, to determine the policing needs and priorities on an annual basis, to advise the Provincial Cabinet on these and to make recommendations to the National Minister. The MEC can also evaluate whether policing needs and priorities are reflected in national policing policy.

Section 23 of the Community Safety Act further requires the MEC to report annually to the Provincial Parliament on his findings and submit the report to the Standing Committee on Community Safety. After affording the Provincial Commissioner of Police an opportunity to comment on the report, the Provincial Minister must formulate recommendations on the policing needs and priorities for the province for the approval by the Provincial Cabinet. The approved report must be submitted to the national Minister of Police to be taken into account when the policing policies and plans for the province are formulated, as contemplated in sections 206(1) and (2) of the Constitution. He must do this after submitting the report for consideration and debate to the Standing Committee for Community Safety.

The Department of Community Safety (DoCS) has traditionally used a series of consultative workshops to determine the provincial policing needs and priorities (PNPs). During the 2017/2018 financial year, it held consultative workshops in six policing precincts where it determined the stakeholder perceptions of crime, safety and policing needs and priorities. These have been summarised in this report, along with the results of the Community Safety Scorecard – a perception survey that was completed by participants at the PNP workshops.

DoCS also engaged in desktop research to analyse key trends, developments and concerns regarding policing in the Western Cape. The state of policing in the province is assessed against key principles of democratic and professional policing. The report looks at issues such as police performance, resourcing, and the use of specialised units. It also highlights key priority crimes in the province and recommends ways to respond to them.

Together, this information constitutes the Department's assessment of the state of policing in the province based on the policing needs and priorities.

1.1 Mandate and programmes of the Department of Community Safety

Sections 206(1), (2) and (3) of the Constitution give the Provincial Minister powers and functions to monitor the conduct and oversee the effectiveness of policies and directives implemented by the police, and to promote good relations between the police and communities.

The Western Cape Community Safety Act, which came into effect in October 2016, sets out the mandate of the Department. Broadly, the Department's mandate is to monitor police conduct and oversee the effectiveness of the police, and promote good relations between the community and the police. This PNP report therefore focuses its attention on policing in the Western Cape.

Section 3 of the Community Safety Act obliges the MEC for Community Safety, amongst other things, to monitor the effectiveness and efficiency of the police service; to analyse the competency and capacity of the police service; to receive and analyse information about the funding, expenditure, activities, outputs and outcomes of policing; to review the practices and patterns of policing; to identify problems and shortcomings; and to identify the policing needs and priorities of the province.

Drawing from the National Development Plan Outcome 3, envisioning that "All people in South Africa are and feel safe", the Provincial Strategic Goal 3 (PSG3) of the Western Cape Government seeks to increase wellness and safety and reduce social ills.

The Community Safety Improvement Partnership (CSIP) was designed to give effect to these policy directives, following the "whole of society" approach to safety and policing.

The CSIP programme has the following outcomes and interventions constituting the Department's basket of services:

a) Promotion of professional policing through effective oversight:

- Via the Western Cape Police Ombudsman, effectively deal with service delivery complaints from communities.
- Regularly inspect police stations to measure the state of policing against pre-determined service standards, the results reported and followed up, in order to assess whether or not the situation has improved.
- Expand the Watching Briefs Programme to monitor police conduct and efficiency in courts, particularly in respect of drug-related and violent crime.
- Brief the public on official crime rates in police precincts that fall within the 16 clusters through the Policing Needs and Priorities (PNP) workshops.

- Influence the alignment of safety resources in accordance with community needs and priorities identified at the PNP workshops.

b) To make all public buildings and spaces safe:

- Provide safety and security support and advice to WCG departments and conduct oversight functions.
- Evaluate and report on the state of safety and security in public buildings and spaces, and recommend solutions (SSRA).
- Manage the provisioning of internal and external guarding services within the CBD.
- Sharing of best practices, methodologies and knowledge with WCG departments and municipalities in support of their efforts to secure public buildings and spaces.
- Establish a formal partnership (MoU) with local government aimed at achieving an alignment of safety resources and methodologies in order to increase safety.
- Deploy safety kiosks in priority areas in partnership with law enforcement personnel to create safe areas within communities. Safety kiosks provide communities with a visible access point to law enforcement, and provide basic services such as certification of documents and reliable communication with emergency services and law enforcement.
- Form partnerships with WCG-accredited Neighbourhood Watch Structures (NHW) to promote safe and secure public buildings and spaces.

c) To establish viable safety partnerships in communities:

- Utilise the Western Cape Expanded Partnership Programme (EPP) to strengthen Community Police Forums (CPF's), thus enabling them to perform their civilian oversight function.
- Establish a database of community-based organisations working for safety with a view to creating strategic partnerships.
- Create opportunities for communities to identify safety challenges and possible solutions through outreach programmes.
- Formalise partnerships with municipalities through the Joint Planning Initiative (JPI) programme.
- Mobilise the religious fraternity, through the Youth Safety and Religion Programme (YSRP), to host programmes for children and youth, especially during school holidays.
- Recruit youth from crime-affected communities and provide appropriate training via the Chrysalis Youth Academy. Deploy trained youth back to their communities with remuneration from the Department via its EPWP Youth Work Programme.

- Formalise safety partnerships through the neighbourhood watch safety model services.

d) To reduce alcohol-related injuries:

- The effective regulation of liquor outlets through improved law enforcement to ensure compliance with standards and norms.
- The effective capacitation and accreditation of NHW structures to work with government and other partners in reducing alcohol-related harms.
- The provision of mobile safety kiosks to serve as contact points for law enforcement support.
- The provision of support services from the departments of Cultural Affairs and Sport (DCAS), Economic Development and Tourism (DEDAT), Social Development (DSD) and Health (DoH).
- The promotion of behavioural change via the methodology of “teachable moments” at Emergency Centres.
- The provision of attractive recreational and economic alternatives that enhance a sense of safety.
- Understanding the alcohol distribution chain to reduce the number of unregulated outlets, thereby creating a “responsible alcohol economy”.

From 2016 to 2018, the Alcohol Harms Reduction Programme (AHR) was limited to the priority areas of Paarl East, Town Two in Khayelitsha, and Gugulethu/Nyanga.

The CSIP programme formed the backbone around which the policing needs and priorities were determined and the community safety plan was developed.

1.2 Public consultations to determine the PNPs

Public consultations are key to the determination of PNPs. Not only do they provide a platform for stakeholders to communicate their policing concerns and desires to the MEC and the Department, but they enable discussion of issues with other stakeholders, including representatives of the South African Police Service (SAPS), local and provincial government, municipalities, local law enforcement agencies, and community representatives. The Department’s partners, such as members of community police forums (CPF) and neighbourhood watches, are also invited.

The consultative workshops are in keeping with policy directives such as the White Paper on Transforming Service Delivery in South Africa (Batho Pele White Paper) which requires consultation with residents around the delivery of public services.

For the past several years, the Western Cape Department of Community Safety (DoCS) has annually embarked on a public consultation process to determine

the province's Policing Needs and Priorities (PNPs). Public engagements were previously held within each policing cluster (16 in total), with participation by key stakeholders either involved in policing, victim support, crime prevention and community safety or who have influence over policing resource allocations, including the South African Police Service at cluster and precinct level.

For the 2017/2018 financial year, the Western Cape Government earmarked four priority areas where improved service delivery and integrated planning would take place through coordinated service delivery to improve safety levels and the quality of life of residents. This involves intersectoral consultation, cooperation and collaboration, effective and integrated service delivery and community engagement and accountability at a local, provincial and national level as an imperative for building safer communities. The Department, as a key role player in the province, also focused on these geographic areas. The 2017 PNP consultative workshops were held in the focal areas. The focus was initially on four priority areas: Khayelitsha, Gunya (Gugulethu and Nyanga), Saldanha Bay and Paarl East, but was later expanded to include Manenberg and Hanover Park. A consultative workshop was also held in Riebeeck West, which falls outside the priority areas.

The Department aimed to collaborate with the CPF, SAPS, municipality and local law enforcement, as well as other role players to determine local policing needs and priorities and develop local-level safety plans for implementation in each area. The Department will closely monitor the implementation of the safety plans.

In 2017, in an effort to increase safety through a whole of society approach, the Department assisted communities in each focus area to develop a localised safety plan after the local policing needs and priorities were identified.

This plan will inform the funding decisions of the Department, the local municipality, local councillors and CPFs, and all other relevant role players, as well as the interventions required to increase safety levels at a local level.



2. PROFESSIONAL POLICING IN THE WESTERN CAPE

Policing is central to contemporary life. Individuals, communities and governments look to police to bring about the safety and order that are necessary for them to flourish. Through their work, police organisations and their officers label bodies, judge actions, and distribute and redistribute opportunities and sanctions to the people and communities with which they engage. It is important, therefore, that police organisations and officers are broadly trusted and perceived as legitimate authorities, and are held accountable for their work. Key to both police accountability and efficacy are partnerships with communities and other public and private entities.

The police mandate is vast and the demands placed on officers unending. As the most visible manifestation of the state on the street, police are expected to maintain public order, protect and respect individual and community rights, prevent and investigate crime and respond to requests for assistance with speed and courtesy.¹ As a result, police work is necessarily discretionary work. Decisions at the organisational level, such as which police resources should be deployed, where and how they should be used, as well as street-level decisions, such as which streets to patrol and when to fire a service weapon, have great bearing on peoples' lives. This is particularly relevant in contexts of inequality where policing can increase, sustain or help to dismantle social and economic injustices.

The Western Cape province and South Africa are among the most unequal political communities on earth.² They also generate high rates of violent and property crime, leaving many people feeling vulnerable.³ In such contexts, the least that must be expected of police is that they not increase inequalities or injustice.⁴ Instead, they should abide by and promote the rule of law, engage with all people with courtesy and respect, and be responsive and accountable to the public.⁵ This is, however, easier said than done.

Police work inevitably involves the breaking of some rules to enforce others. For instance, when police use force, they contradict the state's claim to value peace. For such force to be defensible, therefore, it must be shown to advance the democratic project, rather than impede it. Police can achieve this, in part, by

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- 1 OSCE. (2008). *OSCE Guidebook on Democratic Policing*, Vienna: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
 - 2 World Bank. (2016). *Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2016: Taking on Inequality*. Available at: <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/25078/9781464809583.pdf>, accessed 18 February 2018.
 - 3 Statistics South Africa. (2017). *Victims of Crime Survey 2016/2017*; Department of Community Safety. (2016). *Provincial Policing Needs and Priorities (PNP) 2015/2016 Report*, Western Cape Government; Department of Community Safety. (2017). *Provincial Policing Needs and Priorities (PNP) 2016/2017 Report*, Western Cape Government.
 - 4 Manning, P. (2010). *Democratic Policing in a Changing World*. Abingdon: Routledge.
 - 5 OSCE. (2008). *OSCE Guidebook on Democratic Policing*. Vienna: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

accounting for what they do, striving to earn public support, and by systematically learning from experience.⁶

This report is a key example of police accountability in action.

As illustrated in the report of the Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry and the subsequent advocacy of the Social Justice Coalition (SJC), and as is evident in increased incidents of violent crime – including murder – on Cape Town’s Cape Flats, police and other law enforcers working in the province play a key role in the manifestation of safety and risk.

2.1 Measuring professional policing

To mitigate the potential for police to cause harm, the policies and plans of police organisations and the activities and conduct of their officers must be open to public review and scrutiny. Wherever possible, policing must be carried out with the consent of the communities in which they work. This requires the fostering of partnerships and communicating of intent, action and foreseeable impact in every police operation or encounter.⁷ Professional policing should be based on principles of the sort outlined in Table 1, and police organisations’ efforts at attaining these should be measurable using indicators that can be independently reviewed and tracked over time. Having reliable data about crime and measures of public confidence is therefore key to professional policing. These data should feed the development of police policies and operational guidelines. Setting clear and fair performance indicators against which officers are assessed at regular intervals can help to identify and reward professional conduct for future emulation, as well as unprofessional conduct or abuse of power requiring intervention. This is one of the reasons for the DoCS’s emphasis on professional policing.



6 Stone, C. & Travis, J. (2011). *Towards a new professionalism in policing*. Harvard KSG and National Institute of Justice.

7 Jones, T. et al. (1996). 'Policing and the Idea of Democracy', *British Journal of Criminology*, 36/2: p. 182-198.

Table 1: Core principles of professional policing and related indicators⁸

Principles of democratic and professional policing	Examples indicator
The basic mission of the police is to improve the safety and well-being of all people by promoting measures that prevent crime, harm and disorder.	Feelings of safety and perceptions of police legitimacy; evidence of proactive and responsive (dis)order management, conflict resolution and problem solving
The police must undertake their basic mission with the approval of, and in collaboration with, the public and other agencies.	Trust, confidence and satisfaction with police, evidence of collaboration, honest communication, and sharing of data
The police must seek to carry out their tasks in ways that contribute to social cohesion and solidarity.	Measures of community trust, identity and cohesion
The police must treat all those with whom they engage with fairness and respect. When not interacting with people, they should, through their actions, demonstrate respect for public space and the rule of law.	Trust, confidence and satisfaction with police, including among individuals and groups in regular conflict with the law. Vehicle use data (e.g. speeding), complaints
The police must be answerable to the law and democratically responsive to the people they serve.	Effective, independent monitoring and oversight of police, use of mechanisms to address abuse of power, law and rights
The police must be organised to achieve the optimal balance between effectiveness, cost-efficiency, accountability and responsiveness.	Systems that democratically, transparently and regularly determine a just balance of resourcing and action across police precincts, divisions and units
All police work should be informed by the best available evidence.	Demonstrable use and revision of evidence-based practices by both managers and frontline police officials
Policing is undertaken by many providers, but remains a public good.	Police resources are used in service of all, but foremost for the most vulnerable

As this report illustrates, the Western Cape Department of Community Safety (DoCS) has put in place mechanisms to measure these very principles through its Policing Needs and Priorities Programme and related monitoring systems.

⁸ Adapted from: Independent Police Commission. (2013). *Policing for a better Britain*. See also: Loader, I. (2016) "In Search of Civic Policing: Recasting the 'Peelian' Principles", *Criminal Law and Philosophy*, 10:427-440.

2.2 Evidence-based professional policing

Central to the partnerships and police-community focus of professional policing, is managing public expectations of the police. An incomplete but growing body of work, predominantly based on data and analysis from high-income countries, shows that the standard model of policing characterised by across-the-board random patrol, rapid response and follow-up investigation, has limited impact on general crime.⁹ Nor is it apparent from current evidence that generally increasing police numbers (e.g. at a national or municipal level) reduces incidents of offending,¹⁰ although these are the things communities often demand. This is not to say that communities do not have a right to police services – of course they do – but for policing to be most efficient, both public and police decisions must be based on an understanding of what actually works, rather than on emotion or intuition alone. This includes accepting that detectives cannot solve most cases,¹¹ and that it is not rational to try to provide all people with the same degree of service. Through such understanding, together with communication and partnerships, customised, targeted interventions can be implemented where they are most needed. It is these interventions that are most likely to reduce crime and promote order.¹²

In terms of democratic fiscal management, careful consideration must be given to whether overall harm reduction and safety provision is most economically achieved by investing in law enforcement over other sectors.¹³ For example, a growing body of evidence suggests that early childhood development and parenting interventions are pivotal to growing healthy, non-violent citizens. By implication, money is better spent on parenting, health and welfare interventions than on criminal justice.¹⁴ And yet, law enforcement and policing is key to establishing and maintaining orderly public spaces in which children can play while parents relax, and through which parents travel to work without fear of crime.

9 Skogan, W. & Frydl, K. (eds). (2004). *Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: The Evidence Committee to Review Research on Police Policy and Practices*, National Research Council.

10 Eck, J. E., & Maguire, E. R. (2006). 'Have Changes in Policing Reduced Violent Crime? An Assessment of the Evidence'. In A. Blumstein & J. Wallman (Eds.), *The Crime Drop in America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Bradford, B. (2011). *Police numbers and crime rates – a rapid evidence review*. Available at: <https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/media/police-numbers-and-crime-rates-rapid-evidence-review-20110721.pdf>.

11 Braga, A. (2015). *New Perspectives in Policing: Crime and Policing Revisited*. Harvard Kennedy School & National Institute of Justice, p. 4-5.

12 Abt, T. & Winship, C. (2016). *What works in reducing community violence: a meta-review and field study for the Northern Triangle*, USAID & Democracy International; Skogan, W. and Frydl, K. (eds). (2004). *Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: The Evidence Committee to Review Research on Police Policy and Practices*, National Research Council.; Sherman, L.W., Gottfredson, D., Mackenzie, D., Eck, J. Reuter, P., Bushway, S. (1997). *Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising: A Report to the United States Congress*. Available at: <https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=165366>.

13 See for example: Levitt, S. & Miles, T. (2006). 'Economic contributions to the understanding of crime', *Annual Review of Law & Social Science*, 2, pp. 147-64; Chalfin, A. & McCrary, J. (2013). *The Effect of Police on Crime: New Evidence from U.S. Cities, 1960-2010*. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 18815. Available at: <http://www.nber.org/papers/w18815>.

14 WHO. (2010). *Violence Prevention: The Evidence*. Geneva: WHO; WHO. (2015). *Preventing youth violence: an overview of the evidence*. Geneva: WHO.

Money spent must also produce results. The largest piece of South Africa's budget pie is always education, and rightly so. But the public school system continues to let down millions of children each year by failing to equip them with the skills to complete school, let alone the knowledge required to thrive in a post-school South Africa. Similarly, police and their overseers should be able to measure and quantify the costs and impact of various purchases and actions in order to justify their continuation or revise or abandon them.¹⁵

3. CRIME, HARM AND SAFETY IN THE WESTERN CAPE

The Western Cape SAPS recorded a reduction of 3,5% in respect of All Priority Crime (17 Community Reported Crimes) in 2016/2017, after declines in nine of the 17 categories. This is a continuation of a decline that began in 2014/2015, illustrated in Figure 1. It includes drops in reported assault, rape and attempted murder.¹⁶ Despite this positive trend, incidents of murder, among other crimes, increased over the same period. When murder counts increase but attempted murder counts decrease, it suggests either a shift in mode of violence or in police report taking.¹⁷




15 Braga, A. (2015). *New Perspectives in Policing: Crime and Policing Revisited*. Harvard Kennedy School & National Institute of Justice; Sherman, L.W. (2013). 'The Rise of Evidence-Based Policing: Targeting, Testing, and Tracking'. *Crime and Justice*, 32(1), p. 377-451.

16 SAPS. (2017). *Western Cape Annual Report 2016/2017*. Pretoria: SAPS.

17 In other words, acts that police may have recorded as attempted-murder in previous years, may now be recorded as assault GBH. In this case, one would expect to see an increase in reported assaults, which we do not. See Table 1. See also: Bruce, D. (2010). 'The ones in the pile were the ones going down: the reliability of violent crime statistics', *SA Crime Quarterly*, No. 31, p. 9-17.

3.1 Priority crime


Figure 1: All Priority Crime (Western Cape), 2007/2008 - 2016/2017



Source: SAPS WC Annual Report 2016/2017

Figure 2 shows the breakdown of priority crime by category. Thirty-two percent of recorded priority crime was contact crime, 31% other serious crime, 29% property crime and 8% contact-related crime. That the bulk of recorded priority offenses are contact crimes is concerning. These offences involve threatening or violent contact between perpetrators and victims and occur most likely to erode people’s sense of safety.

Figure 2: Priority crime by category 2015/2016 - 2016/2017



Source: SAPS WC Annual Report 2016/2017

Table 2 illustrates changes in priority crimes reported in the province between 2015/2016 and 2016/2017. It shows a 2,7% increase in murder, but decreases in attempted murder (-1,7%), assault GBH (-4,4%) and assault common (-3,5%).


Table 2: Priority crime in the Western Cape year on year change, 2015/2016 – 2016/2017

Category	% Change
Murder	2,7
Attempted murder	-1,7
Assault GBH	-4,4
Assault common	-3,5
Aggravated robbery	1,3
Common robbery	0,7
Sexual offences	-0,2
Arson	3,2
Malicious damage to property	0
Burglary non-residential	-6,1
Burglary residential	-3,2
Theft of motor vehicle/bike	-11,9
Stock theft	2,8
All theft not mentioned elsewhere	-6,6
Commercial crime	6,7
Shoplifting	7,9

Source: SAPS WC Annual Report 2016/2017

There is no immediate explanation for this. When murder increases, one might expect attempted murder and assault GBH to also increase. That this is not reflected in the figures, suggests the declines may be a result of people not reporting crime rather than there being fewer crimes perpetrated. However, successive victim surveys, which more accurately reflect crime trends than police statistics, confirm a relatively rapid decline in both household and individual crime in the Western Cape from 2013/2014 to 2016/2017, as illustrated in Figures 3 and 4. Despite these declines, victimisation rates remain higher in the Western Cape than in any other province.


Figure 3: Household victimisation rate (%), Western Cape & RSA 2013/2014 – 2016/2017



Source: Statistics South Africa, Victims of Crime Survey 2016/17, p. 6.

Figure 3 shows that in 2014/2015, 13,9% of households in the Western Cape reported being a victim of crime in the preceding year, compared to just 9% in 2016/2017.

Figure 4: Individual victimisation rate (%), Western Cape & RSA, 2013/2014 – 2016/2017



Source: Statistics South Africa, Victims of Crime Survey 2016/17, p. 7.

Figure 4 shows a similar decline in crime beginning in 2013/2014 when 7,6% of individuals reported experiencing crime in the preceding year, compared to 5,4% in 2016/2017. It should be stressed that these victims need not have reported their victimisation to police for it to appear in this data. Victim survey data corroborates broad trends in SAPS statistics, and suggests they are generally accurate.

Table 3: Crime rates per 100 000 residents for selected categories of contact crime, South Africa and the Western Cape

Year	RSA Murder	WC Murder	RSA Attempted Murder	WC Attempted Murder	RSA Assault GBH	WC Assault GBH	RSA Common Assault	WC Common Assault	RSA Common Robbery	WC Common Robbery	RSA Rape	WC Rape	RSA Sexual Assault	WC Sexual Assault
2007/08	37,6	53,5	38,1	34,5	468,6	399,8	612,3	131,5	160,9					
2008/09	36,4	43,3	36,5	32,4	425,2	384,1	582,3	118,4	155,3	94	95,3	12,9	30,6	
2009/10	33,3	41,1	34,3	30,7	433,4	387,3	618,9	113,2	170,4	95,9	111,9	13,2	35,9	
2010/11	31,1	40,9	30,01	38,1	436,8	360,8	586,5	106,7	183,5	94,4	110,1	13,7	32,8	
2011/12	30,1	39,8	28,5	40,1	427,2	348,1	596,8	101,6	192,3	90,9	102,7	13,9	34,2	
2012/13	30,9	43,7	30,9	55,5	415,3	326,8	602,9	101,3	210,5	92,2	99,5	13,3	29,4	
2013/14	31,9	48,3	31,9	55,6	412,3	311,6	618,1	100,4	217,9	85,1	87,3	12,4	28,3	
2014/15	32,9	51,9	32,4	60,7	426,4	298,4	637,2	101,5	218,4	79,8	80,6	11,2	26,7	
2015/16	34	51,4	33	54,9	407,1	300,1	658,3	98,4	199	75,5	76,5	11,3	25,1	
2016/17	34,1	51,7	32,6	52,9	381,1	280,2	622,2	95,7	196,2	71,3	74,5	11,2	26,1	

Source: SAPS official statistics 2016/2017

3.2 Reducing violence by reducing murder

Murder is the product of violence. For every murder committed, many more attempted murders, assaults and other forms of violence can be expected. One way to efficiently use police and social resources is to focus primarily on reducing murder, which should, at least at first, result in reductions in other forms of violence, too. Because most murder in the Western Cape occurs at particular times and in specific areas, this should be possible.

In general, South Africans are half as likely to be murdered in 2016/2017 as they were in 1994/1995.¹⁸ While not as accurate an indicator as murder, most other categories of police-recorded violent crime have also declined significantly since 1994/1995,¹⁹ while 72% fewer households surveyed reported experiencing crime in 2016/2017 compared to 1998.²⁰

Table 4: Long- and short-term changes in recorded crime rates per 100 000 residents, South Africa 1994 - 2017

CRIME TYPE	1994-2017	2016-2017
Murder	-49%	+2%
Attempted murder	-52%	+0%
Assault GBH	-49%	-7%
Common assault	-48%	-5%
Total sexual offences	-38%	-4%
Common robbery	-8%	-1%
Residential robbery	+98%	+7%
Other robbery	+205%	+6% ²¹
Carjacking	-3%	+15%
Residential burglary	-30%	-2%
Theft of motor vehicle/cycle	-64%	-1%
Theft out of or from motor vehicle	-49%	-1%

Source: South African Cities Network 2017; SAPS official statistics 2017

18 Kriegler, A. & Shaw, M. (2016). *A Citizen's Guide to Crime Statistics in South Africa*. Johannesburg and Cape Town: Jonathan Ball.

19 SACN. (2017). *The State of Urban Safety in South Africa Report 2017: A report of the Urban Safety Reference Group*. Johannesburg: South African Cities Network. Available at: www.sacities.net and www.saferspaces.org.za SAPS 2016/2017.

20 Statistics South Africa. (1998). *Victims of Crime Survey 1998*. Pretoria: Statistics South Africa; Statistics South Africa. (2017). *Victims of Crime Survey 2016/2017*. Pretoria: Statistics South Africa.

21 This refers to robbery with aggravating circumstances.

However, this is not true in the Western Cape which has the second highest provincial murder rate in the country after the Eastern Cape. Crime rates present crime reported in an area in relation to the number of people living in the area, usually per 100 000 residents. This is a more accurate means of ascertaining crime risk and prevalence in an area. For example, a resident of a village of 100 people where there is one murder a year, is as likely to be murdered as a resident of a village of 1 000 people, with ten murders a year.

In 2016/2017, the recorded murder rate in the province increased by 0,6%, to 51,7 per 100 000 residents, up from 39,8 in 2011/2012.²² In 2016/2017, 42% of the province’s police stations recorded increases in murders.²³ Figure 5 illustrates this rise in relation to the trend in the national murder rate from 2007/2008 to 2016/2017.

Figure 5: Murder in South Africa & the Western Cape, total & rate per 100 000 residents, 2007/2008-2016/2017



Source: SAPS official statistics 2016/2017

22 In other words, for every 100 000 residents in the province, an average of 51,7 were murdered in 2016/2017.

23 SAPS. (2017). *Western Cape Annual Report 2016/2017*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 30.

3.2.1 Murder: contributing factors

According to the SAPS, most murder is gang related (19%), the result of arguments (17,6%) or robbery (7,6%),²⁴ as depicted in Table 5. However, this analysis is based only on the 57,5% of murder investigations that the SAPS was able to complete. Almost half (43,5%) of all murder is therefore excluded from this analysis, which limits its claims. For instance, if 25% of unsolved murders were attributed to robbery, it would necessitate a very different policing response than if they were gang related. Similarly, it is not clear what distinguishes the SAPS classification of murders caused by ‘arguments’ from the categories ‘domestic violence’, ‘community relations’, ‘relationship/revenge’, or ‘jealousy/love triangle’. Taken together, these categories account for 27,9% of completed murder investigations. If they were consolidated under a single category such as ‘interpersonal conflict’, police intervention would need to be very different (see Gender based and domestic violence on page 34). The same is true for attempted murder where arguments (9,8%), domestic violence (3,1%), retaliation/revenge (1,9%) and community retaliation (1%) account for 15,8% of such crimes.²⁵ If one grouped these as ‘interpersonal conflict’, it would be the second most common cause of attempted murder after gang-related activity.

Table 5: Murder and attempted murder, contributing factors 2016/2017

Cause	Murder	Attempted-Murder
Gang related	19,1%	34,0%
Arguments	17,6%	9,8%
Robbery	7,6%	14,7%
Domestic violence	3,8%	3,1%
Community retaliation	3,5%	1,0%
Relationship/revenge	2,2%	1,9%
Jealousy/Love triangle	0,8%	0,0%
Self-defence	0,4%	0,0%
Other	1,5%	0,0%
Under investigation	43,5%	26,7%

Source: SAPS WC Annual Report 2016/2017 (pp. 32, 34)

24 SAPS. (2017). *Western Cape Annual Report 2016/2017*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 32.

25 SAPS. (2017). *Western Cape Annual Report 2016/2017*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 34.

3.2.2 Murder: day, time and tool

Most murder occurs from Friday to Sunday (65,8%), and between 18:00 and 03:00 (55,6%) and 21:00 and 24:00 (22,7%).²⁶ Alcohol plays a significant role in murder. According to the SAPS, many murders are the unintended consequence of alcohol-fuelled violence. A docket analysis of murders committed between April and September 2016 found that in between 33% and 48% of cases the victim and/or perpetrator were intoxicated.²⁷ Most victims were older than 18 (94,8%) and male (90,7%). Just over 4% of victims were aged between 10 and 17.²⁸ This suggests that the 'youth gangs' of Cape Town's former African townships, which predominantly comprise school-aged boys, do not significantly impact the province's murder rate.

With murder concentrated in time and associated with alcohol, police together with other government agencies should be able to significantly reduce its prevalence, along with related forms of violence. To do so, they and other agencies must together reach out directly to offending and at-risk individuals and groups (e.g. domestic abusers, gang members in a particularly violent area), making it very clear that violence will not be tolerated. This message must be backed with credible threats of enforcement (e.g. rapid, effective investigation, arrest and sanction/prosecution) but, importantly, also with credible promises of assistance for would-be offenders seeking to escape lives of violence (e.g. cognitive behaviour therapy, skills training, educational and career support).²⁹ In this regard, the province's Alcohol Harms Reduction Game Changer (AHR) is key (see page 43), as is the rational distribution and deployment of scarce police resources (see page 113) to areas where violence is most predictable.

3.3 Attempted murder

According to the SAPS, the province saw a year-on-year decline in attempted murder, from a total of 3 444 in 2015/2016 to 3 387 in 2016/2017.³⁰ This is the second year-on-year drop after a 120% increase from 2009/2010 (1 696) to 2014/2015 (3 727). The SAPS reports that 34% of attempted murder is gang related, compared to 19% of murder. This suggests that if gang members become more effective at killing one another, murder could increase sharply. It also suggests that focused efforts at 'gang' stations could result in significant overall reductions in violence.

The greatest number of attempted murders (256) were reported in Khayelitsha, representing a staggering increase of 39,89% in the last financial year. Fifteen stations account for 59,6% of all attempted murder in the province. Nyanga,

26 SAPS. (2017). *Western Cape Annual Report 2016/2017*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 31.

27 Ibid. p. 31

28 Ibid, pp., 32, 33.

29 Abt, T. & Winship, C. (2016). *What works in reducing community violence: a meta-review and field study for the Northern Triangle*, USAID & Democracy International.

30 Ibid. p. 32.

Khayelitsha and Delft are among the top five stations at which both murder and attempted murder are reported.

The SAPS believes that gangs account for significant portions of attempted murder in Delft (39%), Kraaifontein (43,5%) and Elsie's River (82,6%) (see Table 6). In Nyanga and Khayelitsha, robbery accounts for 42,4% and 38% of attempted murders respectively.³¹ This suggests that if robbery is subdued in these areas, overall violence could decline significantly.

3.4 Gang-related murder and attempted murder

Gang violence is a priority concern for the province, deserving focused and multidisciplinary intervention (see Focus on gangs, page 50). However, gang violence is almost certainly not the primary source of violence and murder in the province. This is more likely the result of interpersonal violence between people who know each other. Nevertheless, gang-related violence probably accounts for the second greatest proportion of violence and where it is predictable and organised, police intervention is necessary.

Gang-related incidents are more likely to occur during the week, while robbery and other related incidents occur in patterns congruent with contact crime more broadly, i.e. 55,8% from Friday to Sunday and 69,1% between 18:00 and 03:00.

Just 84,6% of attempted murder victims are male and 15,4% female.³² This might be explained in at least two ways. First, changes in reporting habits may see more crimes against male victims downgraded to assault GBH by SAPS officials for whom male-on-male violence is routine.³³ Second, some incidents of intimate partner violence may be so severe that police record them as attempted murder, when they may have been described as assault GBH if the victim and perpetrator were both male and if a firearm was not used. Indeed, the SAPS reports that most murder and attempted murder counts are in fact 'assaults gone wrong' – that murder 'was never intended'.³⁴

Gang-related activity accounts for far more attempted-murder (34%) than murder (19,1%). The province could therefore see a significant rise in murder if gangs become more proficient at killing. Both Mitchells Plain and Steenberg reported declines in murder and attempted murder, which likely indicates a real decline in related violence.

31 Ibid., p. 33.

32 Ibid, p. 33-34.

33 In other words, police officials may be more likely to interpret serious violence between two men as an unexceptional matter of 'two men fighting' - assault, whereas serious violence against women is less common and thus more shocking, potentially leading police to label such crime 'attempted murder'. For more on the subjectivity of the SAPS' recording of violent crime, see: Bruce, D. (2010). 'The ones in the pile were the ones going down: the reliability of violent crime statistics', *SA Crime Quarterly*, No. 31, p. 9-17.

34 SAPS. (2017). *Western Cape Annual Report 2016/2017*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 36.

Table 6 shows the 12 stations at which 77,9% of the province’s gang-related murders were recorded, according to the SAPS. These murders account for 16,8% of the province’s murders.³⁵ In other words, less than a quarter of murder in the province is believed to be gang related, something that is not always understood.

Table 6: Gang-related murders and attempted murders - Top Western Cape stations

Station	% of WC gang-related murder	% of WC gang-related att. murder	% of all gang-related murder & att. murder	% of station’s murder	% of station’s att. murder
Elsies River	8,1	11,2	10,1	78,5	82,6
Bishop Lavis	10,4	9,3	9,7	68	74,8
Mitchells Plain	9,8	8,1	8,7	60,2	64,6
Manenberg	6,3	7,9	7,3	70,2	80,5
Steenberg	5,4	8,1	7,1	79,1	91,2
Ravensmead	7	7,1	7	72,1	73,9
Delft	8,8	6	6,9	30,4	39
Philippi	6,2	5,8	5,9	60	74,4
Kraaifontein	4,4	6,1	5,5	19,7	43,5
Atlantis	4,7	5,6	5,3	48,4	70,6
Paarl East	3,3	3,5	3,41	53,8	77
Mfuleni	3,5	3,3	3,4	17,6	34,9

Source: SAPS WC Annual Report 2016/2017, p. 35.

Most gang-related murders and attempted murders are firearm related. According to the SAPS, a reduction in firearms may not reduce gang murders. However, research suggests the opposite: that confiscations in line with the Firearms Control Act and other high intensity police operations targeting hotspots, result in very clear reductions in murder.³⁶ In this case, it is important that high-density police operations are carried out with the support of most residents in targeted communities. High-intensity cordon and search-like operations that treat most

35 Author’s calculation, using total murders at station and calculating number using percentage given by SAPS.

36 Lamb, G. (2015). “Fighting fire with an inferno: The South African Police Service and the ‘War’ on Violent Crime”, *International Journal on Human Rights*. Available at: <http://sur.conectas.org/en/fighting-fire-inferno/>, accessed 27 February 2018.

young men in the operational area with suspicion can harm young men’s relationship with police and the state at large. These encounters, too, should be turned into ‘teachable moments’ for good, whenever possible.


According to the SAPS, stations that experienced reductions in gang violence in 2016/2017 saw fewer firearm confiscations. The SAPS believes this is because gangs that are not in active conflict do not need to keep weapons close at hand where police may find them.³⁷

In the next chapter, we consider the provincial response to the National Anti-Gangsterism Strategy (NAGS) in relation to the above trends.

3.5. Robbery

While murder is the most serious of crimes, robbery is perhaps the category of crime that causes the greatest fear for residents in the province, 47,1% of whom believed violent crime was increasing in 2016/2017.³⁸ Robbery involves illegally taking someone’s property using or threatening violence, including lethal violence. According to the SAPS, robbery was the motive in 7,6% of murder in 2016/2017. Robbery was also the most common crime experienced by participants in the 2017/2018 PNP workshops (49,15%). According to the 2016/2017 Victims of Crimes Survey, more Western Cape residents report being victims of robbery than residents in any other province. The SAPS figures also suggest that aggravated robbery increased quite significantly from 2010/2011 to 2016/2017, as shown in Figure 6.

Figure 6: Aggravated robbery (WC), 2007/2008 – 2016/2017




Source: SAPS WC Annual Report 2016/2017, p. 39.

37 SAPS. (2017). *Western Cape Annual Report 2016/2017*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 35.

38 Statistics South Africa. (2017). *Victims of Crime Survey 2016/2017*. Pretoria: Statistics South Africa, p. 64.

In that aggravated robbery often involves organised criminal groups and/or occurs at predictable places and times, a significant portion of these crimes should be policeable, given the right resources, time and skills. It is therefore reassuring that overall trio crimes (vehicle hijacking, house robbery, business robbery) saw a slight but important decline in 2016/2017, after what had been a decade-long rise. This shift is depicted in Figure 7.

Figure 7: Trio Crimes (WC), 2007/2008 – 2016/2017




Source: SAPS WC Annual Report 2016/2017 p. 51.

Disaggregated by crime type, it becomes clear that vehicle hijackings remain the greatest contributor to the ongoing rise in trio crimes. Although the SAPS has a trio crimes task team focusing on such crimes – a positive move – it has only managed to slightly slow the rate at which these crimes have increased since 2010/2011, as shown in Figure 8.




Figure 8: Carjacking (WC), 2007/2008 – 2016/2017



Source: SAPS WC Annual Report 2016/2017, p. 44.

Perhaps the most feared category of crime is residential robbery.³⁹ It is promising, therefore, that this category stabilised in 2016/2017, after a ten-year rise, as shown in Figure 9.

Figure 9: Robbery at residential premises (WC), 2007/2008 – 2016/2017




Source: SAPS WC Annual Report 2016/2017, p. 46.

³⁹ Although victim surveys suggest burglary is the crime most feared, this may reflect a misunderstanding by respondents. Burglary involves illegally entering a property without encountering its occupants, while house robbery involves illegally entering a property, confronting its occupants and taking from them while threatening or using force. It is clear that the latter would be more frightening than the former.

As illustrated in Figure 10, the trio crime that has declined most is robbery at non-residential (usually business) premises. Security upgrades (target hardening) at such premises in the form of walls, alarms, CCTV or armed response services may account for some of this decline. However, most such crimes target small spaza shops, whose owners are limited in the extent to which they can invest in such protection. It is possible that the recorded decline in non-residential robbery reflects in part a change in reporting rather than in crime, though a real decline in crime is also possible.⁴⁰

Figure 10: Robbery at non-residential premises (WC), 2007/2008-2016/2017




Source: SAPS WC Annual Report 2016/2017, p. 48.

Finally, crimes against women and children, including sexual offences, are among the province’s priorities. It is therefore promising that recorded sexual offences have declined year on year since 2009/2010, as shown in Figure 11. Again, it is possible that the decline represents a change in reporting rather than in offending.⁴¹ Unfortunately, provincial victim data is not available for sexual offences, making the trend difficult to corroborate.

40 Recall that the victim surveys suggest overall declines in both property and violent crime in the province and country as a whole.

41 For example, if victims feel judged or re-victimised by the reporting process, they and their familial and social networks may stop reporting sexual offences to police.

Figure 11: Sexual offences (WC), 2007/2008 – 2016/2017



Source: SAPS WC Annual Report 2016/2017, p. 51.

4. RESPONDING TO PRIORITY CRIME IN THE WESTERN CAPE

Much of the province’s violence appears tied to interpersonal conflict. Such violence is often predicted by a confluence of factors, from population density to unemployment and school completion rates, both in South Africa and, to an extent, globally. This section touches on the following related themes in crime, violence and offending in the province, and looks at possible responses by the police and provincial government:

- A) The policing of informal areas
 - a. Where crime occurs
 - b. Sector policing
- B) Gender-based and domestic violence
- C) Violence, alcohol and the Alcohol Harms Reduction Game Changer
- D) Gang-related crime and the National Anti-Gang Strategy.

4.1 Policing informal areas (and where crime occurs)

As shown in the previous chapter, it is possible to predict approximately when and where most murder and related violent crime will occur. Hotspot policing, which involves the targeted and increased deployment of resources in a relatively small geographic area is, despite limitations,⁴² among the best-supported evidence-

⁴² Hotspot policing has been rigorously tested in affluent democracies and found to have a modest impact on crime - Abt, T. & Winship, C. (2016). *What works in reducing community violence: a meta-review and field study for the Northern Triangle*, USAID & Democracy International.

based police practices.⁴³ While the SAPS head office is aware of such evidence and requires that station-based officials are deployed in accordance with crime patterns, it is not clear whether patrol officials follow these instructions.⁴⁴

Recommendation six of the Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry was that the SAPS' Provincial Commissioner should issue guidelines for visible policing in informal neighbourhoods. It was based on a finding that, due to the SAPS's reliance on vehicular patrol, police were seldom visible in informal neighbourhoods, despite these being the spaces in which many priority crimes occurred. Similar concerns have been raised in PNP workshops and reports in the years since.⁴⁵ Unfortunately, these policing guidelines have not been developed.

4.1.1 Where crime occurs

In 2016/2017, the five Western Cape stations at which the most murders were recorded in the province (Nyanga, Delft, Khayelitsha, Harare, Philippi East) were township stations, inclusive of one or more informal neighbourhood. According to the SAPS, increases in murder at such stations are related to 'social imbalances... common to basically all informal settlements'.⁴⁶ With relation to this, 44,2% of business robberies in 2016/2017 targeted informal businesses,⁴⁷ and 42,9% of stolen vehicles recovered were found in informal areas.⁴⁸ These data hint at a disproportionate link between townships, informal neighbourhoods and crime.

Similarly, a World Health Organisation (WHO) review of evidence predicting violence perpetration and victimisation notes variables prevalent throughout South African society, but pronounced in informal neighbourhoods (see Tables 5-9 and Appendix C on page 132). This suggests that the policing of informal settlements should be a priority⁴⁹ and is supported by research that suggests that the following correlate with high murder rates in South African cities:⁵⁰

43 College of Policing. (2018). 'Hotspot policing'. Available at: <http://whatworks.college.police.uk/toolkit/Pages/Intervention.aspx?InterventionID=46>, accessed 20 February 2018.

44 Multiple ethnographic accounts of policing, including in the Western Cape, suggest that police generally don't stick to such plans, though this evidence is subjective and limited, e.g. Steinberg, J. (2008). *Thin Blue: The Unwritten Rules of Policing South Africa*, Cape Town: Jonathan Ball; Faull, A. (2018). *Police Work and Identity: a South African Ethnography*. Abingdon & New York: Routledge

45 PNP 2015/2016, 2016/2017.

46 SAPS. (2017). *Western Cape Annual Report 2016/2017*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 31.

47 SAPS. (2017). *Western Cape Annual Report 2016/2017*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 49.

48 SAPS. (2017). *Western Cape Annual Report 2016/2017*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 65.

49 One complication is the fact that informal settlements are considered by many to be illegal. Shifting police resources from lawful, municipally governed areas to unlawful, relatively ungoverned spaces is politically complicated. While a legal argument can be made for *not* shifting resources to informal areas, this is in tension with a moral imperative to protect vulnerable people at risk of serious harm.

50 Lancaster, L. & Kamman, E. (2016). 'Risky localities: Exploring a Methodology for Measuring Socio-Economic Characteristics of High Murder Areas'. *South African Crime Quarterly*, (56), pp. 27-35.

- a) High population density;
- b) High unemployment rates;
- c) Significant informal housing (including informal settlements and backyard shacks);
- d) High rates of renting property (including informal property);
- e) Higher percentages of orphans in the community; and
- f) Relative poverty compared to the rest of the municipality.

Separate South African research suggests that 20% of police areas may account for 80% of the country's crime, based on an analysis of Tshwane crime data.⁵¹

If regular violence is associated with informal neighbourhoods it follows that a democratic, fair and just police service would prioritise the policing of such spaces, particularly when some serious crime is as predictable as it appears to be. While the SAPS has not issued the guidelines recommended by the Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry, the underlying logic is central to its sector policing philosophy, outlined below. If sector policing were implemented as it is presented by the SAPS, policing would most likely be more effective and efficient, but it requires a paradigm shift in thinking by both police and the public.

4.1.2 Sector policing and the focused policing of informal neighbourhoods

Policing alone cannot prevent crime or harm while embracing democratic principles, but it is important to the reduction of crime and harm nevertheless. Research increasingly shows that the traditional model of policing characterised by random patrol, rapid response, and follow-up investigation is relatively ineffective. What has been shown to have some impact on crime is problem-oriented policing and hotspot policing.⁵² Both approaches fit the SAPS' vision of sector policing, and the guidelines it issues to its officers for the implementation thereof.

Sector policing requires that all SAPS precincts be divided into two or more areas (sectors), which are intensively and repeatedly studied and managed by dedicated sector commanders in partnership with sector forums and communities. The intended result is an understanding of local risk and the targeted deployment of police, municipal and community resources to address them.⁵³

51 Gregory D. Breetzke (2018): 'The concentration of urban crime in space by race: evidence from South Africa'. *Urban Geography*, DOI: 10.1080/02723638.2018.1440127.

52 Abt, T. & Winship, C. (2016). *What works in reducing community violence: a meta-review and field study for the Northern Triangle*, USAID & Democracy International.

53 SAPS. (2015). *Sector Policing Operational Guide*. Pretoria: SAPS.

SAPS National Instruction 3 of 2013 requires that all stations:

- Deploy operational (visible) members and resources in accordance with the crime pattern and threat analysis (so more resources should be allocated where sectors have more crime, etc.);
- Interact with and develop partnerships and programmes with sector communities, to address crime;
- Hold regular sector forum meetings with the sector community, in which crime prevention and social issues affecting the community are discussed, and community needs identified; and
- Establish quarterly review sector profiles, highlighting the causes of crime in the sector.

Furthermore, the SAPS Sector Policing Operational Guide states that:

- Commanders must identify hotspots and vulnerable communities; address community needs and make the most effective use of all available resources at a police station and in the community to address crime;
- Operational members and resources must be deployed in accordance with crime pattern and threat analysis⁵⁴, intelligence reports, Sector Crime Combatting Forum taskings⁵⁵, and community needs⁵⁶, including providing targeted visible patrols and attending to community complaints;⁵⁷
- Station commanders must adapt sector policing to meet the needs of communities⁵⁸ and initiate crime prevention programmes and projects based on community needs;⁵⁹
- Where resources are not available for personnel deployment in each sector, 'members may be deployed according to the crime pattern and threats',⁶⁰ and
- Crime should be prioritised. Crime-prevention officials must choose which problems must be focused on. With limited resources at the crime-prevention official's disposal, it is impossible to focus on all the problems at the same time.⁶¹

This guidance allows station and sector commanders to withdraw or withhold resources from one sector and deploy them to another to most effectively address local harms. It follows that where residents of informal neighbourhoods

54 SAPS. (2015). *Sector Policing Operational Guide*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 17.

55 SAPS. (2015). *Sector Policing Operational Guide*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 18.

56 SAPS. (2015). *Sector Policing Operational Guide*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 39.

57 SAPS. (2015). *Sector Policing Operational Guide*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 37.

58 SAPS. (2015). *Sector Policing Operational Guide*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 20.

59 SAPS. (2015). *Sector Policing Operational Guide*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 2.

60 SAPS. (2015). *Sector Policing Operational Guide*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 38.

61 SAPS. (2015). *Sector Policing Operational Guide*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 87.

are disproportionately victimised or harmed, police resources should be disproportionately deployed to them. As discussed under Police Resource Distribution (see page 112), a similar logic should apply to the allocation of police resources, and the ability of cluster commanders to move some resources between stations in line with crime pattern analysis and hotspot policing.

According to the SAPS, in 2016/2017, 121 of the Western Cape's 150 police stations had implemented sector policing.⁶² However, both DoCS's periodic inspections of stations and independent research reveal that minimum standards of sector policing are not met at most stations.⁶³ In addition, it would appear that sector policing is being applied differently at stations as a result of staff shortages. There are not always dedicated sector commanders deployed to each sector, despite this being central to the sector policing model.⁶⁴ Sector policing is one aspect of policing severely affected by staff shortfalls at high crime stations, which will be discussed later.

4.2 Gender-based and domestic violence

Gender-based and domestic violence, including the killing of women and children, are significant concerns in the province, and are often raised at PNP workshops. Although most violence is perpetrated by men against men, addressing violence in the home and at schools, particularly against women and children, is key to breaking its cycle.⁶⁵

According to various, though dated, studies, 25% of people in South Africa experience physical violence in their lifetimes, 5% experience sexual abuse, and approximately 45% psychological abuse.⁶⁶

A national victim survey of 15 to 17-year-olds in 2015 found significant rates of violence and neglect in public spaces, homes and schools. This included 33% reporting having been hit, beaten, or kicked by an adult; 20% having been sexually abused; 23% having witnessed violence perpetrated by an adult caregiver against a sibling or another adult in the household; 19% having been attacked without a weapon and 16% with a weapon.⁶⁷ In the Western Cape, 29,9% of

62 SAPS. (2017). *Annual Report 2016/2017*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 137.

63 See: DoCS Oversight Inspection Reports 2014/2015-2015/2016; Faull's (2018) claim, based on extensive participant observation with SAPS officials, that in many instances they focus more on producing administrative 'evidence' of work done (e.g. records of vehicles stopped) or systems in place (e.g. sector policing files), than on doing the work.

64 See for instance, Department of Community Safety. (2018). *Provincial Report on Oversight Visits conducted at police stations during the last quarter of 2017/18*, p. 7.

65 Sapolsky, R.M. (2017). *Behave: The Biology of Humans at Our Best and Worst*. London: Penguin Press. Loc.3204; Gould, C. (2015). *Beaten Bad: The Life Stories of Violent Offenders*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

66 Studies available at: WHO. (2018). 'Prevalence studies of intimate partner violence'. Available at: <http://apps.who.int/violence-info/studies?area=intimate-partner-violence&aspect=prevalence&country=ZA>, accessed 18 February 2018.

67 Artz, L., Burton, P., Ward, C., Leoschut, L., Phyfer, J., Loyd, S., & Kassanjee, R. (2016). *Research Bulletin: The Optimus Study on Child Abuse, Violence and Neglect in South Africa*. Cape Town: Centre for Justice and Crime Prevention.

respondents had experienced physical abuse and 17% emotional abuse. Only one other province reported higher victimisation rates for each category.

Similarly, a social audit of 244 Western Cape schools conducted in 2015 found that learners were beaten at 83% of them, usually with a weapon, and that beatings occurred daily at 37% of these.⁶⁸

The 2016/2017 PNP report recommended that community awareness campaigns be carried out to educate communities about domestic violence, and that SAPS officials receive Domestic Violence Act (DVA)-related training. It also recommended that relevant crime be recorded as ‘domestic violence’, rather than simply as ‘assault’ or ‘arson’. In that a large portion of – perhaps most – contact crime is interpersonal and between people who know each other, much of it can likely be described as domestic violence. For instance, the Wellington SAPS which recorded seven murders in 2015/2016 and 28 in 2016/2017, attributed 89,5% of the latter to arguments inclusive of domestic violence.⁶⁹ In Khayelitsha, 17 of the 179 murders reported in 2016/2017 were attributed to domestic violence.⁷⁰

Domestic violence in the Western Cape is the product of a number of intersecting factors, key among them being poverty, unemployment, violence-supporting social norms, excessive consumption of alcohol and significant gender inequalities. Table 7 shows the risk factors identified by the WHO that most consistently predict Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) worldwide, as well as the health consequences of IPV for victims. Living in a community with high crime rates, witnessing IPV in childhood, and gambling, most clearly predict IPV. The most common consequence for victims of IPV is the development of mental and neurological disorders.

Table 7: Risk factors for and consequences of intimate partner violence

RISK FACTORS PREDICTING INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE	LIKELIHOOD
VICTIM: Witnessing IPV in childhood	3,8x
VICTIM: Previous violence victimisation	3,1x
VICTIM: Mental and neurological disorder	2x
VICTIM: Unmarried	2,5x
PERPETRATOR: Gambling	4,2x
PERPETRATOR: Unplanned/unwanted pregnancy	2,8x

68 Equal Education. (2016). *Of ‘Loose Papers and Vague Allegations’: A Social Audit of the Safety and Sanitation Crisis in Western Cape Schools*. Available at: www.equaleducation.org, accessed 15 February 2018.

69 SAPS. (2017). *Western Cape Annual Report 2016/2017*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 31.

70 DoCS (2018). *Policing Needs and Priorities 2017/18 Report for the Greater Khayelitsha, inclusive of Harare, Lingeletu West and Khayelitsha police precincts*, p. 12. Presentation made by SAPS at the PNP.

RISK FACTORS PREDICTING INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE	LIKELIHOOD
PERPETRATOR: Anger/hostility	2,7x
PERPETRATOR: Substance abuse	2,6x
RELATIONSHIP: Marital dissatisfaction	3,3x
RELATIONSHIP: Adherence to traditional gender role norms	2,3x
RELATIONSHIP: Less children	1,2x
COMMUNITY: High rates of crime	5,6x
COMMUNITY: High rates of violence	2,5x
COMMUNITY: Residential stability	2,1x
COMMUNITY: High rates of unemployment	1,5x
SOCIETAL: Social norms supportive of violence	1,5x
CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE	
Mental and neurological disorders	2,5x
Health risks and behaviours	1,9x
Communicable disease	1,6x
Sexual and reproductive health problems	1,6x
Pregnancy termination	2,2x

Source: WHO⁷¹

Table 8 shows the risk factors that most clearly predict sexual violence worldwide, as well as the health consequences for victims. Living in a community with high crime rates, witnessing IPV in childhood, and gambling most powerfully predict IPV. The most common consequence for victims of IPV is the development of mental and neurological disorders.

71 World Health Organization. *Violence Prevention*. Available at: <http://apps.who.int/violence-info/>, accessed 15 February 2018.

Table 8: Global risk factors for and consequences of sexual violence

RISK FACTORS PREDICTING SEXUAL VIOLENCE	STRENGTH
VICTIM: Homelessness	1,4x
PERPETRATOR: Engagement in transactional sex	3,8x
PERPETRATOR: Multiple sexual partners	3,6x
PERPETRATOR: Substance abuse	3,2x
PERPETRATOR: History of violence perpetration	2,8x
COMMUNITY: Urban residence	1,2x
CONSEQUENCES OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE	STRENGTH
Sexual and reproductive health problems	3,8x
Mental and neurological disorders	2,5x
Communicable disease	2,1x
Health risk behaviours	1,8x

Source: WHO⁷²

Although police are limited in their ability to address many of the above causes of IPV, domestic and sexual violence, it is in their power to respond efficiently when such abuses are reported, and to act to prevent their reoccurrence, even if only by showing up and getting other state and NGO entities involved. This is crucial. If the most visible agents of the state are seen to not take intimate partner and parent-child violence seriously, violence-supporting norms will not change, and boys will continue to grow into men who believe violence is acceptable.

In 2017, the Police Ombudsman expressed grave concern regarding the police's failure to respond timeously to reports of missing children, at times with fatal consequences⁷³. Furthermore, in 2016/2017, 53,7% of all complaints against SAPS officials for not enforcing the Domestic Violence Act were lodged in the Western Cape⁷⁴.

The Department of Police's Domestic Violence Act (DVA) Monitoring Tool, discussed below, is a key tool intended to ensure the enforcement of the DVA by police.

72 Ibid.

73 Office of the Western Cape Police Ombudsman. (2017) *Annual Report 2016/2017*.

74 SAPS. (2017). *Annual Report 2016/2017*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 133.

4.2.1 Domestic Violence Act (DVA) station audits

From May 2015 to March 2017, the Western Cape Department of Community Safety visited 29 police stations to monitor the implementation of the DVA, its Regulations and National Instruction 7/1999. The monitoring tool is an imperfect but useful instrument. Its limitations include it being based largely on good faith; the assumption that the claims of two or three officials and victims interviewed are true and reflective of general experiences; and data collected is difficult to verify. A summary of the tool's structure and content is presented in Box 1.

Box 1: Summary of issues probed by the Domestic Violence Act (DVA) Monitoring Tool

1. Station profile.
2. Regulatory Compliance:
 - a. Whether required documentation is available in the CSC, including the DVA; DVA regulations; National Instruction on Domestic Violence; Station Order on Domestic Violence; Copies of SAPS 508(a); a list of local DV organisations and services;
 - b. Whether domestic violence registers are up to date;
 - c. Whether copies of protection orders and warrants of arrest are accessible, filed and up to date;
 - d. Whether protection orders have been served;
 - e. Whether all shifts include female members;
 - f. Whether the station has an accessible, resourced 'victim friendly room' (VFR),
 - g. The number of VFR volunteers at the station, trained/untrained;
 - h. How DV incidents are recorded and whether relevant forms, registers and books, correspond with each other;
 - i. What the common DV trends are, how many incidents are reported, result in criminal charges, and are withdrawn.
3. Implementation of DVA ascertained by asking CSC, patrol and DVA members questions to which they must answer 'always', 'sometimes', 'never', 'yes' and 'no', e.g.:
 - a. How often they - determine if a complainant is in danger, assist a complainant to find shelter or medical care if needed, take a statement, open a docket, explain the DVA notice form to the complainant, record the incident in the OB, request the complainant sign the OB book, provide complainant with information about local DV services and organisations;
 - b. Whether all complainants are - informed of their rights and options, allowed to be served in their language of choice, whether a sign language interpreter is available;
 - c. What actions should be taken when a complainant has visible injuries;
 - d. Whether DVA is addressed in station planning, training and awareness campaigns;
 - e. What challenges are experienced by members implementing the DVA.

4. Non-Compliance by Members:
 - a. Whether records of non-compliance are kept;
 - b. The number and nature of complaints received, whether they result in disciplinary action.
5. Domestic Violence Offences by or against SAPS members:
 - a. Number, type, result, disciplinary proceedings.
6. Training of Members:
 - a. The number of members trained in the DVA, Sexual Offences Act and Victim Empowerment Programme.

Service rating by complainants. Three complainants are contacted from the 508(b) and asked various questions regarding their experience of reporting DV to the station.

Table 9 ranks the 29 audited stations by their DVA audit compliance scores along with select reported violent crime rates at each station. One might expect that where a station effectively enforces the DVA, other forms of violence will be uncommon. But this is not always apparent, with even the most compliant stations still recording high rates of violence – although high-crime stations such Nyanga, Khayelitsha and Philippi are among the more poorly ranked. This suggests that: a) the violence-reducing impact of an effectively enforced DVA will take many years to emerge (i.e., boys raised with less violence in the home will be less likely to use violence as adolescents and adults); 2) that the tool does not accurately measure the degree to which the DVA is being enforced in a police area; c) that domestic violence is so widespread that complaints attended represent only a fraction of such violence, and/or, d) that the link between domestic violence, other violent crime, and policing is tenuous.

In 2016/2017, the SAPS received 242 complaints of officials failing to comply with the DVA. Of these, 53,7% (n=130) were lodged in the Western Cape.⁷⁵ This is a serious failure by the SAPS in the province. However, the fact that so many complaints were lodged in the province very likely also indicates ease of access to and public faith in complaints mechanisms in the province.

75 SAPS. (2017). *Annual Report 2016/2017*, p. 133.

Table 9: DVA station audit results and reported violent crime rates

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT STATION AUDITS				CRIME RATES PER 100 000 RESIDENTS IN STATION AREA				
STATION	YEAR	COMPLIANCE STATUS	SCORE	MURDER	SEXUAL OFFENCES	ATT-MURDER	ASSAULT GBH	ASSAULT COMMON
Villiersdorp	2016	Significant compliance	92,10%	53,00	53,00	36,70	387,34	350,65
Strand	2017	Significant compliance	90,20%	26,94	79,01	62,85	193,94	1014,62
Athlone	2016	Significant compliance	90,00%	36,84	104,63	69,26	244,62	727,98
Paarl	2016	Significant compliance	89,40%	29,07	94,48	36,34	247,10	721,32
Graafwater	2015	Significant compliance	88,50%	37,69	282,70	0,00	659,63	1130,80
Lentegeur	2017	Significant compliance	88,20%	42,09	83,09	41,01	239,57	584,89
Oudtshoorn	2015	Partial compliance	85,60%	17,49	143,64	12,49	790,65	1005,48
Hout Bay	2015	Significant compliance	85,50%	11,14	75,18	38,98	381,49	462,24
Paarl East	2015	Significant compliance	85,50%	43,44	124,76	57,93	548,07	707,37
Delft	2016	Significant compliance	81,70%	110,83	132,63	107,80	350,05	365,19
Riversdale	2016	Significant compliance	81,50%	18,41	105,88	0,00	543,23	511,00
Still Bay	2016	Partial compliance	79,30%	0,00	90,86	0,00	386,14	942,65

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT STATION AUDITS				CRIME RATES PER 100 000 RESIDENTS IN STATION AREA				
STATION	YEAR	COMPLIANCE STATUS	SCORE	MURDER	SEXUAL OFFENCES	ATT-MURDER	ASSAULT GBH	ASSAULT COMMON
Swellendam	2016	Partial compliance	76,10%	34,71	107,99	30,85	601,64	1249,57
Brackenfell	2015	Partial compliance	75,80%	3,67	29,35	9,17	104,55	291,63
Steenberg	2015	Partial compliance	74,40%	65,18	122,78	154,62	147,04	612,40
Manenberg	2016	Partial compliance	74,20%	60,12	145,37	124,60	281,99	626,29
Pacaltsdorp	2016	Partial compliance	74,10%	39,83	304,19	18,11	438,18	1032,09
Vredendal	2015	Partial compliance	72,60%	27,16	142,58	6,79	278,37	291,95
Nyanga	2015	Partial compliance	72,30%	129,82	164,47	84,55	494,80	513,28
Kleinvlief	2015	Partial compliance	71,50%	42,42	103,15	31,81	327,76	779,89
Philippi	2015	Partial compliance	70,60%	112,40	119,32	157,36	172,92	591,39
Klawer	2015	Partial compliance	69,90%	49,37	287,97	8,23	765,18	592,40
Worcester	2016	Partial compliance	68,20%	43,10	78,07	34,97	584,71	127,68
Woodstock	2017	Partial compliance	67,90%	13,47	87,55	23,57	218,86	430,99
Gugulethu	2015	Partial compliance	67,90%	102,23	178,89	57,13	464,53	406,65
Laingsburg	2016	Partial compliance	64,60%	22,98	103,42	11,49	815,90	505,63
Khayelitsha	2015	Partial compliance	63,90%	108,14	94,24	154,66	381,81	499,01
Great Brak River	2017	Partial compliance	63,00%	21,91	118,34	26,30	569,78	512,80
Lambert's Bay	2016	Partial compliance	57,80%	26,50	79,51	13,25	689,11	901,14

Source: Civilian Secretariat for Police Services, Domestic Violence Audit Reports for respective stations and years

BOX 2: BEST PRACTICE IN THE POLICING AND PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

No recent studies have evaluated the effects of policing on domestic violence in South Africa. Where they have been carried out elsewhere, non-police based programmes have shown more promise than policing, but police often remain the contact point required to connect violent partners and homes with intervention services.

Evidence on the policing of domestic violence suggests that:

- Overall evidence suggests no impact of the criminal sanction of domestic violence.⁷⁶
- Second responder programmes have been linked to increased reporting of abuse, but not to reducing repeat violence. These involve a ‘second response’ visit to victims of domestic abuse 24 hours to 14 days after an initial police response. A police officer and another official such as a social worker engage the victim and sometimes the offender about domestic violence and possible interventions.⁷⁷

Evidence for non-policing interventions show that:⁷⁸

- Couples therapy can help reduce male-perpetrated domestic violence.
- Universal screening for domestic violence and abuse of women attending healthcare facilities is effective. If women disclose experiencing domestic violence or abuse, their clinician can direct them to support services.
- Early childhood home visits are believed to reduce domestic violence and child abuse. They involve trained personnel (e.g. social workers) visiting the homes of parents within the first two years of a child’s life. Personnel provide information about parenting, child development and health care.
- School-based programmes have been effective in preventing violence within school-aged dating relationships.

Emerging evidence on protective factors and interventions include:⁷⁹

- Microfinance programmes for women combined with gender-equality education;
- Reducing access to and harmful use of alcohol; and
- Challenging and changing social and cultural gender norms.

Various other strategies show potential, but have not been systematically implemented or evaluated.

76 College of Policing. (2018). ‘Domestic Abuse Sanctions’. Available at: <http://whatworks.college.police.uk/toolkit/Pages/Intervention.aspx?InterventionID=27>, accessed 15 February 2018.

77 College of Policing. (2018). ‘Second Response to Domestic Abuse’. Available at: <http://whatworks.college.police.uk/toolkit/Pages/Intervention.aspx?InterventionID=36>, accessed 15 February 2018.

78 College of Policing. (2018). <http://whatworks.college.police.uk/toolkit/Pages/Toolkit.aspx>, accessed 15 February 2018.

79 WHO. (2018). ‘Studies of intimate partner violence prevention strategies’ and ‘Studies of intimate partner violence response strategies’. Available at: <http://apps.who.int/violence-info/>, accessed 15 February 2018.

4.3 Violence, alcohol and the Alcohol Harms Reduction Game Changer

According to the SAPS, alcohol plays a significant role in violence and injury in the Western Cape, a claim that is supported by trauma and injury data. This is not necessarily because alcohol is more dangerous than other drugs, but rather it is by far the most accessible, consumed and abused inhibition-lowering substance. In 2016, the same year the WHO ranked South Africa's per capita alcohol intake as 19th in the world,⁸⁰ alcohol was estimated to cost the country R37,9 billion a year, R9,3 billion of which was health-related. Alcohol is believed to influence 50% of road accidents and deaths, and predicts both perpetrating and being a victim of violent crime, including domestic violence. It is the third leading cause of death and disability in the country.⁸¹ According to the SAPS, alcohol is the underlying cause of most murder, attempted murder and rape.⁸² According to the South African Demographic and Health Survey (SADHS) released in 2016, risky drinking is most common in the Northern Cape, followed by the Western Cape.⁸³

In 2016, the Western Cape Cabinet committed itself to seven priority interventions known as the Game Changers. One of these is the Alcohol Harms Reduction Game Changer (AHR), in which the police and law enforcement are key players. Alcohol generates both revenue and jobs for the province, but almost certainly costs it more in related harms.⁸⁴

The AHR focuses on reducing the harms of alcohol using partnerships with communities and law enforcement to control access to alcohol and promote economic and recreational alternatives to drinking. It is being piloted in three high-risk areas, namely Khayelitsha (Town Two in Lingeletu West), Gunya (Nyanga and Gugulethu) and Paarl East. In 2015, the year before the AHR was initiated, the Injury Morbidity Surveillance Report found that alcohol was linked to 53% of all injury admissions at sentinel trauma units. In Nyanga and Khayelitsha, alcohol was linked to 82% of weekend injuries and 97% in Gugulethu.⁸⁵ A study of patient intake at medical facilities in Khayelitsha in 2013 and 2015 found that alcohol was reported or suspected in over half (52%) of those injured, while in 11% of cases the use of alcohol was unknown. Only 36% of cases did not involve alcohol.⁸⁶

80 WHO. (2016). 'Total alcohol consumption per capita (liters of pure alcohol, projected estimates, 15+ years of age)'. Available at <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.ALC.PCAP.LI>, accessed 24 February 2018.

81 Western Cape Government. (2016). *Game Changer Roadmap 2016 - Alcohol Harms Reduction*.

82 SAPS Operational Plan, p. 15.

83 Statistics South Africa. (2016). *South African Demographic and Health Survey*.

84 Western Cape Alcohol Authority, *Annual Report 2016/2017*, p. 16.

85 Western Cape Government. (2016). *Game Changer Roadmap 2016 - Alcohol Harms Reduction*, p. 9.

86 Matzopoulos, R., Berens, C., Bowman, B., Bloch, K., Langa, M., Kotze, E., Lloyd, S., Makanga, P.T., Mureithi, L., Schuurman, N. (2017). *A mixed methods study of the nature and extent of the alcohol trade in Khayelitsha - and community perceptions*. Cape Town: Department of Community Safety, p. 88. ISBN: 978-1-928340-23-2. Available online at https://www.westerncape.gov.za/dept/community-safety/documents/reports_research/A.

The AHR's target is a 10% reduction in injury and death related to alcohol by 2019. It measures this using three data sets and compares them with reported crime trends, including murder, rape, assault and domestic violence.⁸⁷

The AHR is led by DoCS in collaboration with the Western Cape Liquor Authority (WCLA) and other departments. The AHR is being delivered using three levers: 1) Reducing access to alcohol; 2) Alternative recreational opportunities, and; 3) Enhancing the quality of governmental and non-governmental alcohol and social services.⁸⁸ Box 3 presents intended policing and enforcement-related outcomes at AHR pilot sites, and shows that policing is only integral to the first outcome. However, if the AHR is to succeed, it is important that the police and law enforcement enforce relevant legislation consistently and efficiently, and that where possible they contribute to the safety of people who have consumed alcohol and act as lever pullers wherever non-enforcement interventions are necessary. As with all policing, police must be responsive to and respectful of residents if they are to be the partners necessary for the AHR to work. Police and law enforcers must carry out this enforcement work in ways that win over, rather than alienate, communities.⁸⁹

BOX 3: ALCOHOL HARMS REDUCTION STRATEGY POLICING AND ENFORCEMENT OUTCOMES

1. Reducing Access to Alcohol

- Outcome 1: Neighbourhood watches (NHW) are competent and equipped to patrol areas, respond to community complaints, call in law enforcement, monitor liquor outlets, give status reports on community safety in general, clarify responsibilities to community members and related governance support communication and information to community and others where needed.
- Outcome 2: Coordinated enforcement in AHR target areas to create safe passageways, conduct oversight and increase visible policing.
- Outcome 3: Participating outlets adhere to and operate within a set of agreed norms and standards.
- Outcome 4: Legal outlets commit to a code of responsible trading.

2. Alternative recreational opportunities

No core policing or enforcement role.

3. Enhancing the quality of governmental and non-governmental alcohol and social services

No core policing or enforcement role.

87 Western Cape Government. (2016). *Game Changer Roadmap 2016 - Alcohol Harms Reduction*, p. 13.

88 Western Cape Government. (2016). *Game Changer Roadmap 2016 - Alcohol Harms Reduction*, p. 20-25.

89 Matzopoulos, R., Berens, C., Bowman, B., Bloch, K., Langa, M., Kotze, E., Lloyd, S., Makanga, P.T., Mureithi, L. & Schuurman, N. (2017). *A mixed methods study of the nature and extent of the alcohol trade in Khayelitsha - and community perceptions*. Cape Town: Department of Community Safety, pp. 129-130. ISBN: 978-1-928340-23-2. Available online at https://www.westerncape.gov.za/dept/community-safety/documents/reports_research/A.

4.3.1 Alcohol Harms Reduction (AHR) developments during 2016/2017

The Western Cape Department of Social Development (WCSDS) is responsible for lever three of the AHR and in 2016/2017 made some related progress. First, it began piloting an internal referral system for DSD case management. The system is intended to make alcohol-related intervention and preventative services easily accessible to communities. Second, a standard operating procedure for high-risk consumers was developed to standardise interventions in the three pilot sites. Additionally, the WCSDS worked with the Western Cape Department of Health (WCDOH) to develop a directory of AHR-related services in order to market them to communities.⁹⁰ The Department also partnered with the University of Cape Town to undertake a study of community perceptions of strategies to reduce alcohol-related harms. The findings show strong support for enforcement approaches that limit children from easy access to alcohol, and that disrupt the flow of high volumes of alcohol to licensed and unlicensed establishments. This requires a focused policing approach in conjunction with other stakeholders who identify the riskiest outlets and provide awareness training to the community.⁹¹

Not directly linked to the AHR, the SAPS drafted an SOP in 2016/2017, which will provide guidance to SAPS officials tasked with policing unlicensed liquor outlets.⁹² The Western Cape Alcohol-Related Harms Reduction Policy White Paper (2017) calls for more consistent policing and law enforcement responses with regard to unlicensed liquor outlets and enforcement of liquor laws and by-laws.



90 Western Cape Department of Social Development. (2017). *Annual Report 2016/2017*, p. 14.


91 Matzopoulos, R., Berens, C., Bowman, B., Bloch, K., Langa, M., Kotze, E., Lloyd, S., Makanga, P.T., Mureithi, L. & Schuurman, N. (2017). *A mixed methods study of the nature and extent of the alcohol trade in Khayelitsha - and community perceptions*. Cape Town: Department of Community Safety, pp. 129-130. ISBN: 978-1-928340-23-2. Available online at https://www.westerncape.gov.za/dept/community-safety/documents/reports_research/A.

92 SAPS. (2017). *Annual Report 2016/2017*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 123.

4.3.2 Reported crime and PNP feedback in AHR pilot areas

The following three figures present select categories of crime recorded at the three police stations servicing the AHR's pilot areas, from 2011/2012 (four years before the AHR was initiated) to 2016/2017 (roughly 15 months after the strategy launched). The categories of crime presented are commonly associated with alcohol. A summary of AHR-related matters emerging from recent PNP workshops is included beneath each figure.

Figure 12: Nyanga AHR-related crimes, 2012/2013 – 2016/2017



Source: SAPS official statistics, 2016/2017


Figure 12 shows that in 2016/2017, Nyanga recorded increases in assault GBH (1,7%), assault common (9,9%), murder (0,7%), rape (3,6%), and common robbery (7%). It saw a sharp increase in drug-related crime (32,5%), which is likely the result of police action rather than increased drug use. Similarly, it saw a decline in drunk driving (-33,1%), which may reflect less police activity, while the decline in illegal possession of firearms (-14,1%) may reflect changes in police action or a declining presence of firearms and ammunition.

The only significant decline was in attempted murder (-7,6%), while aggravated robbery dipped by 0,3%. It can be concluded that apart from a surge in police-detected drug-related crime, the AHR has not yet produced noticeable changes in reported crime in the Nyanga police precinct.⁹³

At the July and September 2017 PNP workshops held for Nyana and Gugulethu, alcohol was listed as a primary contributor to crime in the area, and as commonly abused by youth. The CPF chairperson complained that there was inadequate consultation with business owners regarding alternative economic opportunities and the issuing of liquor licences. He also expressed concern about the well-being of NHW members implementing aspects of the AHR.⁹⁴

A representative of the Western Cape Liquor Authority described how communities can oppose liquor licence applications and what they can do if they have a problem with a shebeen or tavern, stressing that reports should be lodged with police. He said there were about 170 licensed establishments in Nyanga and that the Board had conducted 309 inspections in the cluster. He said the Liquor Authority is reluctant to issue licences in areas plagued by crime or alcohol abuse.⁹⁵

Figure 13: Gugulethu AHR-related crimes, 2012/2013 – 2016/2017



Source: SAPS official statistics 2016/2017


93 During 2016, SAPS provided DoCS with statistics reflecting the monthly increase/decrease in crime in the specific Blocks where the AHR was implemented, but these figures have not been made available during 2017/18.

94 Western Cape Department of Community Safety. (2017). *Report on the 2017/18 Policing Needs and Priorities workshop for GuNya (Gugulethu and Nyanga) police precincts*, p. 10.

95 Ibid. p. 10-11.

Figure 13 presents select crimes for Gugulethu, from 2012/2013 to 2016/2017. It shows significant declines in murder (-26,1%) and attempted murder (-33,3%), and notable declines in assault GBH (-9,9%), aggravated robbery (-11,8%) and common robbery (-6,7%). Crimes dependent on police action saw notable rises, including illegal possession of firearms/ammo (57,6%), drug-related crime (22,8%), and drunk driving (15,9%). The only increases in crime not linked to police activity were common assault (2,5%) and rape (3,6%), which saw minor increases. In contrast to Nyanga, this data suggests significant shifts in both enforcement and offending in the Gugulethu area, which may in part be a result of the AHR. These changes should be monitored and where they persist, lessons should be learned and replicated elsewhere.


Figure 14: Lingeletu West AHR-related crimes, 2012/2013 – 2016/2017



Source: SAPS official statistics 2016/2017

Figure 14 presents select reported crime data for Lingeletu West. It shows a somewhat suspect decline in attempted murder (-27,%) together with an increase in murder (4,8%) and assault GBH (7,1%). Assault common also declined (-4,2%), while rape (14,3%), common robbery (46,8%) and aggravated robbery (21,5%) increased significantly. Despite these increases, it seems police were more active than in preceding years, with illegal possession of firearms/ammunition (23,8%) and drug-related crime (31,5%) increasing, without clear impact on violent crime. Drunk driving stayed flat (0,4%).

Figure 15: Paarl East AHR-related crimes, 2012/2013 – 2016/2017



Source: SAPS official statistics 2016/2017

Finally, Figure 15 presents the data for Paarl East police precinct. In 2016/2017, the station saw increases in murder (77%), attempted murder (160%), assault GBH (4%), assault common (3%) and rape (45%). Common robbery decreased slightly (-11%). Drug-related crime (27%) and drunk driving (6%) increased, presumably because of police action. At PNP workshops in Paarl East in August and September 2017, it was reported that more recent data showed contact crime declining and alcohol becoming less readily available in Fairyland (the site of the AHR intervention in Paarl East). Table 10 shows non-enforcement actions implemented in AHR targeted areas in Paarl East, as reported by the VPUU in late 2017.



Table 10: Cabinet level intersectoral support for the AHR in Paarl East

Lever 1: Community-based action	Working with NHWs to monitor liquor outlets and ensure they adhere to agreed norms and standards.
Lever 2: Alternative activities	Pool tournament and Youth-Led Friday night activities in collaboration with liquor outlet owners.
Alternative income streams	Possible income streams workshop with 10 owners engaged. Business seed funding competition called Jika Jurn in Paarl East in partnership with Business Activator.
Lever 3: Referral pathways for support	Referral pathways training of NHW by DSD
Brief motivational intervention as part of trauma treatment	Information pamphlets in NHW office and safety kiosk.

Source: Paarl-East PNP Report, 2017

4.4 Gang-related crime and the provincial response to the National Anti-Gangsterism Strategy⁹⁶

It is a common misconception that gangs are responsible for most crime and violence in the Western Cape. While this is not true, the shape and character of some of the province’s gangs is unique in the country, including occasional gunfights in public spaces. It is also true that gangs and gang members are responsible for a significant portion of the province’s crime, and that it is very likely that they contribute disproportionately to affected communities’ sense of vulnerability. As shown in the review of provincial crime data for 2016/2017, most murder victims that year were older than 18 (94,8%) and male (90,7%). This suggests that the ‘youth gangs’ of Cape Town’s former African townships, which are often made up of school-aged boys, do not significantly impact the province’s murder rate, at least not as victims.

According to the SAPS, just 42 ‘gang members’ were convicted and sentenced in 2016/2017, and all from just eight Prevention of Organised Crime Act (POCA) cases.⁹⁷ However, it is very likely that numerous others were arrested for common law offences such as assault, theft, robbery, or unlawful possession of a firearm.

96 For an overview of gang-related murder and attempted murder, see the section ‘Crime, Harm and Safety in the Western Cape’ in this report.

97 SAPS. (2017) *Western Cape Annual Report 2016/2017*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 3.

In 2016, the National Anti-Gangsterism Strategy (NAGS) was adopted by the national and Western Cape cabinets. The strategy replaced the 2008 Western Cape Social Transformation, Gang Prevention and Intervention Strategic Framework. Developed by the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee (NICOC), the NAGS is a national, interdepartmental strategy designed to address gang-related crime countrywide. Reminiscent of the National Crime Prevention Strategy, it recognises the need for a holistic approach to gangs and related harms, addressing socio-economic development, root causes and enabling factors behind gangsterism. The four primary objectives of the strategy are:⁹⁸

- Adopting an effective coordinated and interdepartmental approach in preventing and combating gangsterism, guided by government policies and strategies;
- Promoting a community-centred approach to combating gangsterism that emphasises dialogue, participation by and accountability to communities, as well as addressing root causes and enabling factors of gangsterism;
- Establishing partnerships between government, the private sector, civil society and communities geared towards offering a counter-narrative to ‘rule by gangs’, which empower communities and constitutional political processes; and
- Mitigating the risks posed by gang-related activities through the implementation of prevention, containment, management and mitigation mechanisms to address various levels of gangsterism both within and outside correctional facilities.

The strategy further condenses these objectives into the four pillars outlined in Table 11, the last of which is most relevant to policing.

Table 11: The four pillars of the National Anti-Gangsterism Strategy

Empowering communities	Communicating with communities	Prevention	Combating
Addressing human development, social cohesion, unemployment, poverty and inequality	Social partnerships, stakeholder and community engagement (including civil society and the private sector)	Through improved spatial design and by creating safe living spaces	Through effective law enforcement strategies, upholding the rule of law, and maintaining the integrity and efficacy of the Criminal Justice System

The policy requires cooperation and coordination across a range of government departments, including national, provincial and municipal. In the Western Cape, the strategy’s implementation is coordinated by DoCS, which in December 2016 hosted an expert workshop to brief departments and stakeholders about the

98 NICOC Task Team. (2015) *National Anti-Gangsterism Strategy*, p. 13-14.

strategy and brainstorm ideas for its implementation.⁹⁹ The Department coordinates the Provincial Joints Priorities Committee, which consists of representatives of SAPS, National Prosecuting Authority, Department of Justice, Social Development, Education, Correctional Services and City of Cape Town Law Enforcement. The committee met to discuss the strategy in November 2017, where DoCS reported that it was developing provincial response to the strategy and aimed to conduct a series of stakeholder workshops during 2018/2019 in this regard.¹⁰⁰

The actions outlined in Table 12 are the NAGS actions related to policing that have been initiated or are being considered for initiation in the province:¹⁰¹

Table 12: NAGS strategies related to policing

PILLAR 1: HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
1.1 School Safety (Partnering with Basic Education, SAPS, DSD)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implementation of National School Safety Framework – Training Provincial Master Trainers • Monitoring implementation of the National Strategy for the Prevention and Management of Alcohol and Drug use in schools • Working to insure suitable access control is in place at schools • Implementing formal partnerships between the Department of Basic Education and SAPS, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Building bridges by linking schools and police stations • Establishing School Safety Committees • School crime prevention programmes and searches in collaboration with the SAPS • Identifying priority schools and Provincial Safety Co-ordinators • Developing guidelines for principals, managers, governing bodies and educators
1.2 Social cohesion and sustainable communities (Dept. of Arts & Culture, municipalities)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enforcement of by-laws to promote the rule of law • Interagency collaboration to identify and map houses occupied or used by gangs (SAPS, Metro Police, Asset Forfeiture Unit, National Prosecuting Authority) • Expedite evictions where a court finds a resident guilty of illegally selling drugs or alcohol on the premises • Empower Community Safety Forums through resource provision

99 Department of Community Safety. (2017). *Report on the Expert Workshop on National Anti-Gangsterism Strategy held on 02 December 2016 at Chrysalis Academy, Tokai.*

100 Department of Community Safety. (2017). *National Anti-Gangsterism Strategy Prov Joints Priority Committee.* 24 November 2017.

101 Ibid.

PILLAR 1: HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

1.3 Promoting healthy communities (Partnered with Depts. of Health & Social Development)

No police-specific interventions

1.4 Improve service delivery (All three spheres of government)

No police-specific interventions

1.5 Economic development (In partnership with the NYDA & Economic Sectors)

No police-specific interventions

PILLAR 2: SOCIAL PARTNERSHIPS

- Integrate the NAGS with the work of community safety forums and empower local partnerships that promote safety

PILLAR 3: SPATIAL DESIGN

No police-specific interventions

PILLAR 4: CRIMINAL JUSTICE

4.1 Community mobilisation and safety (Partnering with CPFs and CSFs)

- Identify youth at risk in gang affected communities
- Collect and disseminate information on community needs
- Ensure that community needs are considered in IDPs
- Develop awareness programmes on drug and substance abuse
- Mobilise and partner with communities in gang affected areas
- Support developmental and security initiatives in delivering services to communities
- Assist in maintaining government infrastructure

4.2 Intelligence gathering & coordination (Partnering with SAPS, Corrections & Justice)

- Reinstigate SAPS' Organised Crime Threat Assessments for the province
- Ensure greater integration of crime data at station level
- Strengthen the analysis of strategic information for crime prevention purposes
- Increase informant base to monitor gang-related activities
- Implement the Integrated Justice System project to ensure proper profiling of offenders and gang members

PILLAR 4: CRIMINAL JUSTICE

4.3 Crime Prevention (Partnering with SAPS & Department of Education)

- CPFs to engage with communities regarding the prevalence of gang activity in (increase detection of drugs and take action)
- Enhance SAPS marketing strategy – foster community support
- Target at-risk youth and place at-risk youth on leadership and anger management programmes

4.4 Combatting approach (Partnering with the criminal justice sector)

- Joint interventions by SAPS and other departments.
- Implement National Drug Master Plan
- Police visibility in identified hotspots
- Identify and profile ring leaders
- High density operations
- Intelligence-led POCA investigations of high fliers
- Increase capacity to enforce POCA
- Investigate links between criminal syndicates and gangsterism
- Improve co-operation with Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC), AFU, SARS (illicit flows)

4.5 Prosecution

- Strengthen integrated coordinated case management between the DSD, SAPS investigation and NPA prosecutions to combat all forms of gang-related activity.
- Ensuring optimal resourcing of prosecution service. Capacitate Criminal Justice System (CJS) teams at all levels of investigation and judicial service.
- Improve the court case management and increase administrative capacity to support prosecutions.

4.6 Rehabilitation and reintegration of offenders (Partnering with DSD, DCS)

- Improved case management in transfer and management of children from secure facilities
- Behaviour Modification Programme in correctional centres, continuously reassess and modify impact of programmes.
- Improve access of former offenders to employment (partnerships with private sector and government)
- Reintegration and outreach programmes to improve social cohesion and restorative justice
- Partner with NGOs such as NICRO

The next chapter presents the findings of the policing needs and priorities consultations in 2017/2018.

5. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS OF THE POLICING NEEDS AND PRIORITIES PUBLIC CONSULTATIONS, 2017/2018

As part of its annual Policing Needs and Priorities (PNP) consultations, the Western Cape Department of Community Safety (DoCS) in 2017 hosted a series of workshops for the cabinet-prioritised areas, namely GuNYA (Gugulethu and Nyanga), Khayelitsha, Manenberg, Paarl East, Riebeeck West and Saldanha Bay police precincts. (See schedule of public engagements attached as Annexure 3.) These engagements aimed to feed into the consultative process, mandated by Section 206 of the Constitution and Section 23 of the Western Cape Community Safety Act,¹⁰² in terms of which the Minister of Police is obliged to seek input from provincial governments about their policing needs and priorities.

The key aims of the 2017 PNP workshops were to:

- Consult with strategic stakeholders in each police precinct within the Community Safety Improvement Partnership (CSIP) areas about their policing needs and priorities;
- Develop safety plans for each police precinct within the CSIP area; and
- Determine perceptions of safety in each one of the CSIP areas.

5.1 Target group

Six PNP workshops were conducted, based on the number of CSIP areas in the province. These include Paarl East, Saldanha Bay, Khayelitsha, Gunya (Gugulethu and Nyanga), and Manenberg. Riebeeck West was added as an additional consultation at the request of the municipality. Invitations were extended to as wide a range of organisations and individuals as possible, including:

- SAPS cluster commanders and precinct station commanders and members;
- CPFs and cluster executives;
- Neighbourhood Watches;
- Non-governmental, community and faith-based organisations;
- National and provincial government departments as well as other state agencies such as the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA);
- Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID);
- Integrated Development Plan managers;
- Ward councillors; and
- Representatives from businesses, Central Improvement Districts and private security service providers.

102 Act 3 of 2013.

5.2 Structure of the workshops

This financial year (2017/2018), it was decided to host two separate engagements per priority area to allow for more time identifying policing needs and priorities and to develop safety plans based on the policing needs identified. About 279 participants took part in the engagements and 279 completed the survey (Community Safety Scorecard research tool). At the start of the engagement, each participant was handed a file containing key documents intended to contextualise and guide the discussions. These included the 2016 Safety Plan for the cluster (developed during the previous year's PNP engagement workshops), a situational analysis report, safety and security matters raised during the IDP community engagements and copies of various presentations. The stakeholder engagement was opened by the Mayor or Councillor responsible for safety and security. Thereafter, The Minister of Community Safety, Mr Dan Plato, delivered the keynote address, followed by several departmental presentations on safety. This included DoCS, the South African Police Service (SAPS), the departments of Justice and Constitutional Development, Correctional Services, Social Development and the Saldanha Bay Municipal Public Safety Unit (inclusive of Traffic and Law Enforcement).

The SAPS also reported on the implementation of the 2016 Safety Plan and their current interventions to increase safety in the respective areas. This was followed by a plenary session and the completion of the 'Safety Confidence Score Card' research questionnaire. The plenary was divided into randomly assigned groups of 10-15 people. Each group was asked to discuss a theme and any related policing needs. The themes were: professional policing, partnerships and public spaces, substance abuse, gender-based violence, and economic matters. This was later compiled into an outline of the policing needs and priorities identified and presented back to participants at the second workshop. There the participants were again divided into groups to start developing a Community Safety Plan.¹⁰³

As a way forward, the safety plan will be submitted to the SAPS station and CPF chairpersons and clusters and municipality to consider which items of the safety plan to prioritise. The SAPS will address professional policing issues; the local CPF will address relevant issues in the safety plan; and other government departments will consider issues raised for future planning purposes. This is the first step to give local government co-ownership in implementing elements of the safety plan and to co-produce safety in the area.

¹⁰³ The discussions around professional policing, partnerships and public spaces complement the CSIP objectives referred to on page 4 under 'Background'.

5.3 SAFETY CONFIDENCE SCORECARD

The community safety scorecard is a research questionnaire designed to ascertain:

- whether participants were victims of crime and/or police action during the previous year;
- to measure their perceptions of police professionalism;
- whether they feel safe in public and private spaces, and;
- their perceptions of existing safety partnerships (particularly CPFs, CSFs, Reservists and NHWs).

To this end, participants answered a questionnaire containing a series of statements with a range of possible reactions, four (4) being 'strongly agree' and one (1) being 'strongly disagree'. Police professionalism was elicited via 16 questions aimed to measure the ways in which police interactions with the public were perceived by participants; there were 17 questions on feelings of safety in public and private spaces; and 12 questions on partnerships with the police via CPFs, CSFs, NHWs and the SAPS reservist programme.¹⁰⁴ After the workshop, the data were captured and entered into Survey Monkey (a software programme for subsequent organisation of the data on a spreadsheet), in terms of the main issues identified.

5.4 Non-plenary group discussions

The thematic focus group discussions were moderated by a facilitator from the Department and written up by a scribe. The facilitator was responsible for collating the group's input into one document, which was presented in the plenary after the discussion. The group discussions centred on identifying the policing and safety needs and, during the second workshop, on setting policing priorities for the development and implementation of a safety plan.

5.5 Limitations

Given the size of the groups and the time taken by preceding presentations there was insufficient time for in-depth and detailed discussions around the safety plan. Whilst these discussions certainly stimulated debate and gave opportunities (which might not otherwise have arisen) for people to discuss local safety issues, further discussion would be required to develop more concrete plans.

- Percentages may not add up to 100%, as they are rounded to the nearest percentage.
- Participant demographics may not perfectly reflect community demographics (depending on who chose to participate).

104 See Annexure 2 for the questionnaire.

- The votes of the SAPS were included in this year’s calculations and could have skewed the data.
- Some respondents did not complete all the questions on the scorecard. This had various implications for the data and therefore the number of votes for certain questions fluctuates.


These limitations were mitigated through triangulating the key findings with secondary data sources.

6. RESULTS OF THE PNP SAFETY CONFIDENCE SCORECARD

6.1 Participants

Participants consisted of interested parties involved in the field of policing, crime prevention, community safety, victim empowerment and safety and security. The leadership of key groups were invited to participate, such as Neighbourhood Watches (NHWs), Community Police Forums (CPF), SAPS, Community Safety Forums (CSFs), Government Departments, Councillors, Faith-based Organisations, Municipalities, NGOs/NPOs/NPCs, City Improvement Districts (CIDs), Private Security, the Business Sector and selected Community Members.

Figure 16: Participants per stakeholder group (n=279)




As indicated above, the majority of participants (23,66%) were from the NHW, followed by CPF (14,7%), and National and Provincial Government Departments and Community members both at 11,83%. Faith-based organisations constituted 9,32%, followed by NPOs/NGOs (7,89%), Local Government Sector (7,53%), SAPS (6,09%), ‘other’ (5,02%), business sector (1,43%), Victim Support Programme and Community Improvement District (CID) at 0,36% each. It is important to

note that 3,13% of the respondents skipped the question on which stakeholder they represent.

NHWs and CPFs were also the majority represented stakeholders in 2016/2017.¹⁰⁵


6.2 Contact with the Criminal Justice System

Figure 17: Household crime victimisation - Have you or a member of your household been a victim of crime in the last 12 months? (n=275)



The Department asked participants whether they had been a victim of crime in the last 12 months. As illustrated above, 42,55% indicated that they or someone in their household had been a victim of crime; 4,52% of the respondents skipped the question.


Figure 18: Gender breakdown



¹⁰⁵ Department of Community Safety. (2017). *Provincial Policing Needs and Priorities (PNP) 2016/2017 Report*, Western Cape Government, p. 34.

In terms of gender breakdown, there were more females (52,17%) than males (47,83%).

Figure 19: Nature of crime (n =117)




Of those respondents who had been a victim of crime, the majority reported being victims of common robbery (49,15%), burglary at residential premises (33,05%) and robbery at residential premises (28,81%). According to the Victims of Crime Survey 2016/2017, 1,65% of the individuals in the Western Cape were victims of robbery outside their homes.¹⁰⁶ This figure was higher than 0,71% of individuals who had been victims of robbery outside their homes in South Africa as a whole, or in any other province.¹⁰⁷ This shows that robbery in general is still a safety concern in the Western Cape. However, it is worth noting that 59,38% of the respondents skipped the question.

106 Statistics South Africa. (2017). *Victims of Crime Survey 2016/2017*, p. 37.

107 Statistics South Africa. (2017). *Victims of Crime Survey 2016/2017*, p. 37.


Figure 20: Have you or a member of your household been charged with crime detected as a result of police action? (n =260)



12,69% of the sample indicated that they had been charged with crime as a result of police action, while 87,31% had not.

6.3 Professional policing

Figure 21: Perceptions of confidence (n= 275)




A little more than half (53%) of the respondents did not think that the police in their area were corrupt, 68% indicated that they know where to complain if they had a complaint about the service of the police, and 50% were confident in the police. It is worth noting that the Victims of Crime Survey 2016/2017 indicated that 49,3% of the households in the Western Cape were satisfied with the police.¹⁰⁸

108 Statistics South Africa. (2017). *Victims of Crime Survey 2016/2017*, p. 18.


In addition, 56% showed confidence in the Department of Correctional Services, while 52% showed confidence in the National Prosecuting Authority and 40% in the overall Criminal Justice System. This is lower than the 44% figure of the 2016/2017 PNP.¹⁰⁹

Figure 22: SAPS interaction with communities (n=275)



About 46% of the respondents thought that the police inform the community about their services, 60% felt that the police in their area treated the community with courtesy and respect, and 64% agreed that the police had the skills to carry out their policing functions. Only 40% of the respondents thought that the police had sufficient physical resources. This figure is 1% higher than that of the 2016/2017 PNP where 39% felt that the police had sufficient physical resources.¹¹⁰

Figure 23: Police service delivery and performance of functions (n=275)



The majority (65%) of the respondents agreed that the police supported safety initiatives and 62% thought that the police actively patrolled in their areas. Only 41% agreed that the police recovered stolen property. This is slightly lower than

109 Department of Community Safety. (2017). *Provincial Policing Needs and Priorities (PNP) 2016/2017 Report*, Western Cape Government: p. 37.

110 Department of Community Safety. (2017). *Provincial Policing Needs and Priorities (PNP) 2016/2017 Report*, Western Cape Government: p. 38.


41,5% of respondents in the Victims of Crime Survey who said they were satisfied with the police in the Western Cape because they recover stolen property.¹¹¹

Just 35% of respondents indicated that the police arrived at crime scenes timeously. This is lower than the 47% figure of the 2016/2017 PNP consultations.¹¹² It is also important to note that the Victims of Crime Survey 2015/2016 indicated that 71,7% of households in the Western Cape were satisfied with the police because they come to the scene of the crime.¹¹³ The police in the Western Cape responded faster to emergency calls than police in other provinces, with 33,7% of respondents reporting that they arrived within 30 minutes, and 25,7% reporting that they arrived within an hour.¹¹⁴ It should also be noted that police stations were more accessible in the Western Cape than in any other province, with over 98% able to access a police station within an hour.¹¹⁵

Only 42% of respondents agreed that police provided feedback on cases reported in their areas. This is lower than the 50% figure of the previous year.¹¹⁶ Most (67%) respondents agreed that the police in their area arrest criminals. This is lower than the 79% figure of the previous year.¹¹⁷ In addition, the Victims of Crime Survey 2015/2016 indicated that 61,5% of households in the Western Cape were satisfied with the police because they arrest criminals.¹¹⁸

6.4 Perceptions of safety in public spaces and at home

Figure 24: Safety at home and in public (n=268)




Only 13% of the respondents felt safe on the street at night, whereas 39% felt safe during the day. This is different to the previous year’s figures where 35% of respondents felt safe on the street at night, with 58% feeling safe during the

111 Statistics South Africa. (2016). *Victims of Crime Survey 2015/2016*, p. 44.
 112 Department of Community Safety. (2017). *Provincial Policing Needs and Priorities (PNP) 2016/2017 Report*, Western Cape Government: p. 39.
 113 Statistics South Africa. (2016). *Victims of Crime Survey 2015/2016*, p. 44.
 114 Statistics South Africa. (2016). *Victims of Crime Survey 2015/2016*, p. 36.
 115 Statistics South Africa. (2016). *Victims of Crime Survey 2015/2016*, p. 35.
 116 Department of Community Safety. (2017). *Provincial Policing Needs and Priorities (PNP) 2016/2017 Report*, Western Cape Government: p. 39.
 117 Department of Community Safety. (2017). *Provincial Policing Needs and Priorities (PNP) 2016/2017 Report*, Western Cape Government: p. 39.
 118 Statistics South Africa. (2016). *Victims of Crime Survey 2015/2016*, p. 44.

day.¹¹⁹ Only 47% of respondents felt safe in their homes at night, with 61% feeling safe during the day.

Figure 25: Perceptions of safety in community spaces and public commercial buildings (n=268)




Only 18% of the respondents felt safe in open spaces and recreational areas at night, while 40% felt safe during the day. Interestingly, the Victims of Crime Survey 2015/2016 indicated that 48,4% households in the Western Cape avoided going to open spaces and parks because of fear of crime.¹²⁰ Only 21% felt safe accessing communal services at night and 40% during the day. The majority (51%) of the respondents felt safe at government facilities. This is lower than the 67% figure of the previous year.¹²¹ About 27% of the respondents felt safe in public commercial or retail places at night, whereas 39% felt safe during the day.

119 Department of Community Safety. (2017). *Provincial Policing Needs and Priorities (PNP) 2016/2017 Report*, Western Cape Government: p. 43.

120 Statistics South Africa. (2016). *Victims of Crime Survey 2015/2016*, p. 14.

121 Department of Community Safety. (2017). *Provincial Policing Needs and Priorities (PNP) 2016/2017 Report*, Western Cape Government: p. 44.

Figure 26: Perception of safety around public and private transport (n=268)



Only 15% of respondents felt safe using public transport at night, while 40% felt safe travelling on public transport during the day. This is different to the findings of the 2016/2017 PNP where 28% of the respondents felt safe travelling on public transport at night, while 50% felt safe during the day.¹²² The Victims of Crime Survey 2015/2016 has found that 27,1% of households in the Western Cape were prevented from using public transport because of fear of crime,¹²³ highlighting the impact of crime on the daily lives of the majority of residents of the province. Only 15% of respondents felt safe at public transportation hubs at night, with 30% feeling safe during the day. This is different to the findings of the 2016/2017 PNP where 29% felt safe in public transportation hubs at night, while 39% felt safe during the day.¹²⁴ Fewer (29%) respondents felt safe travelling in a private vehicle at night compared to the day (52%). This is different to the findings of the 2016/2017 PNP where 50% felt safe travelling in a private vehicle at night and 71% felt safe during the day.¹²⁵

122 Department of Community Safety. (2017). *Provincial Policing Needs and Priorities (PNP) 2016/2017 Report*, Western Cape Government, p. 45.

123 Statistics South Africa. (2016). *Victims of Crime Survey 2015/2016*, p. 14.


124 Department of Community Safety. (2017). *Provincial Policing Needs and Priorities (PNP) 2016/2017 Report*, Western Cape Government, p. 45.

125 Department of Community Safety. (2017). *Provincial Policing Needs and Priorities (PNP) 2016/2017 Report*, Western Cape Government, p. 45.

6.5 Partnerships

This section discusses how participants view the role and contribution of partnerships between the SAPS and civil society. These include CPFs, Neighbourhood Watches, Community Safety Forums and SAPS Reservists. In terms of its ‘whole of society’ approach, DoCS views partnerships as being central to community safety. As such the third pillar of its CSIP programme is to establish viable safety partnerships within communities.

Figure 27: Partnerships contributing to safety (n=269)




1. NHWs 74% (84% in 2016/2017)
2. CPFs 64% (71% in 2016/2017)
3. SAPS reservists 57% (65% in 2016/2017)
4. CSFs 56% (62% in 2016/2017)

In terms of the rankings listed above, NHWs (74%) received the highest number of votes, followed by CPF (64%), SAPS reservists (57%) and CSFs (56%). As already indicated earlier in the report, the sample is somewhat skewed given that the majority of participants were connected to the SAPS and to safety partnerships and thus the positive rankings for NHWs and CPFs were to be expected. It is also important to note that the rankings of the previous year dropped significantly to those of 2017/2018.




Figure 28: Holding the police accountable through the CPF (n=269)



Most of the respondents (58%) agreed that the CPF holds the police accountable to the community and 48% indicated that the CPF provides regular feedback. This is lower than the 58% figure of the previous year.¹²⁶ Most respondents (59%) indicated that they reported their concerns regarding crime to the CPF, with 61% reporting their concerns about the police. Most respondents (57%) agreed that the CPFs have established strong partnerships in their area. This is lower than the 65% figure of the previous year.¹²⁷

Figure 29: Neighbourhood Watch as a monitoring mechanism (n=269)



The majority of the respondents (64%) agreed that their Neighbourhood Watch helped them to access important safety information from different sources; 67% thought that it helped them to keep track of various safety issues; and 66% agreed that it assisted in monitoring the municipality's role in their areas. This is lower than the 72% figure of the previous year.¹²⁸

126 Department of Community Safety. (2017). *Provincial Policing Needs and Priorities (PNP) 2016/2017 Report*, Western Cape Government, p. 47.

127 Ibid.

128 Ibid.

7. SUMMARY OF KEY PNP CONCERNS AND SAFETY PLANS

The following is a summary of key concerns raised by participants during the 2017/18 PNP consultative workshops with an analysis of whether the concerns and proposed solutions are likely to impact crime levels. The proposed solutions were carried through into the Community Safety Plans developed in each area.¹²⁹

SUBJECT: SAFETY AND SECURITY

POLICE AREA:

Gunya

CONCERN:

Murder; Illegal firearms

COMMENTARY & ANALYSES:

As illustrated in Chapter 2, contact crime in the Western Cape, including at Gunya's stations, is clustered by time and place, with most contact crime and murder occurring over weekends and involving alcohol. As such, focused interventions that target hotspots within these policing areas over weekends may well reduce contact crime and murder. It therefore makes sense to shift policing personnel and resources from less violent police areas to those in which deadly violence is most predictable, during these times.

Where violence and murder are most common in informal neighbourhoods, police must be deployed to them. Importantly, when policing is focused in particularly vulnerable areas, such as Gunya, enforcement posture must be procedurally just and fair, rather than militant. Where a surge in enforcement is perceived as threatening to at risk communities, aggressive policing may do more harm than good.¹³⁰

Removing illegal firearms from communities in which gang violence is common, seems to reduce incidents of murder.¹³¹ Mass seizures are usually achieved through cordon and search operations. Police should continue to carry out firearm-targeting operations but should do so in ways that do not threaten their legitimacy in the eyes of most residents.

As with most violent crime, murder will be most easily reduced through a combination of focused enforcement and social interventions, as is proposed by the AHR model.¹³²

129 The PNP reports and Safety Plans for each PNP area can be found on the Department's website: https://www.westerncape.gov.za/documents/reports_research/P.

130 Eisner, M. (2015) *Homicide Dispatch 1: How to Reduce Homicide by 50% in the Next 30 Years*. Igarape Institute; Office for Community Oriented Policing Services. (2015) *The President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report of the President's Task Force on 21st Century*. Washington, D.C. Available at: <http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/>, accessed 22 February 2018; Skogan, W. and Frydl, K. (eds). (2004). *Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: The Evidence Committee to Review Research on Police Policy and Practices*, National Research Council.

131 Lamb, G. (2015). "Fighting fire with an inferno: The South African Police Service and the 'War' on Violent Crime", *International Journal on Human Rights*. Available at: <http://sur.conectas.org/en/fighting-fire-inferno/>, accessed 27 February 2018.

132 Abt, T. & Winship, C. (2016). *What works in reducing community violence: a meta-review and field study for the Northern Triangle*, USAID & Democracy International; Sherman, L.W., Gottfredson, D., MacKenzie, D., Eck, J. Reuter, P., Bushway, S. (1997). *Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising: A Report to the United States Congress*. Available at: <https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=165366>.

SUBJECT: SAFETY AND SECURITY**POLICE AREA:****Gunya; Khayelitsha; Saldanha****CONCERN:**

Unemployment; Poverty

COMMENTARY & ANALYSES:

Gunya, Khayelitsha and Saldanha PNP participants all identified poverty and unemployment as key drivers of crime in their station areas. Related concerns were a lack of meaningful entrepreneurship programmes.

Proposed solutions included supporting access to the TDA/COCT database to support youth employment, sharing information on EPWPs, and prioritising the use of local actors when tenders are issued. These are not policing issues, but with so much social disorder, police and law enforcement is the key to maintaining order so that socio-economic interventions can be advanced.

Poverty and unemployment are often cited as drivers of crime in Western Cape police precincts. It is important when exploring this claim to include inequality as a driver of crime. In the absence of significant numbers of well-employed and well-remunerated individuals, poverty and unemployment lose much of their criminogenic efficacy. However, unemployment and poverty in the face of extreme wealth and conspicuous consumption more clearly predict crime.

Correlations between neighbourhood disadvantage and violence have been found across the world. In South Africa, wealthier neighbourhoods have much lower rates of reported violence, but higher rates of property crime than poorer areas, and vice versa.¹³³ Nevertheless, it can be difficult to know exactly which factors, or combinations thereof, predict violence.

Robust studies conducted in both wealthy and developing and unequal country contexts find a generally positive correlation between poverty, unemployment and crime rates. It was found in India that there was a positive and statistically significant impact of poverty, inequitable income growth and low quality of the legal system on incidence of total property-related crimes¹³⁴, and that trade shocks which raise relative poverty in an area, also increased the incidence of violent property crime.¹³⁵ In Mexico, increased inequality in gang-plagued areas correlated with significantly more murder in a period of gang conflict.¹³⁶

In the US it was found that cities where the average income increases, crime declines while unemployment, income inequality and racial/ethnic heterogeneity were associated with increased crime rates.¹³⁷ The relationship between income inequality and financial

133 Kriegler, A. & Shaw, M. (2016) *A Citizen's Guide to Crime Statistics in South Africa*. Johannesburg and Cape Town: Jonathan Ball.

134 Bharadwaj, A. (2014). 'Is poverty the mother of crime? Empirical evidence of the impact of socio-economic factors on crime in India'. *Atlantic Review of Economics*, Vol. 1.

135 Iyer, L. & Topalova, P. (2014). *Poverty and Crime: Evidence from Rainfall and Trade Shocks in India*. Working Paper 14-067, Harvard Business School.

136 Ibid.

137 Hipp, J.R. & Kane, K. (2017). 'Cities and the larger context: What explains changing levels of crime'. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 49. pp. 32-44.

crimes has been confirmed in the US, where job opportunities and efficient criminal justice reduces crime,¹³⁸ while a relative income inequality has been shown to drive burglary and robbery.¹³⁹ In Brazil, conditional cash transfers have been shown to have significant impacts on crime.¹⁴⁰

SUBJECT: SAFETY AND SECURITY

POLICE AREA:

Gunya; Khayelitsha; Saldanha

CONCERN:

Drugs and substance use

COMMENTARY & ANALYSES:

At these PNP workshops participants expressed concern regarding the use and abuse of drugs, and their link to other offences, and police corruption. Similarly, victim surveys have consistently shown that most South African households believe 'drug-related needs' motivate most offences.¹⁴¹ In the Western Cape, 84,6% of respondents believed this to be the case in 2015/2016.¹⁴²

Specific concerns raised at 2017 PNP workshops were: 1) an absence of rehabilitation facilities for substance users; 2) a lack of information on 'drug houses' (i.e. where drugs are believed to be sold and used); 3) a need to introduce drug prevention activities in schools; 4) a need to provide mentoring and support to youth when they leave drug rehabilitation programmes, and; 5) in Khayelitsha, a need to participate in the Substance Abuse Forum of the Khayelitsha Commission.

In response, police said they would carry out search and seizure operations targeting drug users, and use warrants and S252a operations to target drug dealers. It should be noted that disproportionately targeting drug users over dealers (which the SAPS performance chart encourages) may cause more harm to police-community relations than good. It may also clog the court roll and put the SAPS at risk of civil litigation where arrested persons are victimised or abused in police custody or holding cells.

Drug and community courts

One innovative criminal justice and social welfare drug intervention that has shown some efficacy outside South Africa is the use of drug courts.¹⁴³

Drug courts cater specifically to offenders who are drug users or addicts, as a form of diversion from the normal court system. Such systems recognise that drug-related

138 Scorzafave, L.G., Soares, M.K. (2009). 'Income inequality and pecuniary crimes'. *Economics Letters*, 104, pp. 40-42.

139 Choe, J. (2008). 'Income inequality and crime in the United States'. *Economics Letters* 101, pp. 31-33.

140 Spillovers from conditional cash transfer programs: *Bolsa Familia* and crime in urban Brazil.

141 Statistics South Africa. (2017). *Victims of Crime Surveys 2016/2017*, p. 71.

142 Statistics South Africa. (2016). *Victim of Crime Survey 2015/2016*, p. 2; NOTE: The 2016/2017 survey did not present this data by province.

143 College of Policing. (2018). 'Drug Courts'. Available at: <http://whatworks.college.police.uk/toolkit/Pages/Intervention.aspx?InterventionID=34>, accessed 18 February 2018.

offending is, to a degree, beyond the control of offenders so that care and support are likely to be more beneficial than punishment.¹⁴⁴

Judges and drug court teams combine supervision, reward and punishment to support offenders to manage or cease their use of drugs and criminal offending. Those who complete the 3-12-month programme without offending can have more traditional sanctions reduced or waived, while those who offend while under supervision can be further sanctioned or redirected to regular criminal courts. Teams working with offenders include prosecutors, lawyers, law enforcement officials, treatment providers, among others.

Based on current evidence, drug courts are most effective when applied to first-time and non-violent offenders, and users of methamphetamine (tik).

While there are two dedicated drug courts in Cape Town, these do not function like the system just described. Rather, they are intended to expedite punishment rather than support drug rehabilitation.¹⁴⁵ Cape Town's community courts are more similar to the effective drug court described above. Set up to 'prevent petty crime and urban decay', a significant portion of the courts' work relates to drug possession (21%-58%).¹⁴⁶ Most cases are resolved (withdrawn) in one day at an average of 8-13 cases a day. This is significantly faster than regular criminal courts, which resolve on average three cases a week. Resolutions commonly involve diversion programmes (e.g. community service, skills training) and mediation. Roughly 80 percent of participants comply with diversion orders. Warrants of arrest are issued for some defaulters.¹⁴⁷

Community courts alone have not been associated with declines in violent or petty crime. However, it is still preferable that people arrested for petty offences, including possession of small quantities of drugs, are not put through a standard criminal prosecution. So even where community courts do not clearly impact crime, they may still play an important but hard-to-measure social role based around civil, supportive interactions between citizens and the state.

There is a danger in the Western Cape, that conservative social values and misunderstandings about 'drugs' will alienate and criminalise people who should be supported. This is a particular danger in light of the SAPS's efforts to annually increase its drug arrests as evidence of work done. A system that punishes individual users rather than producers and dealers can harm people's relationship with the state in ways that do not benefit them or their communities.¹⁴⁸

144 Although similar arguments can be made for all forms of crime and violence, they are particularly relevant to drug-related crime.

145 Evans, J. (2016). 'New 'Drug Court' opens in Bellville'. Available at: <https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/new-drug-court-opens-in-bellville-20160702>, accessed 23 February 2018.

146 Redpath, J. & Petersen, K. (2017). *Western Cape Community Court Evaluation: Final Report*. Africa Criminal Justice Reform, Dullah Omar Institute, University of the Western Cape.

147 Ibid.

148 Abt, T. & Winship, C. (2016). *What works in reducing community violence: a meta-review and field study for the Northern Triangle*, USAID & Democracy International, p. 16.

Drug substitution programmes

Another drug-related intervention that has been shown to reduce crime involves the state substituting or providing drugs to drug addicts.¹⁴⁹ In doing so, these programmes are able to control the amount and type of drugs used by drug-dependent offenders. Some programmes substitute illegal drugs for legal alternatives (such as methadone in place of heroin or morphine), while others provide regulated and legal access to illegal substances so that users do not engage with criminal markets and related harms.¹⁵⁰ It is believed that by providing access to drugs through such systems, addicts are less likely to offend in the pursuit of drugs and may be able to be weaned off their addictions.

SUBJECT: SAFETY AND SECURITY

POLICE AREA:
Gunya; Khayelitsha

CONCERN:
Alcohol

COMMENTARY & ANALYSES:

See also: *Crime Overview* and *Alcohol Harms Reduction Game Changer*

Community members alleged that licensed liquor stores were selling alcohol to unlicensed shebeens, which in turn sold it on to the public; that operating hours at licensed outlets should be regulated and that liquor outlets should be mapped in Khayelitsha. It was also suggested that when considering the granting of licences, the Liquor Authority should consult street committees. At the same time the Liquor Authority appealed to communities to lodge concerns with the SAPS in order to clamp down on illegal outlets and build evidence against problematic licensed premises.

Research from elsewhere on the effects of limits to the hours or days on which alcohol can be sold, has not shown a statistically significant impact on harm or injury.¹⁵¹ Nor has the taxation of alcohol, though this can at least raise state funds to offset alcohol-related harms. On the other hand, qualitative research carried out in Cape Town townships suggests greater harm than good as a result of the policing of informal liquor outlets.¹⁵²

Though unstated, a significant challenge to the enforcement of liquor licences by police is that two or four police cannot easily shut down an illegal shebeen with ten or more drinking clients, without putting themselves at risk. The result is the enforcement of licensing regulations by day and the flouting of them at night.

149 Ibid.; College of Policing. (2018). 'Drug Substitutes'. Available at: <http://whatworks.college.police.uk/toolkit/Pages/Intervention.aspx?InterventionID=43>, accessed 20 February 2018.

150 A similar logic informs calls by many to decriminalise various illegal substances, as well as sex work. Decriminalisation can allow regulation, taxation and oversight in ways that are not possible with criminal markets.

151 College of Policing. (2018). 'Limiting alcohol sales'. Available at: <http://whatworks.college.police.uk/toolkit/Pages/Intervention.aspx?InterventionID=20>, accessed 20 February 2018.

152 Herrick, C. & Charman, A. (2013). 'Shebeens and crime: the multiple criminalities of South African liquor and its regulation'. *SA Crime Quarterly*, 45, pp. 25-32.

SUBJECT: SAFETY AND SECURITY

POLICE AREA:

Gunya; Riebeek West; Saldanha

CONCERN:

Domestic violence; Gender-based violence; Child abuse

COMMENTARY & ANALYSES:

See also: *Box 2 – Best practices in the policing and prevention of domestic violence.*

PNP attendees reported poor police responses to domestic violence; a need for safe places for victims of gender-based violence; and that people accused of child abuse faced no consequences for their alleged crimes. As discussed previously, response time by police does not necessarily reduce harm when it comes to general crime, but it is symbolically powerful – it shows that the state is concerned about the victim, and disapproves of the offender’s actions. In terms of domestic violence, where perpetrator and victim cohabit, a speedy police or other emergency service response allows victims to be moved to a place of safety.

Considering that violence often begins within families, domestic, gender-based and child violence enforcement and related interventions must be prioritised. This includes helping residents understand, a) that everyone has a right to bail and that bail is usually preferable to incarceration for people awaiting trial, and; b) that many South Africans unintentionally reproduce violence-supporting norms as parents, partners and friends.

SUBJECT: SAFETY AND SECURITY

POLICE AREA:

Gunya

CONCERN:

Street safety

COMMENTARY & ANALYSES:

See also: *Robbery in Overview of Crime*

Participants expressed concern about safety in public spaces, including streets. Requests were made for a walking bus to be established in Gugulethu.

Limited ethnographic research with South African police describes the policing of townships at night as focused on emptying streets of small groups of people and avoiding large crowds.¹⁵³ While this approach is understandable – small groups of people may either plan to rob/assault pedestrians or become victims of crime – empty streets are not safer streets. Ideally, police and other law enforcers, together with other stakeholders, would help to foster safe night-time economies in townships. This would generate both natural surveillance and thus safety, and allow for the growth of a night-time economy that enriches the lives of residents and connects them to the broader city economy.

153 Steinberg, J. (2008). *Thin Blue: The Unwritten Rules of Policing South Africa*, Cape Town: Jonathan Ball; Faull, A. (2018). *Police Work and Identity: a South African Ethnography*. Abingdon & New York: Routledge.

SUBJECT: SAFETY AND SECURITY

POLICE AREA:
Manenberg; Khayelitsha; Gunya

CONCERN:
Attacks on EMS

COMMENTARY & ANALYSES:

At each PNP, EMS staff and participants expressed concern about the lack of safety for EMS personnel and the number of attacks on their safety – particularly in Khayelitsha, Gunya and Manenberg.

EMS monitors safety on an hourly basis and issues warnings or prevents staff from accessing dangerous areas at high-risk times. SAPS officials are sometimes asked to escort EMS staff into areas considered dangerous, which both delays emergency response and places a burden on police.

DoCS, the City's Law Enforcement and SAPS are piloting the provision of Safe Zones at 10 high risk schools and 16 areas in Lavender Hill to facilitate EMS access to the community.



SUBJECT: SAFETY AND SECURITY**POLICE AREA:****Manenberg; Khayelitsha****CONCERN:**

Gang-related crimes

COMMENTARY & ANALYSES:

See also: Crime, Harm and Safety in the Western Cape; *Gang-related murder and attempted murder*

Participants from each area complained of gang-related crimes. In Khayelitsha, complaints related to youth proto-gangs, while in Manenberg the gangs are more organised, involved in organised crime, and are structured and linked to the Numbers Gangs. As discussed under *Gang-related murder and attempted murder*, gangs are not responsible for most violence or murder, as is popularly believed in some areas.

The provincial response to the NAGS will be key to addressing gangs in these and other areas in the province. The response strategy is currently being drafted.

The City of Cape Town's Shot Spotter initiative, which identifies the point at which shots were fired in Manenberg and Hanover Park, helps to identify problematic areas and in some cases has facilitated a faster law enforcement response to shootings.

Much more work is needed to reduce gang activity and violence in these neighbourhoods, including both law-enforcement and socio-economic interventions. At-risk young men and known gang members must be made aware that crime and violence will not be tolerated, and enforcement must be swift when they offend. At the same time, they must be provided with plausible and sustainable alternatives to gang membership, that will provide both means to earn legal incomes and to develop healthy, non-violent masculinities. In terms of the latter, cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT) in the USA has been effective in preventing violence and reoffending in violent young men.¹⁵⁴

154 Abt, T. & Winship, C. (2016). *What works in reducing community violence: a meta-review and field study for the Northern Triangle*, USAID & Democracy International, p.12.; College of Policing. (2018). 'Cognitive Behaviour Therapy (CBT)'. Available at: <http://whatworks.college.police.uk/toolkit/Pages/Intervention.aspx?InterventionID=32>, accessed 2 May 2018.

SUBJECT: SAFETY AND SECURITY

POLICE AREA:
Khayelitsha

CONCERN:
Vigilantism

COMMENTARY & ANALYSES:

Although vigilantism has declined slightly in Khayelitsha, it remained a subject of concern at the PNP workshop.

Proposed solutions included SAPS, COCT and DoCS educating communities in respect of the justice system and its related processes; using restorative justice to bring perpetrators and victims/families together in a mediated setting; developing a formal crime prevention strategy for the Khayelitsha areas; and deploying 'community safety officers' or accredited neighbourhood watch members.

SUBJECT: SAFETY AND SECURITY

POLICE AREA:
Khayelitsha; Paarl East

CONCERN:
Absent parents

COMMENTARY & ANALYSES:

Participants expressed concern that parents were leaving children unattended and without discipline. This makes them vulnerable to perpetration and victimisation of crime and violence. It is certainly concerning when young children are left unattended, and this should be addressed. However, the notion that parents must primarily 'discipline' children may also be a driver of violence in the province.

Harsh, inconsistent and violent parenting increases the risk that children will grow up to use violence, or to be the victims of violence themselves (See also appendix A and B on page 125 and page 130¹⁵⁵).¹⁵⁶ Evidence-based parenting programmes, the Children's Act and DSD's Strategic Plan for Prevention and Early Intervention can help to prevent this.¹⁵⁷ However, evidence-based and non-violent parenting will remain challenging in contexts where parents live under stressful conditions, for instance: they parent alone; are unemployed; work/commute long hours (often for little pay); are in chronic debt; suffer mental and physical illnesses, among many others common to the Western Cape and country as a whole.

156 Gould, C & Ward, C. (2015). *Positive parenting in South Africa: Why supporting families is key to development and violence prevention*. ISS Policy Brief 77.

157 Ibid.; Wessel, I & Ward, C. (2015). "A 'best buy' for violence prevention: Evaluating parenting skills programmes". *SA Crime Quarterly*, No. 54. p. 17-28; Safer Spaces. *Positive Parenting in South Africa*. Available at: <https://www.saferspaces.org.za/understand/entry/positive-parenting-in-south-africa>, accessed 2 May 2018.

SUBJECT: SAFETY AND SECURITY

POLICE AREA:
Khayelitsha; Paarl-East

CONCERN:
School-related crime prevention

COMMENTARY & ANALYSES:

Participants requested support for children who drop out of school, and that shebeens that are close to schools be shut down. While school completion – and especially tertiary completion – predicts positive outcomes in South Africa,¹⁵⁸ truancy predicts negative outcomes, including conflict with the law.¹⁵⁹ All law enforcers should be required to engage with truant youth in public spaces when they encounter them out of school during school hours. Intervention in truancy may be key to preventing such youth, particularly boys, from offending later in life. More importantly, it could improve the number of young people who complete high school (currently, 45% drop out nationally before completing matric).

SUBJECT: SAFETY AND SECURITY

POLICE AREA:
Saldanha

CONCERN:
Homelessness

COMMENTARY & ANALYSES:

Participants suggested that homeless shelters should be established to cater to homeless people in the area. But homelessness is not simply a matter of not having a place to sleep. Rather, it can be a product of not having a place to sleep in close proximity to one’s school or work, living in a violent home, or having an addiction, among others. Homelessness is also a product of apartheid’s spatial planning, which purposefully didn’t create housing close to economic hubs, in desirable urban areas, or in major cities for black South Africans. As a result, rural residents migrating to cities are often confined to informal neighbourhoods and/or homelessness.

Holistic interventions are necessary. In this regard, where police and law enforcement officials compel homeless people to move (out of public spaces), they must partner with other departments and officials to address the causes of instability in their lives.

158 In 2007, the average income for a South African who had completed matric was R1100 p/m. This was 40%-70% more than those without matric. Those with diplomas averaged R3 100 p/m and those with degrees R5 400 p/m (‘Institutional clusters in Higher Education in South Africa’. A presentation by the Minister of Higher Education and Training at the Higher Education Summit, 2010.)

159 Gould, C. (2015). *Beaten Bad: The Life Stories of Violent Offenders*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

SUBJECT: PROFESSIONAL POLICING

POLICE AREA:
Gunya

CONCERN:
SAPS members to wear nametags

COMMENTARY & ANALYSES:

Accountability is at the heart of professional policing. Without accountability police are less likely to be considered legitimate. Simply wearing name tags, as per SAPS instructions, is where accountability begins. But SAPS name tags are relatively small and are worn on the upper left chest. As such they are only easily read by people standing relatively close to and directly facing police officials. SAPS may want to consider enlarging name tags to increase their visibility. It may also want to consider adding force numbers to officials' rank flashes (which sit on either shoulder) and to their upper backs (or bullet resistant vests), as is done by some police agencies abroad.

SUBJECT: PROFESSIONAL POLICING

POLICE AREA:
Gunya; Saldanha

CONCERN:
Poor visibility in crime hotspots (SAPS, Metro Police, City Traffic Department and Law Enforcement).

List of hotspots provided in several meetings

COMMENTARY & ANALYSES:

See also: *Policing informal areas (and where crime occurs); Vehicle resourcing, use and safety*

It is common for communities and individuals who regularly feel vulnerable, to desire and request more frequent and more visible police in public spaces. Two related points should be considered: a) Visible police do not necessary reduce general crime, but; b) Visible and approachable/friendly police can improve community perceptions of safety and the legitimacy of police, which can improve cooperation with police and respect for the law,¹⁶⁰ thereby contributing to a reduction in crime.

The notion that where there are police, crime will decline is partially true for specific crimes and geographic areas (hotspots), but false for general crime and traditional policing. For policing to reduce crime in hotspots, it should be guided by clear and focused intent, targeting specific places and specific times; targeting particular offenses, and/or focused on particular individuals.¹⁶¹ The effects of such interventions should be monitored and police deployment and tasks adjusted in purposeful ways. Both police

160 Bradford, B. (2014). 'Policing and social identity: procedural justice, inclusion and cooperation between police and public'. *Policing and Society*, 24:1, p. 22-43; Bradford, B., Huq, A., Jackson, J., & Roberts, B. (2013). What price fairness when security is at stake? Police legitimacy in South Africa. *Regulation & Governance*, 8, p. 246-268; Bradford, B., Murphy, K., Jackson, J. (2014). 'Officers as Mirrors: Policing, Procedural Justice and the (Re)Production of Social Identity'. *British Journal of Criminology*, 54 (4), p. 527-550.

161 Abt, T. & Winship, C. (2016). *What works in reducing community violence: a meta-review and field study for the Northern Triangle*, USAID & Democracy International.

officials and communities should be provided with clear, evidence-based explanations for police deployment. This will help police officials understand the rationale behind their taskings (which may not be immediately clear to them) and help communities to assess and support police work related to specific taskings, rather than judge them on a catch-all impossible 'crime prevention' mandate.

It is worth exploring to what extent visible policing should be equated with interaction with police. Is the public content to see a police car drive by a few times a week, or is it important for police to routinely interact with the public in non-enforcement contexts? In some jurisdictions it seems the latter is desired.¹⁶² While police-community interactions through models such as SAPS's sector policing initiative can improve citizen satisfaction, perceptions of disorder, and police legitimacy, they may have little impact on crime and fear of crime.¹⁶³ Nevertheless, where rapid response from police is expected by those requesting police service, speedy responses offer opportunities for the SAPS and state to win important symbolic victories, improve legitimacy and build the South African nation/identity.

Victim surveys have shown that South Africans' perceptions of police tend to improve following interaction with them. Without such interventions, police rely on the media, movies, spokespeople and rumour mills to craft their public image. This alone provides a good incentive for police to seek out public interaction.

It is promising that more residents of the Western Cape report living within 30 minutes of a police station (87%) than do residents of any other province.¹⁶⁴ While, only 41,80% report seeing police in uniform and on duty in their area of residence at least once a day, this is better than the national average of 33,80%, down from 43,50% in 2011. Victim surveys conducted in 2003 and 2007 showed that 58% of people who interacted with police said their perceptions of police improved because of the interaction.¹⁶⁵ This has important implications for how police and law enforcement authorities think about their engagements with the public.

Police should be made aware of their order-making and maintenance purpose and required to treat all people with courtesy and respect, thus building order in crime hotspots rather than reproducing the disorder that may already exist. Police should appreciate the symbolic power of their presence as indicative of state care, and as signalling who and what is acceptable in a community and who and what not. For instance, police should appear to be neat, polite and law abiding (e.g. adhering to traffic and bylaws). They should also be taught to distinguish between their symbolic and empirical power, and use both effectively. For instance, evidence from the UK suggests that police on horseback are more likely to improve public perceptions of police visibility, trust

162 Scottish Government. (2018). *Narrowing the Gap*. Available at: <http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2002/12/15868/14397>, accessed 21 February 2018; Independent Police Commission. (2013). *Policing for a better Britain*.

163 Gil, C.I, Weisburd, D., Telep, C.W. & Vitter, Z. & Bennett, T. (2014). 'Community-oriented policing to reduce crime, disorder and fear and increase satisfaction and legitimacy among citizens: a systematic review' *Journal of Experimental Criminology*, 10, p. 399–428. DOI 10.1007/s11292-014-9210-y.

164 Statistics South Africa. (2017). *Victims of Crime Survey 2016/2017*. Pretoria: Statistics South Africa, p. 62.

165 Pharoah, R. (2008). *National victims of crime survey: Overview of key findings*. ISS Paper 175, p. 13.

and legitimacy than police on foot, especially in neighbourhood settings.¹⁶⁶ This is not because horses give police a crime-fighting advantage, but because horses make them more noticeable and encourage public interaction with the police. People in turn are more conscious of their presence. Similarly, in Finland a study found that police in patrol cars increased fear of crime, while police on foot decreased such fears.¹⁶⁷

The flip side of visible policing is that communities feel stigmatised and surveyed by police. Police must act in the interests of the greater good, in line with the rule of law, with courtesy and respect. They should communicate as reasonably and best they can to explain their in/action to those affected, including suspects and members of the general public. They should be held accountable for their claims.

Police officials are agents of the state and symbols of the law. They must never be seen to support unlawful behaviour such as mob justice, domestic violence or corporal punishment by teachers or parents.

SUBJECT: PROFESSIONAL POLICING

POLICE AREA:

**Gunya; Khayelitsha; Paarl East;
Saldanha; Manenberg;
Riebeeck West**

CONCERN:

Lack of cooperation between SAPS,
Metro Police, City Traffic, etc.

COMMENTARY & ANALYSES:

Partnerships between law enforcement and other government agencies are key to democratic and problem-oriented policing. In many instances members of the public do not distinguish between policing agencies, meaning the actions of one reflect on all. Relatedly, officials working for the SAPS do not routinely enforce traffic or bylaws, and vice versa for other agencies. This can give the public an impression of irregular law enforcement, and thus illegitimate policing, which in turn may lead to the flouting of laws in the presence of officials whom the public predict will not respond (e.g. speeding past a SAPS vehicle and believing its occupants will not react; drinking in public around SAPS officials). Where officials from one agency are reluctant to enforce laws typically enforced by others, it is in the interest of all to informally engage the offending party, or, when serious, to call the relevant agency to intervene. Such an approach should help contain public perceptions that police ignore particular types of disorderly and criminal conduct.

166 Giacomantonio, C., Bradford, B., Davies, M. & Martin, R. (2014). *Making and Breaking Barriers: assessing the value of mounted police units in the UK: Summary Report*. RAND Corporation. Available at: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR800/RR830z1/RAND_RR830z1.pdf, accessed 21 February 2018.

167 Salmi, S., Gronroos, M., Keskinen, E. (2004). 'The role of police visibility in fear of crime in Finland'. *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management*. 27:4, p. 573-591.

SUBJECT: PROFESSIONAL POLICING

POLICE AREA:
Gunya

CONCERN:
 Mobile police station at KTC not 24/7

COMMENTARY & ANALYSES:

It may not always be possible for mobile or temporary (e.g. See: *Large geographic area* below) stations to be staffed, particularly where armed street robbery is common. However, where SAPS management believe this to be the case, explanations must be clearly provided to communities and officials posted to the stations must be held accountable for remaining at their post until the agreed closing time.

SUBJECT: PROFESSIONAL POLICING

POLICE AREA:
Riebeeck West; Saldanha; Paarl East

CONCERN:
 SAPS slow response time.
 Slow detective services.
 Law enforcement working hours do not match when crime happens.

COMMENTARY & ANALYSES:

While it is common for both the public and police management to desire quick police responses to calls for assistance, response times do not necessarily impact crime. Instead, response time gives the state an opportunity to communicate to citizens (through teachable moments) that it takes their wellbeing seriously. Response times do impact confidence in police and feelings of safety and police should commit to responding promptly to emergency calls in particular. Where police cannot respond to calls, be they emergency or otherwise, clear, defensible reasons should be provided to those requesting service. Ideally, a record of this reason should be kept (even if only in the form of automatic recording of all calls to police stations) for accountability and review purposes. In many instances, police managers must strike a balance between giving officials the leeway to postpone some work in favour of more pressing priorities while swiftly responding to any abuse of such systems. Police may want to consider prioritising certain calls for assistance over others, such as domestic violence, which left unchecked could lead to multiple harms in the long term.

The speed with which detectives begin investigations is important for the collection of evidence and the recording of statements in the immediate aftermath of an offense. As such, detectives should be rated on their ability to carry out core functions in relation to priority crimes, timeously. At the same time, mandatory follow-up investigations of general crime have not been shown to be particularly effective in tackling crime.¹⁶⁸ As such, it makes sense for detectives to prioritise those that cause the greatest harm or show potential for successful investigation.

Finally, working hours and deployment of scarce resources must match offending patterns (time, place and people). There need not be an equivalent number of officials on duty at all times.

168 Skogan, W. & Frydl, K. (eds). (2004). *Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: The Evidence Committee to Review Research on Police Policy and Practices*, National Research Council.

SUBJECT: PROFESSIONAL POLICING

POLICE AREA:

**Riebeek West; Khayelitsha; Manenberg;
Saldanha; Paarl East;
Gunya**

CONCERN:

Poor police resource allocation
-insufficient human and vehicle resources.

COMMENTARY & ANALYSES:

See also: *Police resource distribution*

It is rational and just that police are deployed to areas where the greatest harm is most easily predicted or reasonably expected.

All areas complained of a lack of police resources. In Khayelitsha and Nyanga, the number of allocated personnel had been increased due to the Provincial Commissioner's discretionary use of S 12(3) of the SAPS Act and internal reallocation of resources. However, there was still a concern that the determination of the Granted Establishment at these and other stations does not sufficiently take into account population growth, the geographic size of the precinct (especially in rural areas), and the nature and extent of crime.

In some areas, such as Saldanha, Riebeck West and Manenberg there were concerns that staff are not replaced when they leave the SAPS, or their positions are vacant for long periods. There were also senior and middle management positions that had been vacant for a long period, or where there was a frequent turnover of station commanders.

Stations also reported shortages in detective services and visible policing units – those units responsible for the core responsibilities of police - rather than among administrative personnel.

It was reported that the shortage in human resources affected police visibility in hotspot areas, and impacted on response times. Staff shortages results in partial implementation of Sector Policing. Shortages are exacerbated by staff being off on sick leave, study leave, or duty arrangements elsewhere. Furthermore, the requirement to escort ambulances or psychiatric patients places an additional burden on an already stretched police service. It also affects the safety of police officials.

SUBJECT: PROFESSIONAL POLICING

POLICE AREA:

Riebeeck West; Khayelitsha; Manenberg; Saldanha; Paarl East;

CONCERN:

- SAPS members do not speak Afrikaans (local community language)
- Paarl East satellite station requested
- Vredenburg North police station needed

COMMENTARY & ANALYSES:

All law enforcement and affiliate agencies should strive to strike a balance between action that incentivises compliance with the law and its enforcers, while remaining minimally punitive. Systems that are procedurally just and fair do not detain any person longer than is necessary to issue a sanction or, where necessary, secure their appearance in court. As such, arrest should not automatically mean 12–48 hours in police custody, as it often does.

Section 56 of the Criminal Procedure Act allows arrested persons who, if found guilty in court, are unlikely to be fined more than an amount predetermined by the Minister of Police (approximately R5 000 in 2018)¹⁶⁹ to be released from police custody as soon as possible following the issuing of a J534 fine and/or notice to appear in court.¹⁷⁰ A list of offences for which the local magistrate recommends such fines be issued is meant to be provided to each police station and its guidance followed. It is not at all clear to what extent this section of the CPA is used, but it offers an opportunity for streamlined, resource-efficient and democratic policing. The SAPS annual reports do not include the number of such fines or warnings issued.

Stakeholders might consider empowering NHW members or other designated members of the public (custody visitors) to periodically visit cells to ascertain whether detainees should be in detention and how they are being treated.

While SAPS arrest rates were significantly greater in 2016/2017 than in 2008/2009, NPA finalisation rates barely changed. This further suggests that police may be arresting and/or detaining people unnecessarily, or that detectives and/or prosecutors are failing to build strong cases. In 2016/2017, more arrests were made in the Western Cape, 424 433, than in any other province (26,09% of all arrests countrywide). This is likely due to police-initiated drug-related arrests. In 2016/2017, 107 379 such cases were recorded, with more than one person potentially detained for each. Just 4 083 of these were for dealing in drugs. Of the nearly 13% of PNP attendees who reported that a member of their household had been charged with a crime dependent on police action, 65,52% were drug-related. This work is resource intensive. Careful regard should be given to whether such practices and related performance targets strike the best balance between deterrence, public health, safety and procedural justice/police legitimacy. While illegal substances such as tik and heroin pose serious threats to consumers and society, marijuana, certain psychedelics and some other substances likely don't. Police practices should reflect awareness of this range of harm. Police should communicate evidence-based decisions to the public (e.g. marijuana poses little risk) rather than reinforcing emotional and unhelpful perceptions (e.g. all drugs are evil) and thus unnecessarily stigmatising drug users.

169 This sum was mentioned by SAPS Captain Motlokwane in a presentation delivered at the APCOF/SAHRC *Human Rights and Policing Dialogue* in Johannesburg on 3 May 2018.

170 Section 56(1) and 56(2) of the Criminal Procedures Act 51 of 1977.

SUBJECT: PROFESSIONAL POLICING

POLICE AREA:
Riebeek West

CONCERN:
Large geographic area.
Lack of police station/ contact point in Riebeek Kasteel.

COMMENTARY & ANALYSES:

Rural policing should not be compared with urban policing. While the latter occupies the popular imagination and includes high visibility, patrol and rapid response, these are not possible in large rural precincts. Similarly, it is not feasible that every town or village have its own police station or patrol van. Rather, the power of rural policing is to respond decisively (and rapidly - relative to the geographic area), to signal to residents that the state remains concerned about their wellbeing and that they are accountable for their actions. That said, SAPS should consider experimenting in rural areas, for example by setting up weekly police contact points in different towns and villages, so that residents without the means to get to or contact a formal police station can still consult with police at least weekly.

SUBJECT: PROFESSIONAL POLICING

POLICE AREA:
Riebeek West; Khayelitsha;
Manenberg; Saldanha; Paarl East;

CONCERN:
Recruitment of police reservists

COMMENTARY & ANALYSES:

All areas noted a decline in the number of reservists and called for a recruitment drive in their area. Reservists can add numbers to the overall police service and improve police visibility, especially in patrols and in the customer service centre.

SUBJECT: PROFESSIONAL POLICING

POLICE AREA:
Riebeek West; Khayelitsha;
Saldanha; Paarl East;

CONCERN:
Law enforcement officials not acting against transgressing members;
SAPS members' collusion with gangsters

COMMENTARY & ANALYSES:

Residents felt that police and law enforcers did not enforce the law against their off-duty colleagues. Being seen to enforce the law consistently and fairly is key to professional policing and the building of police legitimacy. It is in management's interest to regularly engage the public regarding perceptions of police legitimacy and procedural fairness and to be seen to be responsive where the public feels unfairly treated. This can simply involve providing rational and clear explanations to community members regarding why police have not responded to certain reports.

SUBJECT: PROFESSIONAL POLICING

POLICE AREA:
Riebeek West

CONCERN:
Irregular enforcement of alcohol regulations and hours for businesses (spaza shops, etc.)

COMMENTARY & ANALYSES:

Once again, procedural fairness requires that police and law enforcers are seen to treat all people fairly and consistently, including by enforcing the law predictably and consistently.

In many townships and lower-to-middle income neighbourhoods, spaza shops and taverns/shebeens are the only form of after-hours commerce or economic activity. This makes them both potential targets and important community anchors and services. Police should regularly engage staff and owners of such businesses and agree to minimum standards of police service. If these businesses can operate in safety, the night-time economy may grow, thus generating both more income and consumption/activity opportunities for residents. This can grow social cohesion, local investment, and thus reduce crime. Alternatively, where police actively work to empty such streets of people in order to make them safe, they risk entrenching poverty and weak community bonds.

SUBJECT: PROFESSIONAL POLICING

POLICE AREA:
Khayelitsha; Paarl East; Saldanha

CONCERN:
Gender-based violence

COMMENTARY & ANALYSES:

See also: *Gender-based and domestic violence*

Residents complained that first responders were not sensitive to domestic violence, nor aware of the procedures they should follow to appropriately respond to domestic violence.

Considering that much of the harm in violent communities likely begins in homes and schools, it is important that police management set standards, fill knowledge gaps and hold officials accountable for proper enforcement of related offences.

SUBJECT: PROFESSIONAL POLICING

POLICE AREA:
Manenberg

CONCERN:
Police violence against suspects (especially youth)

COMMENTARY & ANALYSES:

The SAPS and others should consider developing the use of force policies and procedures to guide, document and learn from the use of force. As with all policing, irregular and inconsistent action is a risk for increasing inequalities and fracturing communities, thus promoting disorder.

SUBJECT: PROFESSIONAL POLICING

POLICE AREA:
Saldanha

CONCERN:
Quality of SAPS service

COMMENTARY & ANALYSES:

See also: *Evidence-based professional policing*

The SAPS agreed to prioritise responses appropriately and to communicate predicted response times to those requesting service.

SUBJECT: PROFESSIONAL POLICING

POLICE AREA:
Saldanha; Paarl East

CONCERN:
Long queues and difficulties certifying documents

COMMENTARY & ANALYSES:

Police should consider dedicated certification queues and officials during busy periods, or liaise with the local post office to assist in this regard. Stations can (and some do) use qualified community volunteers to certify documents during busy periods. Other municipal and provincial departments should explore making certification officials and premises available.

SUBJECT: PROFESSIONAL POLICING

POLICE AREA:
Paarl East

CONCERN:
Better treatment of people with disabilities

COMMENTARY & ANALYSES:

All people should be treated fairly and have access to police services. This includes, where appropriate, ensuring that all stations are either accessible to people with disabilities, or that police are willing to travel to individuals who are unable, due to disability, to travel to police stations. Disabled people should be treated fairly and respectfully, and, where possible, provided with any additional services and resources that the SAPS can make available.

SUBJECT: PARTNERSHIPS

POLICE AREA:

Gunya; Khayelitsha; Riebeek West

CONCERN:

Neighbourhood Watch (NHW)

COMMENTARY & ANALYSES:

Various concerns were raised related to the NHWs. These included the safety of members while working, clarity regarding the equipment and resources that should be available to them, training and capacitating for NHWs, accreditation of recognised NHWs to prevent vigilantism, incentives and payments to improve retention, sustainability, and that some SAPS officials use NHWs for personal gain. These matters will be addressed by DoCS.

SUBJECT: PARTNERSHIPS

POLICE AREA:

Gunya; Riebeek West ; Khayelitsha; Paarl East

CONCERN:

CPFs

COMMENTARY & ANALYSES:

CPF concerns included struggles to access DoCS grants; resourcing; clarity regarding CPF and NHW mandates and roles; the need for city representation (counsellors) at CPF meetings; and the need for area-specific safety plans.

SUBJECT: PARTNERSHIPS

POLICE AREA:

Gunya

CONCERN:

Alcohol Harm Reduction

COMMENTARY & ANALYSES:

Participants felt that the AHR needed better coordination.

SUBJECT: PARTNERSHIPS

POLICE AREA:
Riebeeck West

CONCERN:
Farm atches

COMMENTARY & ANALYSES:

Like CPFs, farm watches require clarity regarding their role.

SUBJECT: PARTNERSHIPS

POLICE AREA:
Riebeeck West

CONCERN:
PNP composition and action

COMMENTARY & ANALYSES:

Participants were concerned about inconsistent and irregular attendance at PNP workshops and related events. They also felt that the Department of Correctional Services needed to better monitor parolees in the area and that the Department of Rural Development needed to intervene in farm evictions.

SUBJECT: PARTNERSHIPS

POLICE AREA:
Khayelitsha

CONCERN:
Community participation

COMMENTARY & ANALYSES:

It was felt that there needed to be more community participation in community safety forums (not street committees), and that religious organisations needed to be more active too.

SUBJECT: PARTNERSHIPS

POLICE AREA:
Paarl East

CONCERN:
Gang Violence

COMMENTARY & ANALYSES:

Concerns were expressed regarding gang violence at schools.

SUBJECT: PARTNERSHIPS

POLICE AREA:
Paarl East

CONCERN:
Understanding criminal justice

COMMENTARY & ANALYSES:

It was felt that communities needed assistance to understand the functions of the Criminal Justice System. This is central to professional policing and justice, as understanding allows rational rather than emotional evaluations of service. It is in all residents' interest to be able to easily access information (e.g. guides) in this regard.

8. THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE AND THE WESTERN CAPE COMMUNITY

8.1 Overview

The Western Cape SAPS is responsible for an area of 130 684 km², which is home to 6,82 million people. It has 150 police stations and 30 satellite stations grouped into 16 clusters.¹⁷¹ In 2016/2017 it employed 20 230 personnel,¹⁷². Of these, 16 481 were employed under the SAPS Act and of these employees, 58% were in Visible Policing, 16% Detective and 18% (3 749) employees in terms of the Public Service Act and 7% Police Act Support Service employees.

Twenty-eight of the province's police stations and 18 of its satellite stations are leased, while the rest are state-owned. It has at its disposal 6 213 vehicles (cars), 336 trailers, 190 motorcycles, 33 boats and 10 other vehicles.¹⁷³ The 2016/2017 provincial budget was R725 762 998, with 39% of all Goods and Services expenditure going to fuel.¹⁷⁴

The Western Cape SAPS embraces the broader organisation's *Back to Basics* strategy, which seeks to do 'the basics' of policing right through:¹⁷⁵

- 1) Leadership by example, effective command and control and the clear realising of roles and responsibilities across all levels (Back to Basics);
- 2) Ensuring community satisfaction through service delivery;
- 3) Building trust and seeking solutions through partnerships; and
- 4) Directing resources to priority areas (Focused Approach).

These principles are aligned with democratic and professional policing.

The SAPS recognises the province's great inequalities as central to its crime and disorder challenges, and knows that safety and order will only be achieved in partnership with others. It named alcohol and drugs as 'the main contributor to serious and violent crime' in the province and said it would cooperate with other tiers of government to 'curb this scourge'. Crimes against women and children would also remain a priority. It pledged to look after its members and provide them with health, wellness and spiritual support.

Many of the SAPS's goals and focus areas suggest an awareness of the anxieties and frustrations expressed at PNP workshops. This section describes its stated claims and targets in this regard, and explores what they mean for policing in the province.

171 SAPS. (2017). *Western Cape Annual Report 2016/2017*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 9..

172 Ibid, p 131. It should be noted that the Annual Operating Plan for the Western Cape 2016/17 has slightly different figures, citing 20291 SAPS employees for the year (p. 12)

173 Ibid., p. 162.

174 Ibid., p. 164, 164.

175 SAPS. (2017). *Annual Operational Plan: Western Cape*, p. 14.

8.2 Strategy and performance

8.2.1 Performance environment

Changes in provincial and national SAPS leadership have compelled the provincial SAPS to shift focus in recent years. It has identified gangsterism, substance abuse, violent protest and illicit firearms and weapons as generators of crime.¹⁷⁶

It reports that Operation Combat, which began in 2013/2014, has decreased gang-related incidents in the province, while partnerships with law enforcement, private security and communities has aided a reduction in property crime.¹⁷⁷

Alcohol is believed to be an 'underlying factor' in most murders, attempted murders and rape cases, as well as violence against police. Aggravated robbery continues to erode feelings of safety in the province. The SAPS hopes to address the latter through intelligence-driven and 'lockdown' operations.¹⁷⁸ Vigilante or community justice remains a concern, motivated by frustration with police and the broader Criminal Justice System (CJS). Evidence emerging from DoCS Watching Briefs¹⁷⁹ supports communities' concerns regarding police inefficiencies that unnecessarily derail prosecutions. The SAPS reports that it has implemented a recovery plan for detectives to improve detection and conviction rates, and that it will partner with communities to improve relations. The DoCS will request the SAPS reports on progress in this regard to ascertain whether interventions produce results.

8.2.2 Organisational environment

The Western Cape SAPS blames ill-discipline and inexperience by many of its members for an erosion of its relationship with some communities.¹⁸⁰ Back to Basics is intended to 'take employees back to the fundamental roots of policing', emphasising 'discipline and training to do the basics right'. This is important, but must be balanced with an organisational justice model that treats employees fairly. Police officials must be capacitated to do the work expected of them, and feel that they are treated fairly and supported by superiors, rather than being made to fear them.

Efforts are being made to slow exits from the service and to implement a safety plan to prevent police murders.

176 Ibid., p. 15.

177 Ibid., p. 15.

178 Ibid., p. 15.

179 The Watching Brief Project monitors the progress of dockets through the courts in priority areas, identifies problems in investigation and SAPS and prosecutorial procedure, and makes recommendations to address these issues systemically.

180 SAPS. (2017). *Annual Operational Plan: Western Cape*. p. 16.

8.2.3 Areas of strategic focus

The SAPS has tailored *Back to Basics* in the Western Cape to focus on four areas:

Back to Basics: Emphasising individual discipline through proper dress, productivity, motivation, attitude, efficiency and effectiveness. This will be achieved by:

- Leading by example
- Setting clear roles for officials and assessing individual performance
- Effective command and control

Service Delivery

- Addressing minor concerns before they become major concerns, enforcing by-laws (broken windows)
- Ensuring individual and organisational efficiency and effectiveness by setting quantifiable goals and evaluating progress towards them

Partnerships

- Working with all role players
- Enhancing partnerships through media engagement and awareness programmes
- Deploying a media strategy to improve public perceptions
- Improving the SAPS's corporate identity

Focused approach

- Using intelligence to guide work
- Assigning officials to focus on trio crimes
- Using high-density policing operations in key areas
- Tackling domestic violence, crimes against women and children
- Addressing gang violence, building on Operation Combat
- Ending police killings through analysis and protective gear.


This vision is aligned with the policing needs and priorities of the province. The DoCS will monitor the implementation thereof. Additional aspects that the SAPS should keep in mind include:

1. Promoting 'discipline' without neglecting organisational justice. As recognised by the DoCS's Promote Professional Policing campaign, compliance with norms and standards cannot merely be coerced, but must be praised and rewarded too. SAPS employees will comply with norms and standards when they feel valued and fairly treated by their managers and colleagues. The SAPS should strive to strike a balance between expectations of 'discipline' and employee rights and support structures.
2. Ensuring that intelligence gathered is accurate and rational (not based on intuition, or produced for the sake of a performance targets) and acted upon (rather than being presented to patrol officials who ignore data in favour of intuition).
3. Carrying out 'broken windows' enforcement in ways that promote individual and community justice. This requires a problem-oriented rather than 'zero tolerance' approach.¹⁸¹ This may require collaboration with other departments and agencies. The middle class need not fear arrest for sleeping on the street or urinating in public, so by-law enforcement can appear and be anti-poor.
4. Implementing high-density operations with sensitivity. Treating all people in the target area fairly, especially young men. Where possible, including community members or structures to give the operations legitimacy, and wherever possible combining enforcement activity with socio-economic support for at-risk individuals and groups.
5. Domestic violence must include 'disciplinary' violence inflicted on children at home and school. Many SAPS officials may not see such violence as criminal or even wrong, so should be presented with the evidence of its harms, and be held accountable for its enforcement.
6. SAPS managers should acknowledge that the most effective way to save officials' lives is to require that they wear seatbelts and obey the rules of the road, unless responding to an emergency call. It should think of this as 'back to basics' and 'broken windows' personnel management.

181 Abt, T. & Winship, C. (2016). *What works in reducing community violence: a meta-review and field study for the Northern Triangle, USAID & Democracy International*, p. 11.

8.3 Human resource utilisation

Fig 30: SAPS Western Cape Employment Totals - 2008/09 to 2016/17¹⁸²



The number of SAPS officials employed nationally has increased by 12,33% from 173 241 to 194 605 between 2008/09 to 2016/17, to match the 12,48% growth in the national population over the same period. However, while the Western Cape population has grown by 18,3% to 6 407 604,¹⁸³ the numbers of SAPS officials have not kept pace.

In the last nine years, the number of SAPS members in the Western Cape had only increased by 4%. There was a significant increase in staff levels in 2011/12 to a high of 22 011, but these numbers have since decreased. More concerning is that the number of SAPS officials - those employed in terms of the SAPS Act - have only increased by 0,87% from 16 338 to 16 481 in the last eight years. In the same period, civilian members employed in terms of the Public Servants Act have increased by 2,7% from 3 484 in 2009/10 to 3 749 in 2016/17.

The Granted Establishment was not filled to capacity, and the Province needs to continually recruit new personnel. In 2016/2017, 1 324 student constables were deployed to stations around the province. Additionally, 373 trainees were enrolled in basic training.¹⁸⁴ Of these, 171 will be deployed to VISPOL and detective branches at Western Cape police stations, while 122 will join the Public Order

182 Figures are sourced from the SAPS Western Cape Annual reports from 2008/09 to 2016/17. However, the SAPS have not reported on human resource numbers consistently over the years.

183 SAPS. (2018). *Redrawn financial year crime statistics 2017/18*. Available online on <https://www.saps.gov.za/services/crimestats.php>, accessed 18 September 2018.

184 SAPS. (2017). *Western Cape Annual Report 2016/2017*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 114

Police (POP). Additionally, 160 Public Service Act (PSA) appointments were made at priority police stations, and another 37 at 10111 centres.¹⁸⁵

The SAPS reported a delay in appointing detectives due to shortages in VISPOL units from which detectives are recruited. The staffing level in the province was 94,17% in 2016/2017, with appointments limited by post allocation and recruitment processes.

Labour relations training was provided to 704 employees. Relatedly, 72 members received bursaries for tertiary study, 20 attended Chinese language training and 40 Xhosa language training. 1 659 training programmes were presented to provincial staff, resulting in 11 875 competent trainees (99,3% competent). An additional 48 804 members were put through firearm training, but only 88% were found competent.

The idea of labour relations training is commendable. It can play an important part in organisational justice (ensuring that all employees are and feel heard and treated fairly), which is key to police practising procedural justice on the streets.¹⁸⁶ Similarly, supporting staff development through training and bursaries should foster morale and talent. The SAPS has traditionally only supported staff who pursue strict policing or management-focused studies. The organisation and its employees would, however, likely benefit from engagement with a greater diversity of subjects.

8.4 Management interventions

In 2016, the SAPS announced the establishment of its Management Intervention competency. At face value, the division appears to be an important tool for the realisation of democratic and professional policing. It is intended to identify problem stations or units, work with them to assess their challenges and needs, and to recommend corrective interventions that are implemented and monitored over time.¹⁸⁷ It has been referred to as a management consulting agency within the SAPS.¹⁸⁸ The SAPS's new research division is closely aligned with it so that its work is meant to be informed by a knowledge base. In 2016/2017, 32 interventions were carried out in the Western Cape, followed by 30 follow-up assessments. Common concerns were lack of training and resources.¹⁸⁹

This is another promising development that hints at an evidence-based, rather than intuitive approach to problem solving within the organisation - Targeting,

185 SAPS. (2017). *Western Cape Annual Report 2016/2017*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 83.

186 Haas, N.E., van Craein, M., Skogan, W., Fleitas, D.M. (2015). 'Explaining officer compliance: The importance of procedural justice and trust inside a police organization'. *Criminology & Criminal Justice*, 15:4, p. 442-463.

187 Burger, J. (2017). 'On the Record: Interview with Lieutenant General Gary Kruser, Deputy National Commissioner, South African Police Service', *SA Crime Quarterly*, No. 59, p. 59-64.

188 Ibid.

189 SAPS. (2017). *Western Cape Annual Report 2016/2017*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 95.

Testing and Tracking to address system inefficiencies.¹⁹⁰ It will be helpful for DoCS to be kept abreast of the Management Intervention Unit's work in the province, including its monitoring and evaluation of interventions. Although the division appears similar to the SAPS's former Inspectorate,¹⁹¹ it brings with it a number of new approaches and technologies, which may improve service delivery in the province.¹⁹²

8.5 Provincial instructions and tools

During the financial year, the Provincial Commissioner issued 13 instructions requiring the weekly reporting of select information by stations. These included:¹⁹³

- an overview of crime;
- a list of wanted persons;
- a list of all arrests;
- an overview of deployments; and
- performance-monitoring tool data.

Relatedly, the province reports having developed a number of tools including:

- Wanted Persons Performance Management Tool and Guidelines;
- Domestic Violence Management Tool;
- Reservist Performance Management Tool;
- Gang Performance Management Tool;
- Vehicle Deployment Assessment Tool;
- National Service Delivery Complaints Database; and
- Standard daily production sheets for each member.

The Provincial Commissioner also ordered the establishment of a Provincial Deployment Committee.

As with so much in the SAPS Annual Report and Operational Plan, these suggest an intention to use evidence-based, targeted and resource-efficient policing to meet community needs. It is not possible, based on public data, to evaluate the extent to which these instructions or tools have impacted the daily duties of officials working in the province. DoCS looks forward to reviewing evidence of their efficacy and reviewing them in due course.

190 Sherman, L.W. (2013). 'The Rise of Evidence-Based Policing: Targeting, Testing, and Tracking'. *Crime and Justice*, 32(1), p. 377-451.

191 See for example: Omar, B. (2009). *Inspecting' the SAPS National Inspectorate*. ISS Paper No. 207, Institute for Security Studies.

192 Burger, J. (2017). 'On the Record: Interview with Lieutenant General Gary Kruser, Deputy National Commissioner, South African Police Service', *SA Crime Quarterly*, No. 59, p. 59-64.

193 SAPS. (2017). *Western Cape Annual Report 2016/2017*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 101.

8.6 The Visible Policing environment

Visible policing is the largest component of the SAPS, with 50% of all employees allocated to VISPOL. In 2016/2017, VISPOL in the Western Cape reported the following performance data:¹⁹⁴

Second-hand Goods (SHG) Dealers: 124 warnings issued; 250 non-compliant SHGs temporarily closed; 132 non-compliance fines issued; 29 suspects arrested at SHG dealerships and 220 confiscations enacted. It is unclear to what extent these actions impact property-related crime or the sale of stolen items.

Reaction to Complaints: Monthly monitoring of complaints and responses to complaints.

Safer Schools Programme: Implemented at 1 536 schools; developed a School-based Crime Prevention Database of priority crime and gang-affected schools; developed a Crime Awareness Report to log all school-related crime awareness initiatives.

Sector Policing: Implemented at all 150 stations, including 29 stations where it had previously not been implemented.

Rural Safety: Implemented at 96 stations; unable to be implemented at 4 stations.

Custody Management: 191 detainees escaped in 127 incidents; 2 people died as a result of police action, and 11 died in custody.

Police Murders: 3 members were murdered on duty and 3 off duty; 8 members were shot, 1 was stabbed; 2 on-duty members were not wearing bulletproof vests; two murders occurred while attending complaints and two while members travelled between home and work; in four incidents the motive was robbery.

Police Attacked on Duty, 2016/2017	
Members attacked on duty	657 (11,34% decline compared to 2015/2016)48
Most common circumstances of attack on duty	Attending complaints (26%); patrols (11,4%); crime prevention duties (9,6%); vehicle chases (8%); arresting suspects (6,7%); executing warrants (5,8%)
Most common means of attack on duty	Shot (35,3%); assaulted (25,9%); had an object thrown at them (23%); had a firearm pointed at them (4,1%); stabbed (3,9%)

194 SAPS. (2017). *Western Cape Annual Report 2016/2017*. Pretoria: SAPS, pp. 111-112.

195 SAPS. (2017). *Western Cape Annual Report 2016/2017*. Pretoria: SAPS, p.114. The various totals provided by the SAPS vary in each category, casting doubt on the accuracy of this data.

196 It is not clear why this number is lower than the list of circumstances ('duties performed') in which attacks took place

8.7 Specialised units

In general, the SAPS crime prevention and investigation mandates are all-encompassing. Uniformed officials are expected to be competent managing the potentially infinite range of challenges that may occur during a shift, from securing a crime scene to calming a lost child or resolving a conflict between friends. Similarly, general detectives are expected to know how to methodically gather evidence, take statements that will stand up in court, and tick numerous administrative boxes to build prosecutable cases. Such skills are vital to effective policing, but they don't allow the development of focused and often complex skills required for tackling threats such as cyber-crime, natural resource exploitation or organised gangsterism. As such, both the Visible Policing (VISPOL) and Detective Services programmes in the SAPS employ specialised units: Specialised Intervention units (VISPOL) and Specialised Investigations units (these units have a long history in modern policing).¹⁹⁷

Common special units found in police organisations around the world include drug units, fraud units and child protection units. Some special units focus on particular offenders rather than crimes, for instance commercial or organised crime units. These units gather intelligence and build cases around one or more offender rather than pursuing single charges. Such approaches allow detectives to build strong cases against gangs, commercial criminals and corrupt politicians. Specialist detectives and crime intelligence officials may be required to foster relationships with regular offenders, which can pose ethical and oversight challenges for their work.

Although cluster commanders can set up cluster task teams, for instance, focusing on trio crimes, these do not have the same status, resources or expertise as specialised units. The SAPS's DPCI (Hawks) has a legislated mandate to investigate organised crime; crime that requires national prevention or investigation; and crime that requires specialised skills in preventing or investigating it.¹⁹⁸ Within the DPCI, a number of sub-units focus on particular crimes:

a) Serious Organised Crime (SOC)

Serious Organised Crime Investigation Units (SOCIU) are responsible for the prevention and investigation of national and transnational organised crime. These include the following crime types affecting the Western Cape: drug production, copper theft, gang-related murder and abalone harvesting and crimes against the State.¹⁹⁹ While the work these units carry out in the Western Cape is not reported by the SAPS, nationally 51,6% of SOCIU projects were closed in 2016/2017, up from 9,62% in 2015/2016, resulting in 358 convictions. The increase is attributed to the use of new methods and oversight.

b) Serious Commercial Crime (SCC)

197 Newburn, T. & Neyroud, P. (2013). *Dictionary of Policing*. Abingdon: Routledge, p. 264-265.

198 South African Police Amendment Act, 10 of 2012.

199 SAPS. (2017). *Annual Report 2016/2017*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 202.

SSC includes cybercrime and serious corruption. In 2016/2017, detectives made 1 893 arrests and secured 1 145 years in convictions.²⁰⁰

The SAPS in the Western Cape currently has the following specialised units:

8.7.1 Anti-Corruption Section and Unit

In 2016/2017, after more than a decade of civil society advocacy, the SAPS established the Anti-Corruption Section nationally and provincially, along with an Anti-Corruption Unit. The section focuses on corruption by police officials that falls outside the mandate of the Directorate for Priority Crimes Investigations (DPCI/Hawks) and IPID. The section's goal is to ensure the disruption of police corruption and the conviction of corrupt officials. Its scope is: interprovincial corruption-related cases involving police officials, other corruption-related offences, cases determined by the Detective Service Divisional Commissioner and the National Commissioner, fraud and theft-related corruption involving police officials, and allegations reported to the National Corruption Hotline and Crime Stop. As discussed under 'Police Conduct' below, the provincial Anti-Corruption Unit arrested 33 members for corruption or corruption-related offences in 2016/2017, on charges including corruption, extortion, theft, dealing in drugs, fraud, defeating the administration of justice, kidnapping and assault. During the same period, seven members were convicted.²⁰¹

8.7.2 Stock Theft and Endangered Species

Stock theft is a serious challenge in many rural areas. The Stock Theft and Endangered Species Unit reported in 2016/2017 that because farmers did not promptly report the theft of stock (presumably in part because it is not counted daily), investigations were hindered.

In conclusion, the Western Cape faces several serious challenges that require specialist investigations. These include copper theft, organised crime and related (gang) violence, abalone poaching, and violence in the taxi industry. It is not clear from SAPS reports to what extent these are being addressed by dedicated investigators within the DPCI or any other unit.

8.8 Detection rate

The Western Cape SAPS reports that it met its annual Detection Rate on all crime categories except for the category Crime Dependent on Police Action for Detection, reasons being that: a) suspects are not charged on all charges on the CAS system in a docket with more than one charge; and b) cases are opened and registered when drugs are found abandoned, when only an enquiry is required. Provincial interventions were carried out among detectives at various stations. These involved tracing operations targeting suspects wanted for crimes such as common assaults and assault (GBH). The arrests of wanted suspects were also

200 SAPS. (2017). *Annual Report 2016/2017*. Pretoria: SAPS, p.203.

201 SAPS. (2017). *Western Cape Annual Report 2016/2017*. Pretoria: SAPS, p.123.

monitored by the provincial office. Detectives at every station in the province carried out at least one tracing operation each week.²⁰²

Table 13: SAPS Detection Rates in the Western Cape²⁰³

Detection Rates	WC Performance 2015/2016	WC Performance 2016/2017	Change	National Performance 2016/2017
Contact crime	58,36%	56,38%	↓1,98%	52,28%
Property-related crime	16,79%	17,46%	↑0,67%	14,43%
Contact-related crime	46,74%	47,52%	↑0,78%	47,50%
All other serious crime	34,41%	35,63%	↑1,22%	36,75%
Dependent on police action for detection	99,87%	99,83%	↓0,04%	99,75%
Trio crimes	18,33%	19,55%	↑1,22%	Not Reported
Crimes against women	65,53%	81,88%	↑16,35%	72,86%
Crimes against children	70,14%	78,42%	↑8,28%	69,91%
All serious crimes	48,95%	38,23%	↓10,72%	36,22%

Detection rates improved year on year with regard to property-related crime (+0,67%), contact-related crime (+0,78%), all other serious crime (+1,22%), trio crime (+1,22%), and crimes against women and children (+16,35% and +8,28%, respectively). Provincial performance surpassed national performance in all areas except All Other Serious Crime. The province performed particularly well relative to the national average in terms of detecting Crimes against Children and Crimes against Women.

202 SAPS. (2017). *Western Cape Annual Report 2016/2017*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 123.

203 SAPS. (2017). *Western Cape Annual Report 2016/2017*. Pretoria: SAPS, p.124.

Table 14: SAPS trial-ready rate²⁰⁴

Trial ready rates	WC Performance 2015/2016	WC Performance 2016/2017	Change	National Performance 2016/2017
Contact crime	70,75%	78,99%	↑8,24%	83,63%
Property-related crime	73,43%	81,95%	↑8,52%	84,80%
Contact-related crime	73,54%	81,42%	↑7,88%	87,17%
All other serious crime	68,86%	79,46%	↑10,60%	85%
Dependant on police action for detection	60,40%	70,95%	↑10,55%	77,46%
Trio crimes	69,53%	73,35%	↑3,82%	Not reported
Crimes against women	72,28%	80,64%	↑8,36%	82,11%
Crimes against children	69,52%	79,60%	↑10,08%	78,51%
All serious crimes	65,70%	79,69%	↑13,99%	84,21%

Like Detection Rates, Trial Ready rates improved year on year for all categories of crime: contact crime (+8,24%), property-related crime (+8,52%), contact-related crime (+7,88%), all other serious crime (+10,60%), trio crimes (+3,82%), crimes against women (+8,36%), and crimes against children (+10,08%) and all serious crimes (+13,99%). These increases were higher in magnitude (3,82%-13,99%) than most of the improvements in detection rates for the same period.



204 SAPS. (2017). *Western Cape Annual Report 2016/2017*. Pretoria: SAPS, p.125.

Table 15: Conviction rate²⁰⁵

Conviction Rate	WC Performance 2015/2016	WC Performance 2016/2017	Change	National Performance 2016/2017
Contact crime	82,78%	84,63%	↑1,85%	80,94%
Property-related crime	89,14%	91,38%	↑2,24%	89,18%
Contact-related crime	89,56%	90,39%	↑0,83%	86,71%
All other serious crime	96,15%	96,66%	↑0,51%	95,72%
Dependant on police action for detection	97,81%	98,31%	↑0,50%	97,68%
Trio crimes	77,05%	79,34%	↑2,29%	Not reported
Crimes against women	85,59%	87,30%	↑1,71%	84,03%
Crimes against children	80,96%	79,77%	↓1,19%	87,00%
All serious crimes	94,57%	90,79%	↓3,78%	88,64%


Like detection rates and trial-ready rates, total convictions and conviction rates increased for most crime types: contact crime (+1,85%), property-related crime (+2,24%), contact-related crime (+0,83%), all other serious crime (+0,51%), trio crimes (+2,29%), and crimes against women (+1,71%). Conviction rates for these crimes were better than national conviction rates for all these categories of crime. Conviction rates were lower for crimes against children (-1,19%) and all serious crime (-3,78%), though the rate for the latter remains higher than the national values.

These figures suggest that detective performance in the province improved marginally in 2016/2017, compared to the previous year. However, where provincial detection rates were generally better than the national average, trial-ready rates were below the national average for all categories of crime other than crimes against children, which was 1,09% higher than the national. It is not clear what these variances explain, but they may have to do with caseloads per detective in the Western Cape, relative to smaller provinces where detectives may have smaller caseloads. Conviction rates also carry less weight when fewer cases are made trial ready. The DoCS will continue to monitor detective performance in the province with interest, and hopes that the gains made in 2016/2017 are built on in 2017/2018.

205 SAPS. (2017). *Western Cape Annual Report 2016/2017*. Pretoria: SAPS, p.126.

8.9 Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences (FCS)

Figure 31: Sentences handed down in relation to FCS unit cases for 2016/2017²⁰⁶



While the Western Cape SAPS does not disaggregate reported crime by sex or age, the national SAPS does. Startlingly, 39,55% of reported sexual offences, 24,10% of murder, 21,98% of attempted murder, 12,74% of assault GBH and 11,55% of common assaults were committed against children. Importantly, the detection rate for such crimes against children increased from 1,2% in 2015/2016 to 69,91% in 2016/2017, along with the trial-ready rate (from 10,52% to 78,51%) and the conviction rate (from 9,64% to 87%).²⁰⁷

In 2016/2017, the Western Cape FCS units carried out 327 awareness campaigns (20,5% of the national total), 1 159 tracing operations (25,5% of the nation total) and made 1 613 arrests (22,3% of the national total).

Compared to FCS units in other provinces, Western Cape FCS cases did not result in significant numbers of life sentences (a measure reported by the SAPS). Provincial FCS cases resulted in 39 life sentences (3,2% of national) for 22 suspects (3,5% of national): one for murder, 29 for rape, one house robbery and 3 armed robberies.²⁰⁸


206 SAPS. (2017). *Annual Report 2016/2017*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 195.

207 SAPS. (2017). *Annual Report 2016/2017*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 196.

208 SAPS. (2017). *Annual Report 2016/2017*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 194.

9. SELECT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS RELEVANT TO DEMOCRATIC AND PROFESSIONAL POLICING: DATA AND COMMENTARY

PROGRAMME: ADMINISTRATION ²⁰⁹			
Statement	Indicator	Target	Result
Implement the performance management system for all personnel	Compliance rates for performance enhancement plans complied	99%	99,72%
Commentary & Analysis			
<p>This goal is key to the <i>Back to Basics</i> intention to hold individual officials accountable for their performance. The SAPS assesses individual performance using its Performance Enhancement Process (PEP) evaluations. The Khayelitsha Commission found that most PEP documents were incorrectly completed at the stations reviewed, that targets were not set, and that tasks assigned to officials were ambiguous.²¹⁰ It noted that 96% of employees were rated three, on a scale from one to five. This neither rewards excellence nor corrects failings, potentially harming the quality of policing and career prospects for dedicated officials whose accomplishments are not recognised.</p>			



209 SAPS (2017) *Annual Operational Plan, Western Cape*, p. 23-28

210 O'Regan, J.C. & Pikoli, A.V. (2014). *Towards a Safer Khayelitsha: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of Police Inefficiency and a Breakdown in Relations Between SAPS and the Community of Khayelitsha*. Cape Town: Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry, p. 197.

PROGRAMME: ADMINISTRATION ²¹¹			
Statement	Indicator	Target	Result
Improving employee health and wellness to promote health, dedication, responsiveness and productivity.	Rendering employee, health and wellness services to employees by Communicating EHW Proactive services and programmes; Providing assistance and counselling to personnel	60%	100%
Commentary & Analysis			
<p>Employee Health and Wellness (EHW) is central to effective democratic and professional policing. Police officials cannot be expected to carry out their work fairly if they do not feel fairly treated within the organisation. This includes ensuring that they feel heard by superiors, are sufficiently remunerated, and are provided with the resources, training and guidance required to fulfil their tasks.²¹¹ While the SAPS has an impressive suite of EHW programmes and courses on offer, its members kill themselves at an alarming rate. Between March 2012 and December 2015, 26% of SAPS deaths were a result of suicide²¹², with 115 in 2012/2013 alone.²¹³ Family murder suicides are also too common in the SAPS.²¹⁴</p>			

211 Office for Community Oriented Policing Services. (2015) *The President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report of the President's Task Force on 21st Century*. Washington, D.C. Available at: <http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/>, accessed 22 February 2018; N.E., van Craein, M., Skogan, W., Fleitas, D.M. (2015). 'Explaining officer compliance: The importance of procedural justice and trust inside a police organization'. *Criminology & Criminal Justice*, 15:4, p. 442-463; Independent Police Commission. (2013). *Policing for a better Britain* Bradford and others; Better Britain.

212 SAPS. (2016). *Risk Management Strategies to Reduce Police Deaths*. Pretoria: SAPS.

213 SAPS. (2013). *Annual Report 2012/13*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 15.

214 For example: Serra, G. (2017). 'Cop turns gun on his family'. *The Voice*, 1 September. Available at: <https://www.dailyvoice.co.za/news/cops-turns-gun-on-his-family-11033083>, accessed 17 March 2018

PROGRAMME: VISIBLE POLICING ²¹⁵			
Statement	Indicator	Baseline/Target	Result
Addressing contributors to crime <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gangsterism • Drugs • Liquor • Firearms • Taxi violence • Dangerous weapons 	Conduct targeted operations on generators of crime – drugs	93 996	103 212 (possession) 4 083 (dealing)
Commentary & Analysis			
<p>Targeted operations are central to democratic, professional, impactful policing. It is, in some ways, positive that the SAPS continues to increase the number and quantity of drug seizures year on year. However, were its actions disrupting organised gangs and their flows of illicit substances and finances, one would expect these numbers to decline. One would hope to see significantly more arrests for dealing than for possession, especially where the latter pertains only to dagga. Of the five main categories of substance seized (khat, dagga, tik, mandrax, cocaine), dagga accounts for the vast majority (20 107 341g). It is important that the roughly 100 000 arrests for possession of drugs are used as teachable and diversionary moments wherever relevant, rather than as opportunities to simply shame and punish (See: <i>Drug Courts</i>).</p>			
Statement	Indicator	Baseline/Target	Result
Addressing contributors to crime <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gangsterism • Drugs • Liquor • Firearms • Taxi violence • Dangerous weapons 	The number of lost/stolen and illegal firearms recovered	1 405	1 200
	The number of SAPS-owned firearms recovered	47	33
Commentary & Analysis			
<p>Targeted operations are central to democratic, professional, impactful policing. It is, in some ways, positive that the SAPS continues to increase the number and quantity of drug seizures year on year. However, were its actions disrupting organised gangs and their flows of illicit substances and finances, one would expect these numbers to decline. One would hope to see significantly more arrests for dealing than for possession, especially where the latter pertains only to dagga. Of the five main categories of substance seized (khat, dagga, tik, mandrax, cocaine), dagga accounts for the vast majority (20 107 341g). It is important that the roughly 100 000 arrests for possession of drugs are used as teachable and diversionary moments wherever relevant, rather than as opportunities to simply shame and punish (See: <i>Drug Courts</i>).</p>			

215 SAPS (2017) *Annual Operational Plan, Western Cape*, p. 28-31

PROGRAMME: VISIBLE POLICING²¹⁵			
Statement	Indicator	Baseline/Target	Result
Addressing contributors to crime <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gangsterism • Drugs • Liquor • Firearms • Taxi violence • Dangerous weapons 	The number of stolen/robbed vehicles recovered	4 384	5 021
Commentary & Analysis			
<p>Again, these figures are hard to evaluate without all such thefts/robberies being listed. Elsewhere the SAPS reports 7 381 thefts of motor vehicles and motorcycles and 2 259 car and truck hijackings in 2016/2017. The former have declined significantly over a 10-year period while the latter have increased sharply. It is important that recovered vehicles are used to build cases against the generally organised groups responsible for their theft.</p>			
Statement	Indicator	Baseline/Target	Result
Quality service delivery and responsiveness	Monitoring of the response to complaints on a monthly basis	Reaction time to Alpha (15:51), Bravo (18:14) and Charlie (16:36) complaints	Alpha (15:11); Bravo (18:48); Charlie (16:56)
Commentary & Analysis			
<p>These response times appear reasonable, especially if one considers that over 90 of the province's stations are in rural areas. It would be helpful for the SAPS to report how it measures response times as they can be hard to quantify. It is likely, as in the past, that dispatchers request arrival times from first responders once the action for which they were dispatched has been addressed. Times are therefore likely estimates rather than carefully measured. It would be helpful if the SAPS could link AVL data to 10111 dispatch systems, which automatically time responses from the moment tasks are assigned, to when the vehicle reaches the target location. It would be more difficult but not impossible for such a system to be implemented for tasks dispatched from police stations.</p> <p>See also: <i>Response times</i> on page 115.</p>			

PROGRAMME: VISIBLE POLICING²¹⁵			
Statement	Indicator	Baseline/Target	Result
Enhancing partnership policing	Percentage of functional Community Police Forums (CPF's) implemented at police stations according to set guidelines	100% (150)	100% (150)
Commentary & Analysis			
<p>This is an important indicator with regard to democratic and professional policing, which foregrounds partnerships as key to harm reduction and the building of police legitimacy. However, it is not clear how the SAPS defines a CPFs as 'functional', and there is likely great variance between them.</p> <p>The DoCS has its own measurement of CPF functionality based on its participation and performance in the Expanded Partnership Programme (EPP). On this basis, approximately one third of CPFs participate in the EPP. No CPFS were fully compliant with the terms by which grants were provided. In total, DoCS provided CPF and Cluster Boards with R2 151 862,49 in 2017/2018.²¹⁶</p>			
Statement	Indicator	Baseline/Target	Result
Enhancing partnership policing	Number of Provincial CPF board executive meetings to enhance the functioning of the CPFs in the province.	3 (new indicator)	6
Commentary & Analysis			
<p>This is a promising new indicator, which has the potential to enhance the function of CPFs and community-police partnerships more broadly.</p>			

216 DoCS. (2018). *Report on the performance on [sic] CPF structures: Expanded Partnership Programme (EPP) Overview 2017/18 Financial Year.*

PROGRAMME: VISIBLE POLICING²¹⁵			
Statement	Indicator	Baseline/Target	Result
Percentage of school safety programmes implemented at identified schools (140 priority schools)	Number of schools where the school safety plan is implemented	140 (100%)	100%
Commentary & Analysis			
This target and commentary overlaps with the previous indicator. The SAPS intends to implement school-based crime awareness campaigns as well as community crime awareness and educative programmes aimed at schools. Such engagements offer an opportunity for police to counter negative perceptions of police among young people. As such, it is important that police do not victim-blame or simply threaten young people with punishment.			
Statement	Indicator	Baseline/Target	Result
Police safety	Number of police murdered on duty	1 (reduce by 2%)	4 (missed)
Commentary & Analysis			
It is imperative that the SAPS do all it can to ensure the safety and wellbeing of its employees. This includes ensuring that: a) they are trained to use incremental and minimal force, but also to use deadly force when necessary; b) that its impressive Employee Health and Wellness (EHW) services are used by those who need them (e.g. suffering trauma, toxic stress, domestic violence); c) that officials are made aware of the importance of sleep, healthy diets and exercise in promoting overall wellbeing; and d) that they are required to wear protective vests/clothing as necessary and seat belts whenever travelling in a vehicle.			
Statement	Indicator	Baseline/Target	Result
Police safety	Number of police murdered off-duty	2 (reduce by 2%)	5 (missed)
Commentary & Analysis			
More police are murdered off duty than on duty. This is likely, in part, due to the dangerous areas in which some police live, but may also be partially driven by the ways in which some police officials behave when off duty, e.g. reverting to the use of force during arguments at taverns or in private homes. Officials should be taught to remain self-critical in this regard, and possibly provided with cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT) and other coping tools. EHW already offers many such services, but it is not clear whether these are effective or even used.			

PROGRAMME: VISIBLE POLICING²¹⁵

Statement	Indicator	Baseline/Target	Result
Police safety	Number of attacks on police members on-duty	649 (reduce by 2%)	582 (achieved)

Commentary & Analysis

See commentary above.

Statement	Indicator	Baseline/Target	Result
Police safety	Number of attacks on police members off-duty	76 (reduce by 2%)	74 (achieved)

Commentary & Analysis

See commentary above.



10. POLICE CONDUCT

Perceptions of legitimacy are central to professional policing. When people view the state, its police and its laws as legitimate and fair, they are more likely to comply with them. This is true, even in the absence of police.²¹⁷ Where police are perceived as legitimate, people are also more likely to cooperate with them and identify with the authority they represent, i.e. the local, provincial or national community.²¹⁸ Police can therefore both generate and fracture social cohesion.

People judge police both on the impact of their work and on how they carry it out. Where they are perceived as consistently fair, they are more likely to be regarded as legitimate. In the Western Cape, the DoCS's Promote Professional Policing campaign fosters police legitimacy by encouraging the public to report both good and bad police conduct, thus supporting dedicated police and holding others accountable for their misdeeds. It is also why the province established the Office of the Western Cape Ombudsman, and why it monitors dockets unduly struck from court rolls due to police inaction.

The SAPS also has a few mechanisms through which people can lodge complaints regarding police conduct. The Western Cape accounted for 5,7% of all Domestic Violence Act (DVA) non-compliance complaints in the country in 2016/2017, 33,5% of all SAPS's corruption and fraud-related disciplinary hearings, and 20% of all IPID incidents. In each case more incidents were recorded than in any other province, even though the Western Cape population is less than half that of Gauteng, and 40% smaller than KwaZulu-Natal.

10.2 The Office of the Western Cape Police Ombudsman

The Office of the Western Cape Police Ombudsman (WCPO) was established in 2015/2016 in terms of Section 10 of the Community Safety Act to enhance the efficiency of the police services and improve relations between the police and communities by: a) investigating complaints of police inefficiency and/or, b) investigating a breakdown of relations between the police and the community. The office is headed by Advocate Vusi Pikoli, who leads ten additional staff.²¹⁹

In 2016/2017, the Office engaged with the SAPS at cluster and community meetings to ensure that its work and mandate were widely understood. It also worked to strengthen links with Community Policing Forums (CPF), including through its participation in PNPs. The Office set itself a target of conducting three outreach

217 Bradford, B. (2012). 'Policing and social identity: procedural justice, inclusion and cooperation between police and public'. *Policing and Society*, 1-22; Tyler, T. R. (1997). 'The psychology of legitimacy: A relational perspective on voluntary deference to authorities.' *Personality and social psychology review*, 1(4), p. 323-345; Sunshine, J., & Tyler, T. R. (2003). 'The role of procedural justice and legitimacy in shaping public support for policing.' *Law & Society Review*, 37(3), p. 513-548.

218 Bradford, B., Murphy, K., Jackson, J. (2014). 'Officers as Mirrors: Policing, Procedural Justice and the (Re)Production of Social Identity'. *British Journal of Criminology*, 54 (4), p. 527-550.


219 Office of the Western Cape Police Ombudsman. (2017) *Annual Report 2016/2017*.

activities a month in 2016/2017, but was unable to meet its target due to regular engagement requests from the SAPS, CPFs and others.

The Office noted significant tension between CPFs and SAPS management at some stations, and believed this to be the result of misunderstandings with regard to CPF’s mandate. It recommended the formation of a task team to work through these tensions.

In 2016/2017, the Office received 540 complaints, 71% more than were received in 2015/2016, most related to poor communication (n=172), unacceptable behaviour (n=91) and poor investigations (n=90). Many could not be substantiated (n=125) or fell outside of the office’s mandate (n=62). During the year, 170 complaints were finalised and 366 remained under investigation.²²⁰

Figure 32: Western Cape Police Ombudsman (WCPO) Complaints received by Type, 2016/2017



220 Another four were ‘ready for screening’. Source: Office of the Western Cape Police Ombudsman. (2017). *Annual Report 2016/2017*.

Figure 33: WCPO Outcomes of Finalised Matters, 2016/2017




Table 15 presents the 10 stations that generated the most complaints in 2016/2017. Mitchell’s Plain generated 23 complaints, followed by Nyanga (n=20), Gugulethu (n=20), and Delft (19).

Table 15: Complaints received by the WCPO in 2016/2017 – top stations

Police Station	Number of Complaints
Mitchell’s Plain	23
Nyanga	20
Gugulethu	20
Delft	19
Cape Town Central	18
Mfuleni	17
Khayelitsha	16
Lentegeur	15
Bishop Lavis	11
Harare	10
Kleinvlei	10
Lingeletu West	10
Steenberg	10

10.2 Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID)

The IPID Act (2011) requires that the SAPS and municipal police services report any of 11 listed offences to the Directorate. Table 16 shows that in 2016/2017, 1 383 such reports were made to the IPID's Western Cape Office, accounting for 20% of all complaints in the country.

Table 16: Reports made to IPID in the Western Cape, 2016/2017

IPID ACT INCIDENT	WC TOTAL	WC AS % of RSA
Deaths in police custody	20	7%
Deaths as a result of police action	25	6%
Discharge of official firearm	385	23%
Rape by a police official	20	18%
Rape in police custody	6	30%
Torture	1	1%
Assault	911	24%
Corruption	1	1%
Other criminal matters	7	2%
Systemic corruption	0	0%
Non-compliance with IPID Act	7	11%
TOTAL	1 383	20%

Most matters dealt with by IPID (65,88%) related to allegations of assault. With 911 incidents reported, the province recorded 55,72% more assault cases than the next most prevalent province, the Free State (n=585). The province also accounted for the most reports related to the discharge of an official firearm (27,83% of all reports), which was the second most common matter dealt with.

It should be noted that the onus rests with police to report the discharge of a firearm to IPID. The high number of reports recorded in the province could therefore indicate the disproportionate use of firearms, or a functional reporting system. The fact that discharging of firearms does not correlate with an increase in deaths as a result of police action in the province, suggests the latter may be the case. Twenty-five deaths as a result of police action were reported in the province, compared to 115 in Gauteng and 110 in KwaZulu-Natal.

Seven of the 20 reported rapes took place while the accused was on duty and 13 while off duty. Of the six incidents of rape in police custody, four were allegedly committed by civilians and two by police officers.²²¹

10.3 SAPS-recorded complaints

The Western Cape SAPS received and acted on a number of complaints in 2016/2017. The provincial discipline office dealt with 1 226 new cases of which 484 were criminal cases and 742 departmental cases. 1 471 cases were finalised, 42 employees resigned and 49 were dismissed for misconduct. Table 17 presents the outcomes of disciplinary hearings reported by the SAPS. Almost half (43%) resulted in 'not guilty' verdicts, while another 22,8% were withdrawn. Only 34,2% resulted in sanction.²²²

Table 17: Outcomes of SAPS Disciplinary Hearings, 2016/2017²²³

Outcome	Number	Percentage of total (%)
Case withdrawn	240	22,8
Suspended dismissal	84	8
Final written warning	83	7,9
Written warning	81	7,7
Dismissal	51	4,8
Not guilty	452	43
Fine	28	2,7
Corrective counselling	13	1,2
Demotion	0	0
TOTAL	1 052	100

Loss of firearms, escapes from custody and fraud and corruption were identified as serious risks in the province, as illustrated in Table 18.

221 Independent Police Investigative Directorate. (2017). *IPID Annual Report 2016/2017*, p. 46.

222 SAPS. (2017). *Western Cape Annual Report 2016/2017*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 87.

223 SAPS. (2017). *Western Cape Annual Report 2016/2017*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 94.

Table 18: SAPS Western Cape Disciplinary Data 2016/2017, Key Risks

Type	Number	Guilty	Dismissed
Firearm losses	18	11	0
Escape	101	41	1
Fraud & corruption	60	40	20

The Western Cape SAPS received 130 of the country's 242 complaints against SAPS members for not complying with the Domestic Violence Act, accounting for 53,7% of all such complaints nationwide.²²⁴ It also held 103 disciplinary hearings in response to allegations of corruption and fraud lodged against Western Cape officials in 2016/2017. These account for 33,5% of all such hearings nationwide and 50% more than in Gauteng, which held the second most hearings in the country.

Table 19 lists the stations where actions were taken against three or more officials.

Table 19: Corruption- and fraud-related disciplinary hearings – top stations, 2016/2017²²⁵

Station	Number of hearings
Lingeletu West	6
Delft	5
Robertson	5
Cape Town	4
Lwandle	4
Goodwood	3
Sea Point	3
Claremont	3
Mowbray	3
Harare	3
Vredendal	3

Table 20 presents the outcomes of corruption- and fraud-related disciplinary hearings in the Western Cape, with only 35 members being found guilty.

224 SAPS. (2017). *Annual Report 2016/2017*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 133.

225 Data sourced from the Western Cape Department of Community Safety's 2016/2017 *Policing Complaints Reports*.

Table 20: Outcomes of corruption and fraud disciplinary hearings, 2016/2017²²⁶

Members charged	Guilty	Dismissed	Not guilty	Sanction short of dismissal	Withdrawn	Pending
345	35	0	26	25	17	25

10.4 Disproportionate complaints in the Western Cape

It is tempting to interpret this data as evidence that Western Cape SAPS officials are significantly less law abiding than their counterparts in other provinces. This may be true, and would not be surprising if one accepts the prevalence of organised criminal gangs in the province and their need for police accomplices. It is particularly concerning that so many assault incidents occur and that so many firearms are discharged. However, it is also very possible that these numbers reflect something positive. They could be the result of a provincial public that has confidence in complaints and oversight mechanisms in the province. They could also be indicative of functional provincial SAPS and DoCS systems, rather than disproportionate abuses. Indeed, this is the kind of active citizenry and partnership that DoCS has in recent years promoted as part of its Promote Professional Policing campaign. This same logic applies to categories of crime such as sexual offences or domestic abuse. Where police record increases in such categories of crime, trends may reflect increased trust in police rather than a rise in offences.

It is similarly concerning, but also promising, that in 2018 former Western Cape Provincial Commissioner Arno Lamoer pled guilty to one count of corruption. In the same case, a SAPS Brigadier, Sharon Govender, was also found guilty of corruption.²²⁷

10.5 Civil litigation, accidents and absenteeism

Other indicators of police conduct and community relations can be found in records regarding civil litigation, vehicle accidents and absenteeism.

The Western Cape SAPS dealt with 3 269 claims against the state during the 2016/2017 financial year, and 886 loss files. One hundred and ninety-seven (197) matters went to court, resulting in payments of R8 902 506 being paid out.²²⁸ Twenty-seven cases were concluded in favour of the SAPS. Targets set for the finalisation and payment of civil claims were surpassed, with 72% and 79% achieved respectively.²²⁹

226 Data sourced from the Western Cape Department of Community Safety's 2016/2017 *Policing Complaints Reports*.

227 Dolley, C. (2018). 'Former Western Cape top cop found guilty of corruption'. 19 February, *News 24*. Available at: <https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/breaking-former-western-cape-top-cop-found-guilty-of-corruption-20180219>, accessed 3 May 2018.

228 SAPS. (2017). *Annual Report 2016/2017*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 97.

229 *Ibid.*, p. 98.

During the 2016/2017 financial year, 1 375 SAPS vehicle collisions were recorded in the province. Damage to state vehicles seriously inhibits the SAPS's ability to carry out its core functions. Recklessly driven marked vehicles also reflect poorly on police legitimacy, as they reveal police and other law enforcement authorities as flouting the laws they are expected to defend.²³⁰

The province established vehicle risk committees at all police stations to monitor misuse of official vehicles. During the reporting period, 46 members had their authorities to drive official vehicles suspended and disciplinary steps were instituted against 32 members for misuse and or abuse of vehicles.²³¹

In the same way that damaged vehicles limit the SAPS's ability to serve communities, so too do absent employees. Absenteeism also reflects, to an extent, employee commitment to work and/or the state of employee health, both of which impact service delivery and reflect on management. Absentee data therefore provides additional insight into the delivery of police services and community-police relations. As shown in Table 21, all SAPS employees in the province used, on average, all their annual sick leave.²³² Even senior managers used nine of their ten annual sick days.²³³ This suggests either that SAPS employees are in particularly ill health, or that some employees treat sick leave as a form of general leave.

Table 21: SAPS Western Cape sick leave figures, 2016/2017²³⁴

	Days	Employees	Percentage of employees using sick leave	Average days per employee	Estimated cost of sick leave
TOTAL	207 579	20 367	100%	10	R222 792 514

Employees also took an average of 24 annual leave days in 2016/2017, so that on average employees took 34 days off work. For VISPOL officials who work on average 16 days a month, this equates to two full months off work in 2016/2017.

230 It is common for SAPS, metro, law enforcement and even traffic police, to be seen speeding, changing lanes without indicating and committing other transgressions.

231 SAPS. (2017). *Western Cape Annual Report 2016/2017*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 105.

232 SAPS employees may take up to 30 days of sick leave per three-year cycle. The fact that employees use exactly ten days a year suggests the leave may not always be used for medical reasons.

233 SAPS. (2017). *Western Cape Annual Report 2016/2017*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 91.

234 SAPS. (2017). *Western Cape Annual Report 2016/2017*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 94.

10.6 Watching Briefs

As part of its oversight function, the DoCS’s Directorate: Monitoring and Evaluation monitors the passage of select cases through the courts, to gauge police conduct, efficiency and effectiveness in this regard. Table 22 presents these findings for the first quarter of 2017. Of concern, 368 cases were struck off the court roll during this period for petty failings on the part of police, mostly detectives. Cases included murder, rape, aggravated robbery and domestic violence. Responses to these findings were requested from the SAPS.

Table 22: DoCS Watching Brief findings, January to March 2017

REASON CASE STRUCK OFF THE ROLL	Number
Docket not in court	104
Failure to complete investigation timeously	162
Witnesses not subpoenaed to testify	60
Outstanding forensics & lab reports	5
Accused not brought to court	37
Total	368
CASES INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING	
Murder	2
Robbery aggravated	11
Attempted murder	6
Rape	6
Domestic violence	5

11. POLICE RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION

Measuring and responding to the public demand for policing is not a simple matter. While policing is a public good to which all have a legitimate claim, police resources cannot be deployed equally across space or communities. Rather, careful consideration must be given to how crime, harm and safety change across environments, with resources deployed where risk of harm is greatest. As shown in the section 'Crime, Harm and Safety in the Western Cape' (page 15), a large portion of the province's murder occurs in predictable areas at predictable times.

In accordance with the White Paper on Safety and Security (2016), and with the Community Safety Improvement Partnership (CSIP), the Department works to influence the alignment of resources with community priorities as identified in PNP public consultations. In addition to public concern over police resources raised at PNP workshops, several authorities and civil society groups have noted the same in recent years.²³⁵ In the Western Cape, the Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry recommended that the SAPS revise its system for determining the Theoretical Human Resource Requirement of police stations, and the urgent reallocation of human resources to the three Khayelitsha stations, while the Portfolio Committee on Police recommended the same for Nyanga and Philippi stations.

In Cape Town, the Social Justice Coalition (SJC), Equal Education (EE) and the Nyanga Community Police Forum (Nyanga CPF) have argued in court that the SAPS's system discriminates against poor, black communities, using data such as that in Figure 34 to make their point.²³⁶ This figure appears to show a correlation between murder rates and low police-resident ratios, so that stations with high murder rates tend to have fewer police officials relative to the local population.

Although counterintuitive, there is no consistent body of evidence to support the notion that increasing police numbers in general reduces violent crime.²³⁷ Indeed, the most consistent finding across studies (from wealthy countries) is that increasing police numbers has no effect on crime levels, though some studies suggest associated reductions in specific, non-violent crimes like theft.²³⁸ This section discusses research and debates in this regard.

235 Civilian Secretariat for Police (CSP). (undated). *Analysis of Resource Allocation in the South African Police Service*. p. 1.

236 Social Justice Coalition. (2018). 'Police Resources court case resumes 14 & 15 February in Equality Court'. Available at: http://www.sjc.org.za/police_resources_court_case_resumes_14_15_february_in_equality_court, accessed 8 March 2018.

237 Eck, J. E., & Maguire, E. R. (2006). 'Have Changes in Policing Reduced Violent Crime? An Assessment of the Evidence'. In A. Blumstein & J. Wallman (Eds.), *The Crime Drop in America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

238 Corman, H. & Mocan, H.N. (2000). A Time-Series Analysis of Crime, Deterrence, and Drug Abuse in New York City." *American Economic Review*, June 2000, 90(3), pp. 584-604; Klick, J. & Tabarol, A. (2005). 'Using Terror Alert Levels to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime.' *Journal of Law and Economics*, 48(1), p. 267-79.

Figure 34: Police per 100 000 residents, 2013–2016



Source: *www.sjc.org.za* (excluding Table Bay)

11.1 SAPS Human Resource Management in the Western Cape²³⁹

Many of the policing interventions discussed earlier in this report are only possible with a minimum threshold of resources. One of the most effective forms of policing, hotspot policing, is possible when a baseline resource allocation is significantly boosted for a period of time in a specific area. Yet even without such focused deployment, appropriate resource allocation can result in a reduction in serious crimes such as murder,²⁴⁰ improve police visibility, and help authorities to respond to social and economic inequities that drive crime. To date, several models have been used to allocate human and vehicle resources within the SAPS. The current model is the Theoretical Human Resource Requirement system (THRR).

The THRR is based on calculations/estimates of the cumulative time taken for all tasks routinely carried out at a police station. Information on the internal and external factors shaping policing are collected at station level. External factors include demographic and environmental data, as well as information on gangs, liquor stores, shopping centres, and firearm dealers and owners. Internal factors include station infrastructure, number of client service centre activities, reported crime and number of crime prevention activities carried out. All factors are weighted and aggregated to arrive at a final score. Although station and cluster

²³⁹ This section is primarily based on two reports: 1) Simelane, B. Brown, L. & Seyisi, S. (2017). *Analyses of Human Resource Allocation for South African Police Service with specific reference to the Western Cape*; Western Cape Department of Community Safety; and 2) Civilian Secretariat for Police (CSP). (undated) *Analysis of Resource Allocation in the South African Police Service*.

²⁴⁰ Redpath, J. and Nagia-Luddy, F. (2015). 'Unconscious and irrational human resource allocation.' *SA Crime Quarterly*, 53, p. 15-26.

managers collect and submit the data at the heart of the THRR system, it seems that many may not understand how it is used, or how it impacts resource allocation. They do not see the results of the THRR, but only the fixed establishment.²⁴¹

In 2017, the Civilian Secretariat for Police (CSP) commissioned a national review and DoCS conducted a study of the THRR in the Western Cape. The CSP study emphasized that the THRR is used to determine the ideal number of personnel, while actual posts are filled according to budgets and planning. None of the stations randomly reviewed had been fully capacitated. This is expected to remain so until the national economy improves, making more money available to the Department of Police.²⁴²

According to Section 12 of the SAPS Act, the distribution of resources is the mandate of Provincial Commissioners, but they are limited by station classifications. The SAPS divides its stations into three categories based on their size and the rank of the station commander. Each category is assigned a corresponding human resource limit: A-Captain (90), B-Lt Colonel (180), C1-Colonel (360) and C2-Brigadier (not less than 360). Categorisation is decided at the national level and cannot be changed by Provincial Commissioners. In terms of Regulation 35 of the SAPS Act, the Minister or National Commissioner may upgrade a police station provided certain criteria are met.²⁴³

Resources allocated to SAPS nationally have increased since 2010/2011 with the most recent annual increase (+5.7%) surpassing inflation for the same period (+4.5%), though this has resulted in only an additional 838 SAPS members from 2010/2011 to 2015/2016. This trend has not been reflected in the Western Cape SAPS budget, which decreased by 19.7% in 2014/2015 and then increased by 24.9% in 2015/2016. Despite these budgetary fluctuations, SAPS Western Cape filled 89%-98% of the granted human resource posts in 2010/2011-2015/2016 with a significant increase between 2014/2015 and 2015/2016 (+7%).

It is also significant that in this period there were numerous promotions from lower to middle management across the SAPS, so that just 43% of station-based officials are *not* supervisors.²⁴⁴ This suggests an inverted organisational hierarchy, and one that could make lower-ranked officials less satisfied than would be the case if the organisation were constable-heavy, as is the norm in policing.

The DoCS review of the THRR made a number of important observations and recommendations, outlined below.²⁴⁵

241 Simelane, B. Brown, L. & Seyisi, S. (2017). *Analyses of Human Resource Allocation for South African Police Service with specific reference to the Western Cape*; Western Cape Department of Community Safety.

242 Civilian Secretariat for Police (CSP). (undated) *Analysis of Resource Allocation in the South African Police Service*, p. 30.

243 Ibid.

244 Redpath, J. and Nagia-Luddy, F. (2015). 'Unconscious and irrational human resource allocation.' *SA Crime Quarterly*, 53, p. 15-26.

245 Simelane, B. Brown, L. & Seyisi, S. (2017). *Analyses of Human Resource Allocation for South African Police Service with specific reference to the Western Cape*; Western Cape Department of Community Safety.

11.1.1 The THRR, FE and actual resource allocation per station

The theoretical human resource requirements were stable for 2011/12-2013/2014, but increased from 2014/2015-2015/2016. These increases were the highest in two stations of the six reviewed, both in the top 10 provincial and top 30 national priority police stations. Most stations were allocated more resources than the theoretical needs for the last two annual reporting periods. Analyses of the trends in human resource allocation suggested that the allocation of the fixed establishment was not directly proportionate to the THRR, though none of the stations were capacitated below two thirds of their fixed establishment. Fixed establishment allocations appeared relatively constant over five years despite changes in the external environment, which seems contrary to the premise that the THRR computes real need at police stations.

11.1.2 Problematic areas pertaining to THRR input audit sheets

The THRR aims to take into account both internal and external factors to allocate resources appropriately, but it contains several (perhaps inevitable) inaccuracies:

- The gang indicator is weighted the same as other factors – using only a number, without considering violence frequency and intensity.
- Domestic violence cases – the time taken for police to respond is not considered.
- Firearms ownership – applications for licences and licence renewals are not considered.

Other issues with the THRR include:

- Data governance, reliability and integrity – some data are not available.
- Determination of indicators and weights allocation not based on area population and reported serious crime in the station area.
- THRR and preferential treatment – the THRR theoretically prioritises priority stations, but it is not clear whether this is true in practice.
- Population data is not included in the THRR sheet, but is rather inputted by the province. The province uses projections that aren't always based on fact, which skews the data and thus the resource allocation.
- Allocation by THRR does not result in the desired resource allocation in terms of detective work loads and the 17 community-reported serious crimes.
- Only licensed liquor outlets are listed on THRR sheets.

11.1.3 Constraints that impact the utilisation of human resources

Station commanders have limited scope in terms of their station's workload. Resource allocations in terms of human and vehicle allocation do not correspond with the geographical and demographic particulars of each station, nor their crime profile. E.g. in Manenberg many human and vehicle resources are diverted to escort EMS and city council members when they enter the area, which is not captured by the THRR.

11.2 Vehicle allocation

The vehicle ratio in the Western Cape is lower than the national ratio (3,05 vs 3,77 nationally). The provincial target in 2015/2016 was for a ratio of 4,51, but not achieved. The process of assessing vehicle requirements does not take into account already allocated vehicles with mechanical problems. At times money is wastefully spent on fixing vehicles that should be retired, sometimes costing the SAPS more than 100% of the vehicle purchase price in repairs. The amount of time taken to repair faulty vehicles is also a major concern.

11.3 Reservists

In March 2017, 13 577 reservists were registered with the SAPS nationally. This is less than the 18 637 reservists, which the SAPS reports were recruited and trained in 2007/08²⁴⁶ and marginally more than the 12 541 trained in 2008/09.²⁴⁷ In 2007/08, the SAPS reported having 66 394 reservists. Reservist numbers declined rapidly after SAPS National instruction 3 of 2014 was enacted, which set out strict requirements for the appointment of reservists.

National and Western Cape SAPS launched a new recruitment drive for reservists in November 2016, which remains ongoing. Only 509 applications were received in the Western Cape, of which only 302 passed the psychometric assessment. The application process was still under way at the end of the previous financial year. The Western Cape Ombudsman was requested by Provincial Parliament to undertake a review of the reservist programme in the Western Cape. The results of this are expected during 2018.

It is important that while striving to rebuild its reservist base, the SAPS does not lower recruitment criteria. There is little evidence that reservists have historically served the SAPS in any exceptional way. Rather, the traditional reservist system was and still is open to abuse. Reservists are not visually distinguishable from permanent members so that their actions reflect on the whole service. Despite this, they receive infinitely less training than permanent members. Reservists, if well trained and managed, can offer the SAPS numerous advantages. But they can also seriously harm the SAPS. Cognisant of the fact that research shows no consistent link between police numbers and general crime, the SAPS must not recruit reservists simply for the sake of recruitment. Where they are recruited,

246 SAPS. (2008). *Annual Report 2007/08*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 98.

247 SAPS. (2009). *Annual Report 2008/09*. Pretoria: SAPS, p. 89.

they should be strategically deployed to crime hotspots, rather than limited to their residential policing area. Reservists in Rondebosch and Claremont, for example, could do far better in a crime-prone informal settlement over a weekend than they could in their home suburbs.

11.4 Conclusion

The THRR should be treated as a guide to inform the resource allocation process rather than a strict and reliable formula that supports the rational and just distribution of resources. The recommendations of the THRR are not subjected to any additional (e.g. qualitative) assessment, so that factors that are not measured (e.g. faulty vehicles) remain invisible to the assessment process. In addition to these limitations, no station is fully capacitated based on THRR recommendations (i.e. all stations are under-resourced according to the THRR).

As mentioned under the section: 'Crime, Harm and Safety in the Western Cape', much of the province's violent crime is concentrated in time and place. A more flexible resource allocation and deployment system than the THRR would allow for resources to be deployed when and where they are most effective. As such, the model and process that the Western Cape SAPS uses to shift and reshuffle resources requires further investigation.

The THRR system seems to work well in terms of gauging provincial needs, but makes less sense at station level. In an attempt to address shortages, internal resource shuffling and shifting at the police station level is a norm rather than an exception.

11.5 Recommendations

1. Some crimes are more harmful than others (e.g. murder versus assault) and more policeable than others (e.g. street robbery vs cyber-crime). Resources should be dispatched in such a way that they reduce the most harm in the most efficient way. This can be achieved by focusing resources on high-crime/violent areas and individuals, and on particular crimes. Resources should be allocated and deployed accordingly.
2. In order to test the ability of the THRR to determine requirements and to allocate resources correctly, attempts should be made to capacitate 10% of the police stations to the requirement of the THRR and then monitor these stations' performance over a period of three years in respect of reported crime and the perception of safety from the communities (beneficiaries of the services).
3. Noting the importance of the THRR to the police station, there is a need to ensure that the police station management understands how it works and its implications in resource allocation.
4. Guidelines should be determined at provincial level to inform the discretionary process of reallocation to the police station level in terms of

Section 12(3) of the SAPS Act, taking into consideration the peculiarity of each police station.

5. Attempts should be made to standardise processes and systems in terms of data governance and management at the different police stations. The Provincial Office should consider guiding the police stations in terms of formats and protocols for the storage and management of data and information.
6. The SAPS should explore the possibility of using other independent data systems and available data sources to improve the data integrity of the THRR. These could include data in the possession of the Department of Education, regarding the number of schools and learners per school within a police precinct. Furthermore, the number of liquor outlets per police station as captured by the Western Cape Liquor Authority could be accessed and used to improve the accuracy of the liquor-related data.

11.5.1 What if systems were made more efficient?

The proportion of SAPS employees in non-supervisory roles at police stations is 43%; this means that most SAPS employees occupy administrative and supervisory positions. Rebalancing of SAPS resource allocation towards frontline services could markedly improve service delivery within existing budget constraints.



Vehicle resourcing, use and safety

- a) Police vehicles – typically cars – are central to the practical and symbolic work of policing. Practically, the expansive nature of South African towns and cities, and the breadth of its rural areas, require that police have access to vehicles for targeted patrols, responding to calls for service, and travelling to meetings. Symbolically, police are most visible when in marked cars, and visibility is often what communities desire most from police. Vehicles are perhaps the police’s most important tool. Their care and maintenance should be a priority.
- b) But police need not be as limited by vehicles as they sometimes claim to be. Patrols should not be random, even if people in randomly selected spaces are reassured by a police presence. Patrol should be targeted, which may require less driving and more static work. Less driving means less wear and tear and reduced likelihood of accidents, which should mean less maintenance. An alternative would be for officials deployed to hotspots on foot, bicycles, motorbikes, quadbikes or horses to be supported by a dedicated car patrolling the broader hotspot area. The Cape Town City Improvement District uses such a model.
 - Depending on the area, police should not automatically assume that where they do not have access to a car they cannot do their work. Rather, creative solutions should be explored, e.g. making use of Uber where it is prominent.
- c) Police and communities should carefully consider their expectations of rapid police response. While rapid response reassures the public and gives police work dramatic meaning, it seems to have almost no impact on general crime,²⁴⁸ while incentivising reckless driving by, and unrealistic expectations of police.
- d) Each year, more SAPS officials die in car accidents than are murdered on and off duty, combined.²⁴⁹ In 2016/2017, the Western Cape SAPS reported 1 309 accidents involving official vehicles, an average of 3.6 per day. This suggests a culture of reckless driving, which achieves the opposite of what police visibility should do – it signals to communities that police in cars are above the law.
 - The SAPS should adopt a realistic and transparent stance to rapid response and pursuit, which disincentivises reckless driving without eroding service delivery.
- b. The SAPS should regularly review officials’ driving habits. This can be achieved using existing AVL technology, or by incorporating technology used by insurance companies to monitor their clients.²⁵⁰
- e) Vehicle use and dispatch must be based on rational and procedurally fair reasoning. Alpha complaints should be prioritised, within reason, while bravo complaints must be weighed against competing demands and options.
- f) Vehicle maintenance and repair systems should be monitored to ensure rapid throughput. Where the SAPS outsources work to private providers, it should negotiate priority service agreements (i.e. that SAPS vehicles are attended to immediately, rather than joining the back of the queue).

248 Skogan, W. & Frydl, K. (eds). (2004). *Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: The Evidence Committee to Review Research on Police Policy and Practices*, National Research Council.

249 SAPS. (2016). ‘Risk Management Strategies to Reduce Police Deaths’. Briefing to the Portfolio Committee on Police, 17 February; SAPS. (2015). ‘Measures Implemented to Ensure Safety of SAPS Members and Address Unnatural Deaths’. Briefing to the Portfolio Committee of Police, 28 August.

250 E.g. Discovery Insure’s Vitality Drive product, which tracks drivers speed, breaking, cornering, cellphone use while driving, night driving and distance travelled. Rewards and sanctions are allocated to clients based on this data.

12. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The basic mission of democratic, professional police and other law enforcement agencies is to improve safety and well-being by promoting and supporting measures that prevent crime, harm and disorder. This is achieved not only by enforcing and implementing criminal law, but by forging partnerships with and responding to specific community needs in order to improve feelings of safety. Engagements should be based on transparent, clear and consistent communication and on systems of evidence application and refinement. While the experience and intuition of police officials is important, it should be used to inform an evidence base, rather than drawn on in place of official evidence and instructions.

Police officials are powerful shapers of communities and identities. The ways police engage with the public signals to them what and who is and is not considered acceptable. For these interactions to enhance rather than fracture social and national cohesion, law enforcers must interact in ways that promote trust and confidence in their institutions.

Policing is a public good to which all living in South Africa should have access. However, harm and risk are not evenly distributed across the country. Thus, police resources should not be equally distributed, either. Rather, police resources and action should focus on areas that generate the most harm. For example, roughly 12% of SAPS stations account for 50% of all recorded crime. In the Western Cape, 10 Cape Town stations account for 47% of all murder in the province. It is both just and rational that these areas receive the lion's share of police attention and resources. Addressing crime and disorder in such areas will have positive knock-on effects in other areas, ultimately benefitting all.

While the evidence of what works in policing is growing – predominantly based on research in wealthy nations – it is obvious and clear that police alone cannot stop criminality. Wherever possible, targeted police action should be carried out in partnership with other government and NGO bodies that offer support to would-be and known offenders. In other words, let people know that crime and violence won't be tolerated, but also offer them realistic ways to escape high-crime social groups, gangs, etc.

12.1 Comments

1. **Impressive response times:** The SAPS in the Western Cape should be commended on achieving some of the fastest response times in the country. Although this has little to no impact on general crime rates, it is important to build trust and confidence in police, which in turn can improve safety.
2. **Gang-related murders should be contained:** According to the SAPS, 34% of attempted murders in 2016/2017 were gang related, compared to 19% of murders. If gangs become more effective killers, murder could increase sharply. Focused interventions at 'gang' stations should therefore be pursued to prevent this from happening. These interventions should include searches

for and the confiscation of firearms, as well as the targeted detection of crimes already carried out.

- 3. Monitor and address absenteeism:** Absenteeism appears endemic in the SAPS. Almost every employee uses all sick leave allocated to them in a three-year cycle. Rather than revealing that officials are on average ill for 10 days of each year, it suggests an abuse of sick leave. It is particularly concerning that even senior management in the province report being sick for nine days each year. While officials must be allowed time off for legitimate physical and mental health needs, abuse of the system must be nipped in the bud.

It is recommended that SAPS Western Cape's sick leave be audited and the root causes of the sick leave being investigated and reported to the Department and Standing Committee.

Absenteeism of SAPS members need to be investigated: The Western Cape Province is already under-resourced which impacts on service delivery. Absenteeism (inclusive of sick leave, leave, re-deployment and or training) and the impact on staff mental health and available resources at any shift needs to be investigated and SAPS report on aspects related to shift management at station level to address absenteeism.

- 4. The SAPS is a top-heavy police organisation:** Most officials expect a rank promotion or two at some point in their careers, but police hierarchies do not allow for a promotion of all officers. Rather, it can be expected that most police would remain constables for life, but that they should be provided with incentives and rewards provided unrelated to rank to maintain morale.

Police resources should not only be increased in the Western Cape but the distribution thereof be such that resources are allocated based on the needs of areas affected by the prevalence of serious crimes.

12.2 Recommendations

- 1. Human Resource allocation to the Western Cape must be increased:** The allocation of human resources to the Western Cape has not kept pace with the growth in the population and the high rate of violent crime. There is a need to ensure that police in the province are adequately resourced to render an effective policing service.
- 2. Resources must be shifted to address predictable murder:** Murder in the Western Cape is clearly concentrated in time and place and is often associated with alcohol. Police resources should be shifted accordingly to focus on and disrupt these predictable modes of offending and in ways that win and maintain community support. Resources should be shifted to those precincts where murders and violent crimes are largely concentrated.
- 3. Resources must be organised to achieve the optimal balance between effectiveness, cost efficiency, accountability and responsiveness.** This should include disproportionately allocating resources to the areas where the most harm is caused.

4. **Sector policing should be implemented at priority stations:** Sector policing should be implemented as envisaged in the SAPS Sector Policing manual. While this is not possible at all, perhaps at most stations, it should be attempted in the province's most unsafe and harmful police areas. Protocols should be developed to justify and allow for the temporary withdrawal of resources from one cluster to another in order to have the greatest impact on overall harm and safety. The rationale should be clearly communicated to both public and police.
5. **Police should consider targeting murder, robbery and domestic violence:** Police should consider focusing resources and time on select crimes, which if reduced could significantly reduce overall harm in communities. These include murder, robbery and domestic violence, especially in police areas where these are most common and predictable. Each of these categories should be receptive to consistent, evidence-based interventions that are adequately resourced, and are tracked and revised over time. Focused interventions would include prioritising deployment, response and investigation of select crimes; working with prosecutors to divert or prosecute offenders, and with social services and businesses to provide alternatives to crime and violence.
6. **Policing should be evidence based and learning oriented:** All policing should be based on best practice, evidence and learning. This includes police officials being made aware of existing evidence on violence prevention, much of which is not police-centric. They should also be aware of the limits of policing and related need for non-policing partner interventions.
7. **High-intensity 'crackdowns' must grow public trust:** The enforcement of the Firearms Control Act appears to have real impact on murder rates and should thus continue to be enforced. High-intensity 'crackdown' operations have the clearest impact on short-term firearm violence. However, such operations also pose a risk of eroding community-police relations as an entire block or neighbourhood is momentarily locked down and its young men treated with suspicion. Operation commanders and participants should always be reminded of this fact and of the need to treat all people as fairly and respectfully as possible. Operations should be guided by procedural fairness. Officials should be equipped with the skills necessary to both keep themselves and communities safe, and win the hearts and minds of those they encounter, including those in conflict with the law.
8. **Officials must act against intimate partner, parent-child and teacher-learner violence, and understand their role in changing related social norms:** If police are not seen to take intimate partner, parent-child and teacher-child violence seriously, violence-supporting norms will not change and boys will become men who believe violence is acceptable. SAPS officials should be incentivised, equipped and evaluated with regard to their policing of related crimes. This may require that police, too, are convinced of the harms such violence produces. More education of officials is needed when dealing with intimate partner, parent-child and teacher-child related violence cases.

9. **The SAPS must address failures related to trial processes:** The DoCS watching briefs reveal shocking failures of justice because of sloppy police work, for instance dockets not being sent to court and investigations not being concluded. This is concerning because these practices are relatively common, that corrupt officials may accept bribes from suspects and conveniently ‘forget’ to send a docket to court or issue a summons, knowing the case will be struck from the roll with minimal backlash. Accountability and case management mechanisms must be improved in this regard. The SAPS should report to the DoCS the steps taken to address these faults, and should monitor interventions over time.
10. **More emphasis must be placed on getting cases trial ready:** General detective performance in the province improved in 2016/2017. The SAPS reports that it has implemented a plan to improve detection and conviction rates, but it is in getting dockets trial ready that it fails. Where a case has little chance of success, it should be closed, but where successful prosecution is possible, time and resources should be invested to ensure greater success at trial or mediation. The role of the Forensic Science Laboratory should be considered.
11. **A designated team be allocated to ensure that dockets are court-ready:** A prosecutor should be assigned to and based close to each police station to ensure that dockets are court-ready. This will promote prosecution-led investigations of all cases as all evidence reports are ready.
12. **Better coordination across the criminal justice sector can reduce withdrawals and postponements:** To improve effectiveness of the current Criminal Justice System, actors across the system must work together so that better quality dockets are put before the NPA and so that instructions of prosecutors are complied with timeously.
13. **Police and enforcement agencies should be organisationally just work environments:** Enforcement agencies should apply procedural fairness/organisational justice within their own structures, recognising that one can’t expect procedurally fair policing where police do not feel fairly treated themselves. This is particularly important as the SAPS attempts to instil ‘discipline’ in its members.
14. **Police must not increase inequality:** The Western Cape is an unequal, unjust socio-economic community. Policing and law enforcement should not increase inequality or harm. Where bylaws/‘broken window’ are enforced, they should not exacerbate the inequalities linked to crime and should be applied in conjunction with other interventions that support common by-law offenders, e.g. homeless people.
15. **Innovation in policing must be monitored and revised following implementation:** The SAPS in the Western Cape introduced a range of impressive-looking tools and instructions in 2016/2017. These should be monitored and the lessons learned reported to DoCS and the public, particularly as they relate to priority crimes. Where efforts fail, they should be revised or abandoned and the lessons learned used to inform new approaches.

16. **Organised crime should be targeted through a data-driven approach:** The SAPS should report on the impact of serious organised crime work in the province, particularly with regard to organised crime, abalone harvesting, taxi and transport violence and cable theft. These require specialist resources to understand and disrupt. It is difficult for DoCS and others to evaluate SAPS effectiveness in this regard based on available information.
17. **Police officials should be provided with incentives:** Police officials should be provided with incentives and rewards unrelated to rank to maintain morale. In addition the distribution of resources should be amended to increase personnel at station level rather than at provincial office level to address morale and boost resources and work experience levels at station level.
18. **SAPS should ensure that it implements a safe school strategy** in partnership with government and non-governmental stakeholders to ensure that learners are safe in school as well as to and from school.



13. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Department of Community Safety thanks all of the participants in the PNP workshops for giving up their work time in order to participate.

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Amanda Dissel, Winston Cogill, Therasha Hanekom, Khumbulani Mfanta and Bhekithemba Simelane, and Dr Andrew Faull for his analysis of professional policing and the performance of the SAPS.

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APPENDIX A: RISK FACTORS PREDICTING VIOLENCE BY TYPE						
RISK FACTORS GROUPED BY SOCIO-ECOLOGIC LEVEL	CHILD MAL-TREATMENT	SEXUAL VIOLENCE	INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE	YOUTH VIOLENCE	ELDER ABUSE	
LGBT	3,9x (child)			3,0x (victim)		
Externalising behaviour problems/ delinquency	3,3x (child)			1,6x (victim) 4,4x (perpetrator)		
Intellectual disability/ cognitive impairment	2,7x (child)			*victim (no estimate)	3,0x (victim)	
Low self-esteem	3,0x (parent/ caregiver)			*victim (no estimate)		
Poor impulse control	2,8x					
Mental and neurological disorder	2,3x (child) 2,5x (parent/ caregiver)		2,0x (victim)	* perpetrator (no estimate)	3,8x (perpetrator)	
Witnessing IPV in childhood			3,8x (victim)			
Previous violence victimisation			3,1x (victim)	*victim/ perpetrator (no estimate)		
Unmarried			2,5x (victim)			
Gambling			4,2x (perpetrator)			
Unplanned/unwanted pregnancy	2,9x (parent/ caregiver)		2,8x (perpetrator)			
Anger/hostility			2,7x (perpetrator)			
Substance abuse		3,2x (perpetrator)	2,6x (perpetrator)	3,0x (perpetrator)		
History of violence perpetration		2,8x (perpetrator)		3,9x (victim) 5,5x (perpetrator)	6,1x (victim)	
Frequent use of the internet				2,8x (victim)		
Moral disengagement				2,3x (perpetrator)		
Homelessness		1,4x (victim)				
Engagement in transactional sex		3,8x (perpetrator)				

INDIVIDUAL

APPENDIX A: RISK FACTORS PREDICTING VIOLENCE BY TYPE						
RISK FACTORS GROUPED BY SOCIO-ECOLOGIC LEVEL	CHILD MAL-TREATMENT	SEXUAL VIOLENCE	INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE	YOUTH VIOLENCE	ELDER ABUSE	
Multiple sexual partners		3,6x (perpetrator)				
Ethnic minority				* perpetrator (no estimate)	4,0x (victim)	
Life dissatisfaction					2,8x (victim)	
Caregiving burden					1,4x (perpetrator)	
Poor parent-child relationship	3,1x			1,5x		
Low parental supervision				1,4x		
Parental death/ separation	2,4x		251			
Single parent				1,3x		
Poor family relationships	2,2x				5,5x	
Violence in the family	2,0x			* (no estimate)		
Marital dissatisfaction			3,3x			
Adherence to traditional gender role norms			2,3x			
Less children			1,2x			
Delinquent peers				1,4x		
Rural or urban residence	2,1x (rural)	1,2x (urban)		*urban (no estimate)		
High rates of crime			5,6x	* (no estimate)		
High rates of violence			2,5x	* (no estimate)		
Residential stability			2,1x			
High rates of unemployment			1,5x			
Adverse school environment				1,0x		

251 World Health Organisation. Violence Prevention. Available at: <http://apps.who.int/violence-info/>, accessed 15 February 2018

APPENDIX A: RISK FACTORS PREDICTING VIOLENCE BY TYPE					
RISK FACTORS GROUPED BY SOCIO-ECOLOGIC LEVEL	CHILD MAL-TREATMENT	SEXUAL VIOLENCE	INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE	YOUTH VIOLENCE	ELDER ABUSE
SOCIAL	Social norms supportive of violence		1,5x		
	High level of inequality			* (no estimate)	

APPENDIX B - CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE BY TYPE						
CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE VICTIMISATION	CHILD MAL-TREATMENT	SEXUAL VIOLENCE	INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE	YOUTH VIOLENCE	ELDER ABUSE	
HEALTH PROBLEMS	Mental and neurological disorders	2,3x	2,5x	2,5x	2,3x	4,7x
	Health risks and behaviours	1,5x	1,8x	1,9x	1,1x	
	Poor general health				2,0x	3,5x
	Communicable disease	2,4x	2,1x	1,6x		
	Sexual and reproductive health problems		3,8x	1,6x		
	Excessive health service use	2,5x				2,1x

APPENDIX B - CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE BY TYPE						
CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE VICTIMISATION	CHILD MAL-TREATMENT	SEXUAL VIOLENCE	INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE	YOUTH VIOLENCE	ELDER ABUSE	
SOCIAL/BEHAVIOURAL PROBLEMS	Pregnancy termination	* (no estimate)	2, 2x			
	Attachment issues	41, 2x				
	Poor emotional functioning	3, 5x				
	Sex work	2, 5x				
	Low life satisfaction	2, 4x				
	Externalising behaviour problems	2, 4x		2, 0x		
	Subsequent perpetration of violence			1, 4x		
	Subsequent violent victimisation			1, 1x		
	Cognitive impairment	1, 8x				
	Poor academic performance	1, 3x			* (no estimate)	
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS	Poor language functioning	1, 3x				
	Gambling	1, 1x				

Appendix C: Schedule of PNP Consultations

Geographic area	SAPS station	SAPS cluster	Municipality	District municipality	Date	Venue
PNP sessions						
Middelpos, Diazville, White City (Saldanha)	Saldanha	Vredenburg	Saldanha Bay	West Coast	12 July 2017	Protea Hotel, Saldanha
Gunya (Gugulethu/Nyanga)	Nyanga & Gugulethu	Nyanga	CoCT Metro	CoCT	28 July 2017	KTC Hall, c/o Mjodo & Ntamo Street, Nyanga
Gugulethu (Lusaka and KTC), Nyanga (Hlazo specific area)						
Paarl East	Paarl East	Winelands	Drakenstein	Cape Winelands	4 August 2017	Mbekweni Thusong Centre
Khayelitsha	Lingelethu West Police	Khayelitsha	CoCT Metro	CoCT	5 September 2017	Mew Way Hall, Khayelitsha
Riebeeck West	Riebeeck West	Milnerton	Swartland	West Coast	19 Oct 2017	Riebeeck West City Hall
Manenberg	Manenberg	Nyanga Cluster	CoCT Metro	CoCT	25 October 2017	Phoenix Secondary School, Silver Stream Road, Manenberg
Safety plan development sessions						

Geographic area	SAPS station	SAPS cluster	Municipality	District municipality	Date	Venue
Middelpos, Diazville, White City (Saldanha)	Saldanha	Vredenburg	Saldanha Bay	West Coast	30 August 2017	Protea Hotel, Saldanha
Gunya (Gugulethu/ Nyanga)	Nyanga & Gugulethu	Nyanga	CoCT Metro		13 September 2017	Zolani Centre, tbc
Groenheuwel, Smartie Town, Chicago, Fairyland	Paarl East	Wineyards	Drakenstein	Cape Winelands	20 September 2017	Mbekweni Thusong Centre,
Khayelitsha	Lingeletu West Police Harare Khayelitsha	Khayelitsha	CoCT Metro		3 October 2017	Oliver R Tambo Community Hall (c/o Mew Way Road & Govan Mbeki Road, Khayelitsha)

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Afrikaans and isiXhosa versions of this publication are available on request.

DISCLAIMER

The English version of this Annual Performance Plan is regarded as the official text.

The Department cannot be held liable for any misinterpretations that may have occurred during the translation process.

VRYWARING

Die Engelse gedeeltes van hierdie Jaarlikse Prestasieplan word geag die amptelike weergawe te wees.

Die Departement aanvaar geen verantwoordelikheid vir moontlike wanvertolkings gedurende die vertalingsproses nie.

INKCAZO

Inguqulelo yesiNgesi yale Inkqubo yogchwanchiso yonyaka ithathwa ngengeyona isebenza ngokusesikweni.

Isebe alinakubekwa tyala, ngazo na iziphoso ezengathi zibe khona ngexesha lenguqulelo yezinye iilwimi.



**Western Cape
Government**

Community Safety

PR 236/2018

ISBN: 978-0-621-46451-1